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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this dissertation is to carry forward the theo¬ 
retical and practical work of the ANISA Model by: (1) elaborating on 
the ANISA Theory of Development as it pertains to pre-numerical think¬ 
ing by contrasting it with the theoretical perspectives of Jean Piaget 
and his colleagues; and (2) developing the outline and supportive 
materials for a training program that will enable parents and teachers 
to facilitate pre-numerical thinking in young children. 
The first objective was addressed through a presentation of the 
ANISA Model which included a discussion of it's Philosophy, the Theory 
of Development, the Theory of Curriculum and the Theory of Pedagogy. 
A similar presentation of the Piagetian Theory was made. Chapter Three 
was devoted to a presentation of Piaget’s views on the development of 
number. A review of major research findings with regard to the develop 
mental sequence of number, the conservation of number, relational 
terminology and conservation, the structure of language, age and the 
iv 
attainment of conservation, and length, density and number research. 
Chapter Four is devoted to an analysis of ANISA's concept of 
learning to learn or learning competence and Piaget's concept of 
equilibration from which are derived the major causal or regulatory 
mechanisms of development as they apply to the period of the develop¬ 
ment of number and logic. Through this analysis, it was concluded 
that the ANISA concept of learning competence and Piaget's notion of 
equilibration describe in the development of the child a similar 
mechanism. That mechanism basically involves gaining conscious control 
over the processes of differentiation, integration and generalization 
through equilibratory mechanisms of conflict between schemes. Internal 
conflict between schemes leads the child first to trial and error 
solutions, compromise judgments and retroactive corrections of apparent 
discrepancies between the perceptual field and logical operations. In 
the last stage of the development of number, the child is able to con¬ 
sciously utilize aspects of the operation of number through the trans¬ 
formational rule structure of reversibility, identity and compensa¬ 
tion. The developmental sequence of number is then described in 
ANISA terminology. This developmental sequence is based upon Piagetian 
theory and research. The result of this analysis was to determine the 
learning to learn of number. 
The second major objective of the dissertation was that of practi¬ 
cal implications for an ANISA parent-teacher training program, as 
derived from the theoretical synthesis of Piagetian number and ANISA's 
learning to learn. A two-part training program was suggested. The 
v 
technique for train- fi^st part utilizes a modularized "audio-tutorial" 
ing parents and teachers in various aspects of number development. 
The modules suggested were: The fundamental properties of number, the 
conservation of number, classification, seriation, and the diagnosis 
of the developmental level of competence. The first unit, the funda¬ 
mental properties of nunber, is then developed in some detail which 
includes objectives, materials, a booklet for parents and teachers, 
and a sample discussion of the fundamental properties of number. The 
second part of the training program places the parents and teachers 
in an actual teaching situation with children. This is conducted 
under the guidance of ANISA trainers, and involves actual implementa¬ 
tion of number experiences with children. 
vi 
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INTRODUCTION 
The number and variety of available models, philosophies and 
theories of educational practice have increased dramatically in recent 
times. Many, having been founded upon sound pedagogical and theoreti¬ 
cal principles, have proved to be effective in at least some measurable 
categories. A wide variety of these programs have been implemented at 
the pre-school level. 
In a recent study, Bissell divided existing pre-school programs 
into four categories based upon their objectives, strategies, and the 
extent of their structure. The four categories were: (1) the 
permissive-enrichment programs; (2) the structured-cognitive programs; 
(3) the structured-informational programs; and (4) the structured- 
environment programs.'*" 
In the permissive-enrichment category were programs such as Bank 
Street, Weikert’s traditional or "Unit" Programs and many Head Start 
Centers. According to Bissell, these programs are "essentially adapta¬ 
tions of adjustment-centered pre-schools . . . the teaching strategies 
2 
(of which) are typically child-centered and permissive." According 
to Weikert, they are characterized by "watching and waiting for the 
1Joan Bissell, "The Cognitive Effects of Pre-School Programs for 
Disadvantaged Children," in Revisiting Early Childhood Education: 
Readings, ed. Joe L. Frost (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 
1973), p. 224. 
2Ibid. , p. 225. 
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child’s needs to emerge and to determine the timing of different 
3 
activities. 
Among programs of the second type, the structured-cognitive pro¬ 
grams, were, for example, the Karnes Ameliorative program, the 
Ypsilanti: Perry-Piagetian Cognitive program. In general, these pro¬ 
grams foster "aptitudes and attitudes directly related to the learning 
processes . . . and they have fostered the development of language, 
conceptual, perceptual and attentional processes through a strategy of 
teacher-directed activities."^ 
Among programs of the third type, the structured-informational 
programs, were versions of the Bereiter-Engelmann model. These pro¬ 
grams have a general goal of teaching specific information through an 
extremely structured program which is wholly teacher-directed. 
The best examples of structured-environment programs are the 
traditional Montessori program and Nimnicht and Meiers "New Nursery 
School" program. In the Montessori program, the children direct their 
own activities within a carefully prepared self-instructive environment. 
"These programs have learning-process goals and a moderate degree of 
structure."-’ Specifically, the Montessori programs "have as their 
3Joan Bissell, "The Cognitive Effects of Pre-School Programs for 
Disadvantaged Children" (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1973), 
p. 225, quoting D. Weikert, "Pre-School Programs: Preliminary Findings," 
in Journal of Special Education, I, 1967, pp. 163-181. 
^Bissell, "The Cognitive Effects of Pre-School Programs for 
Disadvantaged Children," pp. 226-227. 
5Ibid., pp. 227-228. 
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objectives the fostering of growth in ordering and classifying skills, 
arithmetic concepts, attentional and sensory faculties and motor 
coordination. 
Bissell reported significant differences among the programs in 
results of tests in cognitive areas as measured by the Stanford-Binet 
Intelligence Scale, the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, the Illinois 
Test of Psycholinguistic Abilities, and the Metropolitan Readiness 
Test. "Tests for significant differences among groups indicated that 
the performance of children in the Ameliorative (structured-cognitive) 
and the Bereiter-Engelmann (structured-informational) programs were 
significantly better than that of children in the two traditional pro¬ 
grams (permissive-enrichment) and the Montessori programs."^ Remember¬ 
ing that the programs were divided or classified according to their 
objectives, strategies, and the extent of structure, it was found that 
for "disadvantaged children" the structural approach to cognitive 
growth was most effective. 
Citing such analyses as Bissell's is to recognize a need for the 
educational profession to establish itself on a scientific basis, on 
test-proven results. Although Bissell's analysis concerned only cogni¬ 
tive growth, there is a need to show how the above pre-school programs 
have been able to establish scientifically-provable effective results 
across the entire spectrum of human potentiality. The programs have 
6Ibid., pp. 227-228. 
^Ibid., p. 237. 
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tended to be piecemeal to a greater or lesser degree when the "whole" 
human being is considered. In recognition of the strengths of prior 
educational efforts and in view of the need to establish a comprehen¬ 
sive approach, the ANISA model was developed. 
This dissertation is associated with the development of the 
ANISA model which has evolved over the past thirteen years through 
the efforts of Dr. Daniel C. Jordan and his colleagues. At the pres¬ 
ent time, this model would not fit easily into any one of Bissell's 
four types of programs, as it transcends each in some fundamental 
ways, and is at variance with several of them. An important charac¬ 
teristic of the ANISA model is its aspiration to deal developmentally 
with the child in a comprehensive manner; that is, ANISA eventually 
aspires to succeed at producing measurable effects along a comprehen¬ 
sive spectrum of potentialities as the child develops rather than in a 
limited number of cognitive and affective categories. Balanced and 
comprehensive development is one of the keys to the release of human 
potential. 
Another important difference is that ANISA is more than a pre¬ 
school program. It includes parent-training, with concern for the 
quality of prenatal development, emphasizing that nutrition is the key 
to the actualization of biological potential (or achievement of man’s 
biological potential). It is a teacher-training program, and above all, 
because its philosophy is based on the nature of man and not on a 
particular methodology, it can take from all existing successful, 
scientifically effective methods or programs and tailor them into a 
5 
comprehensive program designed to release man's potential across his 
entire spectrum of abilities. 
The breadth of ANISA's philosophy and educational goals provides 
a theoretical umbrella under which the development of specific educa¬ 
tional objectives, strategies and structures can proceed in logical 
consistency with all other specific aspects of the model. As an 
example, this dissertation relates to a specific area of cognitive 
growth which will be developed under the general theoretical umbrella 
and which at a later time will be integrated into the entire compre¬ 
hensive ANISA model. 
Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of this dissertation is to carry forward the theo¬ 
retical and practical work of the ANISA model by: 
(1) elaborating on The ANISA Theory of Development as 
it pertains to pre-numerical thinking by contrast¬ 
ing it with the theoretical perspectives of Jean 
Piaget and his colleagues; and, 
(2) developing the outline and supportive materials for 
a training program that will enable parents and 
teachers to facilitate pre-numerical thinking in 
young children. 
6 
The ANISA Theory of Development and the Need for Elaboration 
The ANISA model is divided into four major aspects: a Philosophy, 
a Theory of Development, a Theory of Curriculum and a Theory of 
Pedagogy. The Theory of Development is derived from the Philosophy 
and in turn provides a broad and logically consistent foudation upon 
which rests its application to both Curriculum and Pedagogy. Chapter 
One contains a discussion of all four related categories of the model. 
Elaboration of aspects of the Theory of Development and their 
consequent application to Curriculum and Pedagogy follow Chapter Three. 
Chapter Two is a presentation of Piaget's Theory of Development. From 
Piagetian theory the specific aspect of cognitive growth which is to 
be applied to the ANISA Theory of Development, namely, pre-numerical 
thinking and the development of logico-mathematical thought (to the 
Piagetian phrases), is derived. A detailed analysis of the development 
of logico-mathematical thought as it applies to the general issues of 
the developmental processes, creativity, learning, environments and 
the nature of interaction with the environments, provide areas of 
concern for the elaboration of the ANISA Theory of Development. This 
analysis will be aided by attempting to find the conjunction between 
the ANISA Theory of Development with that of Jean Piaget and his theory 
of the development of knowledge. In addition, the extensive body of 
research associated with Piagetian theory will be of importance. 
Justification for the thesis that the elaboration of the ANISA 
Theory of Development can occur through an analysis of Piagetian theory 
7 
and research as they relate to number thinking is enhanced when one 
considers that: (1) ANISA as a comprehensive model must rely upon the 
strength of the individual aspects of the program; (2) the individual 
aspects must, in turn, be integrated into the entire model; (3) ANISA 
views mathematics as one of the fundamental symbol systems, the mastery 
of which is important to the actualization of psychological potential¬ 
ity; (4) Piagetian operations established in early childhood have been 
shown to correlate with the "math readiness" of the child when formal 
education is realized, as in elementary school; (5) number thinking is 
the foundation of mathematical abilities; (6) in spite of the funda¬ 
mental nature of mathematical abilities established in the pre-school 
period, little longitudinal research has been directed toward strengthen¬ 
ing its inclusion in curricula. 
It was reported recently (Suydam, Marilyn and Weaver, Fred, 1975) 
that many surveys have been conducted assessing the mathematical 
knowledge acquired by children prior to their entry into school (five 
or six years old). Cited, for example, were: Buchingham and MacLatchy 
(1930); Brownwe11 (1941); Ilg and Ames (1951); Bjouerud (1960); Rickard 
(1967); Heimgartner (1968); Rea and Reys (1970). "Unfortunately, the 
generalization that can be made from such studies are limited for 
several reasons: 
(1) Usually groups were relatively small, and readily 
available groups, rather than groups representative 
of the total population, were used. 
(2) Few surveys have been replicated; most were con¬ 
ducted at only one point in time, as well as in only 
one locality. As with most surveys, the question 
8 
arises whether the findings would be accurate for 
other children in other places. 
(3) The methods of collecting information varied. 
Some used individual interviews; others used test 
groups. Some used one question to affirm a par¬ 
ticular aspect; others asked many. Also the depth 
of the questions varied from those requiring 
single-worded responses to those requiring manipu¬ 
lation of objects or, rarely, reasons for answers."8 
Later analysis will show that the foundation of mathematical think¬ 
ing is established in this pre-school period. Most curriculum efforts 
whose thrust concerns mathematical development have been at the ele¬ 
mentary school level, which occurs after the foundation is established. 
Research cited by the above authors corroborate the importance of 
Piagetian operations (which are established prior to formal math train¬ 
ing) with respect to "math readiness" and success in formal training 
[Almy, Chittendon, and Miller (1966); Robinson (1968); Steffe (1967); 
LeBlanc (1968); Dodwell (1961); and Wheatley (1968)]. These results, 
combined with the strength of the theoretical constructs of ANISA and 
Piaget, would suggest not only the justification of, but even the 
necessity of including "number thinking" as one aspect of ANISA’s 
comprehensive program as it applies to pre-school aged children. 
Teacher and Parent Training 
In order for this theoretical material to be useful in a 
8Marilyn Suydam and Fred Weaver, "Research on Learning Mathema¬ 
tics," Mathematics Learning in Early Childhood, in Thirty-Seventh 
Yearbook of The National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, ed. 
Joseph N. Payne (Reston ."Virginia : The National Council of Teachers of 
Mathematics, 1975), pp* 48-49. 
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pedagogical sense, it must eventually be incorporated into a complete 
training program. An outline of the type of training program, its 
organization, the materials, etc., implied by the complex and detailed 
manner in which development proceeds can be developed within the scope 
of this dissertation. Since one of ANISA's goals is to lay a scien¬ 
tific foundation for the training of teachers, such a training program 
can be of great assistance to the implementation of the ANISA model. 
The training program will be organized around the developmental 
sequence and hierarchy of relationships found within the development 
of number thinking. Its purpose will be to assist the adult learner, 
in this case the parent and teacher, to experience the development of 
this complex concept in a manner similar to the child's development. 
The adult will then understand the processes which enable the child to 
develop at an optimum rate towards a full understanding of number, and 
the adult will be able to function as an effective guide to the child's 
interaction with the environment. 
It is important to state that the ANISA model deals with the 
education of the whole child, cognitive development being but one 
aspect of that whole, and that number is but one aspect of cognitive 
development, albeit an important one. This training program for 
parents and teachers must then at some point be incorporated into a 
training program which integrates all aspects of development. 
10 
CHAPTER I 
THE AMISA MODEL 
ANISA: A General Definition 
ANISA means 'tree of life' and symbolically represents never- 
ending growth and fruition in the context of protection and 
shelter, and signifies the blending of the useable and fruit¬ 
ful past with a new sense of the future. ... It has cul¬ 
minated (thirteen years of research) in the formulation of a 
philosophical base, from which we derived a theory of develop¬ 
ment, a theory of curriculum and a theory of teaching—all in 
the service of one overarching goal: the creation of a com¬ 
prehensive educational system that would be unique in its 
power to release human potential.^ 
ANISA: A Comprehensive Educational Model 
The rationale, justification and historical perspective for the 
development of a comprehensive educational model has been documented by 
Daniel C. Jordan, Director; Donald T. Streets, Assistant Director; and 
ANISA staff members and will therefore not be attempted here. Germane 
to this discussion, however, is ANISA's foundation upon a refreshing 
view of man and his potentialities, on the bold assertion that man is 
the apex of creation and is capable of actualizing his unlimited poten¬ 
tialities. 
For practical purposes, human potential has been divided into two 
basic categories: biological and psychological. The ANISA Theory of 
^Daniel C. Jordan and Donald T. Streets, "The ANISA Model: A Mew 
Basis for Educational Planning," Young Children, Vol. XXVIII, No. 5 
(June 1973), p. 290. 
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Development fixes nutrition as the key factor in the actualization of 
the former and learning as the key factor in the actualization of the 
latter. Psychological potentialities are broken down into five 
categories: the psycho-motor, perceptual, cognitive, affective and 
volitional areas. The actualization 'of potentiality is not viewed as 
a description of an end state but rather as indications of man's 
ability to continually move beyond himself, to transcend his present 
state by establishing goals, objectives and ideals (anticipated future 
states) and to organize the use of energy around these ideals. The 
capacity to create ideals and respond to them as "lures" makes action 
purposive and establishes man as a spiritual being, rather than a 
material being whose behavior is mechanistically determined. The con¬ 
cept of the spiritual nature of man is philosophically related to the 
Whiteheadian notions of immanence and transcendence. Immanence refers 
to the "indwellingness" of the past (memory) as it is brought to bear 
on the present, and transcendence is a state of preparation or anticipa¬ 
tion of the future. The conscious control over creating new states of 
being in all five areas of potentiality is described as learning 
competence. Stated in another way, conscious control over the process 
of learning is viewed as the key to the release of human potential; it 
is the ability to "learn how to learn" or the ability to consciously 
modify and control learning behavior. 
This view of the unfoldment of potentiality leads to a definition 
of man which is based upon purposive activity. 
12 
A Definition of Man 
The chief feature which distinguishes man as an organism 
from man as mechanism is creativity guided by purpose and 
expressed by the two fundamental capacities of man, namely, 
his ability to know and his ability to love.2 
The power made evident through Creativity enables man to structure 
the past, the present and the future in a form that enables him to move 
continually beyond himself. As man's capacities gradually unfold or 
become actualized, new foundations for creative advance are built. The 
importance of this principle can be seen when it is examined in the 
light of the one or two billion year process through which man has 
evolved. Man's position among all other living organisms which have 
evolved is one of preeminence. Although his preeminence is not of a 
physical nature, all of his physical adaptations possessed are well 
suited to serve the real elements of his preeminence, his capacity to 
know and to love. The expression of these characteristics has allowed 
man to become the dominant creature on earth. Dobzhansky observes, "It 
happens, however, that by all sensible criteria of progress man is 
superior to all other creatures. . . The conclusive evidence of man's 
superior position is that he, and he alone, has evolved the genotype 
which enables him to develop and maintain culture." ANISA views all 
of the elements of culture to be expressions of the two basic capacities 
of the individual, which are, in broad definition, his ability to know 
2Ibid. , p. 292. 
^Theodosius Dobzhansky, Evolution, Genetics, and Man (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1955), p. 373. 
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and to love. Agriculture, science and technology are expressions of 
the capacity to know, whereas idealism, altruism, emotions, affectively 
and social unity are examples of the capacity to love. 
Man by nature is conscious of his existence, his powers and his 
potentials. The function of education as conceived by ANISA, therefore, 
is to assist man to assume conscious control over these powers and 
therefore over his destiny, a destiny which is dependent upon trans¬ 
lating the latent potentialities into actuality at an optimum rate. 
Whitehead's philosophy of the organism has been drawn upon heavily 
in developing ANISA's philosophy. It provides "a new vision that can 
integrate the massive knowledge about child development in a way that 
illumines the nature of man and accounts for the phenomenon of purpose 
and its role in continual actualization of human potentialities." 
The capacity for consciousness itself is inherent in the 
nature of man, but its quality is dependent upon the experi¬ 
ence of the organism, the accumulation of its past stored 
as memory (a form of immanence) and the contrast of that 
past with the experience of the immediate present in prepa¬ 
ration or anticipation of the future (a form of transcen¬ 
dence) . These qualities of immanence and transcendence— 
prerequisites of consciousness and self-awareness—define 
man's essential being in spiritual rather than material 
terms, a central proposition of the philosophical basis of 
the model.^ 
The word "spiritual" as it relates to man's being—expressing the 
qualities of immanence and transcendence—is used to suggest an onto¬ 
logical principle in man's becoming which is "evidenced by man's 
ability to structure the unknown and to form ideals which express 
^Jordan and Streets, "The ANISA Model," p. 292. 
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subjective aim or intention which in turn guides the process of 
becoming—perpetual self-transcendence."5 
Conscious control over the processes of becoming and as a result 
control over what one develops into as an ontological principle is not 
suggested by current models of biological evolution, nor does conscious 
control reflect back on vitalistic accounts of evolution. Although 
there is not as yet a single universally accepted theory of biological 
evolution, Darwin's natural selection and Lamark's environmental influ¬ 
ence model have provided a foundation for modern interpretations such 
as Waddington's and Piaget’s. Theirs is the recognition that life is 
an organization which directs and places limits on the nature of the 
interaction which can occur between the environment and the organism.* ** 
The control and influence exercised by the structure or organization 
itself advanced by the ANISA theory is very closely allied to 
Waddington's and Piaget's, although Piaget mainly explains development 
in terms of autoregulatory and equilibration mechanisms which normally 
depend upon the conscious activity, whereas ANISA places greater 
emphasis on the determining aspect of conscious control; i.e., develop¬ 
ment is fundamentally determined by purposive activity and hence cannot 
be automatic or autoregulatory in nature. For ANISA the advent of 
immanence and transcendence is unique to man; however, man is not solely 
5Ibid., p. 292. 
**For a more complete discussion of mechanisms of evolution, see 
p. in Chapter II. 
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accounted for through them as these developmental principles do not 
operate to exclude all levels of evolutionary mechanisms for all must 
be incorporated if the origin and development of man's potential is to 
be fully explained. 
The Process of Becoming 
ANISA recognizes and explains becoming through three interrelated 
processes: growth, development and maturation. Maturation refers to 
the genetically determined aspect of the development of the physical 
organism, such as the nervous system which requires a timetable of some 
fifteen years to reach full maturity. Growth refers simply to an 
increase in size. Hence, our concern is centered on what is meant by 
development. "The theory broadly defines development as the process of 
translating potentiality (biological and psychological) into actuality; 
makes that process synonymous with creativity as the fundamental and 
inherent dynamic characteristic of the organism; establishes inter¬ 
action with the environment as the general means by which the process 
is sustained. 
Learning—The Key Factor in the 
Release of Man's Potential 
The Key factor in the process of translating psychological poten¬ 
tialities into actuality is learning. It is fundamental because it 
7Ibid., p. 293. 
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implies gaining conscious control over the process of becoming. The 
conscious control is manifest when one is "in charge of the process of 
knowing how to learn." Knowing how to learn is what is meant by learn¬ 
ing competence. 
From a general perspective,. the strength of this thesis is tied 
to the idea that creativity is the fundamental and dynamic characteris¬ 
tic of the organism. As a dynamic, it is related in a larger sense to 
motivation, a force which is thought to be behind all learning. The 
most powerful form is intrinsic motivation which in ANISA terms "comes 
from a subjective confirmation that competence is being gained."8 9 When 
a child's relationship with his parents, teacher and environment is a 
confirming one, i.e., when from the environment affirmative support and 
protection are received, then progress is made at an optimum rate. In 
this "feedback" system, Robert White (1959) has suggested a term for 
this sense of competence, this motive force behind all action and learn¬ 
ing, this sense of well being when growth is occurring. He calls it 
"effectance"—qualified by Jordan as "a psychogenic motive which arises 
Q 
out of the structure of consciousness." The term psychogenic in this 
case means structured in the consciousness as opposed to viscerogenic 
(motives such as thirst, hunger, or sex) or neurogenic (motives of 
sensation and reflexes). 
The unity of all existence represented in man is dynamic; 
it is experienced as a consciousness in which stored 
8Ibid., p. 296. 
9Ibid., p. 296. 
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accumulations of past experiences are brought to bear upon 
immediate circumstances in anticipation of the future_an 
a^iCuPati°n felt in the iiranediate present as purpose fused 
with hope and aspiration. Man is thus a conscious creature 
capable of creating his future out of his past by virtue of 
decisions he makes in the immediate present. The quality of 
those decisions determines the rate by which his potentiali¬ 
ties are translated into actuality. It is that process of 
translating potentiality into actuality which the philosophy 
underlying the ANISA model illumines. Learning, very broadly 
defined, is the essential dynamic of that process and gaining 
conscious control over the process is what is meant by learn¬ 
ing competence. 
Now that intrinsic motivation has been related to an inherent 
dynamic, creativity, and this has been given the name "effectance" and 
has been described as the force behind the process of becoming, more 
can be specifically said about the conscious control of this activity 
or process through learning. 
The Process of Differentiation, Integration, 
Generalization and Learning Competence 
Competence depends on gaining conscious control over the processes 
of learning. Competence or conscious control is itself something which 
must be learned. It is learning how to learn. It is gained when the 
environment of the child established by his parents and by an educa¬ 
tional system such as ANISA helps "students to develop an inner accep¬ 
tance of responsibility for developing their own infinitude of poten¬ 
tialities through the acknowledgement and cultivation of a sense of 
■^Daniel C. Jordan and Raymond P. Shepard, "The Philosophy of the 
ANISA Model," World Order, Vol. 7, No. 1, Fall 1972, p. 295. 
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purpose as it relates to aspirations and ideals."11 
Another requirement of learning competence is the capacity to 
utilize the fundamental processes or mechanisms of learning. These are 
the processes of differentiation, integration and generalization. 
Jordan has defined learning competence and its processes as "the 
ability to differentiate experience, whether internal or external, into 
separate elements, to integrate them in a new way, thereby providing 
new information, new feelings, new skills and new perceptions which may 
or may not become expressed immediately in some form of overt behavior, 
12 
and to generalize the integration." 
The efficacy and power of this concept of learning competence can 
be best understood and judged after an explanation of five related 
aspects of ANISA theory. They are: 
(1) A specific analysis of the relevance of the processes 
of differentiation, integration and generalization to 
general learning theories. 
(2) An analysis of the five areas of human potentiality 
as outlined by ANISA (Psycho-motor, Perceptual, 
Cognitive, Affective and Volitional) with respect to 
differentiation, integration and generalization acting 
as common denominators of all types of learning 
reflected in different categories of potentiality. 
^-Jordan and Streets, "The ANISA Model," p. 295. 
l2Ibid. , p. 297. 
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(3) The definition of the environments (Physical, Human, 
Unknown and the Self) which provide sites of inter¬ 
action of experience specified in the definition of 
learning competence and their integration with the 
processes of differentiation, integration and 
generalization. 
(4) The achievement of competence as it relates to stages 
of development and the various forms which differen¬ 
tiation, integration and generalization take in each 
respective stage. 
(5) A description of behavior expressed as actualized 
potentialities which provides criteria for judging 
learning competence. 
1. The Processes of Differentiation, Integration and Generalization 
as Common Denominators of a Variety of Learning Theories 
In 1971, Jordan researched a wide variety of learning theories 
specifically for the purpose of finding common denominators of learning. 
These included "Gayne's eight types of learning, Walter's brain wave 
theory, Tolman's sign learning, Lewin's field theory, Snygg and Comb's 
perception theory, Bandura's modeling theory, Moxrcer's two-factor 
learning theory, various mediational theories, Piaget s theory, the 
TOTE theory of Miller, Primbam and Galantar, Skinner's work on condi¬ 
tioning, and Harlow's theory of learning sets."13 Jordan concluded 
13Daniel C. Jordan, "Learning Competence and the Release of Human 
Potential," unpublished manuscript. Xerox, December 1971. 
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from this study that the processes of differentiation, integration and 
generalization applied as general or common denominators across all of 
these theories. The following is the definition of learning competence 
derived from that study. 
Learning competence, then refers to a capacity to abstract 
(differentiate) or select from what is stored in one's 
memory about the process of learning experienced earlier 
that is relevant to a present learning task and apply it 
appropriately to the task. To do this 'appropriately' will 
involve some kind of association (integration) of the dif¬ 
ferentiated or abstracted aspects of previous learning 
processes with the requirements of a present task.-^ 
Generalization was not included at that time, although it is 
obvious that any integration gains in utility if it can be generalized 
to wider fields of application, and the ability to generalize thus 
increases the competence of the human being as a learner. 
An analysis of some aspects of the relationship between ANISA's 
learning competence model (differentiation, integration and generaliza¬ 
tion) and Piaget's model (assimilation, accommodation and equilibration) 
as they relate to number development will be made later in this work. 
2. Categories of Potentiality 
One of the most important elements of ANISA theory is the recogni¬ 
tion of the breadth of human development accompanied by attempts to 
specify the developmental processes fundamental to different types of 
potentiality. These developmental processes are incorporated into what 
is hoped will be a comprehensive approach to curriculum and human 
14 Ibid., p. 56. 
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development. Five major types of potentiality have been identified, 
the first three of which most school systems deal with in some fashion 
(although not from an ANISA perspective): psycho-motor, perceptual and 
cognitive; the remaining two are affective and volitional. It is 
important to recognize both the usefulness and the limits of these 
definitions, as on the one hand they seem to specify the type of educa¬ 
tional experiences needed while on the other hand they may lead to frag¬ 
mented conceptions of the human being; in reality there is no fragmenta¬ 
tion as the areas of potential overlap. 
Learning is the key to the release of each one of these areas of 
potentiality, hence it is now appropriate to explore the application of 
learning competence to each area and to suggest how the differentiation, 
integration and generalization might differ. 
Psycho-motor potentialities: "Competence in this area refers to 
a capacity to coordinate, control and direct the movement and position 
of the voluntary muscles.Various motor activities must be differ¬ 
entiated, integrated and generalized in order that all of the general 
motor activities become established as part of the motor base of the 
child. Some of the processes recognized are balance and posture, loco¬ 
motion, manipulation receipt and propulsion. Since much of this 
activity occurs at the beginning of a child’s life, and since develop¬ 
ment is continuous and progressive, much that is established in the 
psycho-motor base forms the foundation for the other areas of 
■^Jordan and Streets, "The ANISA Model," p. 298. 
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potentiality: perceptual, cognitive, affective and volitional poten¬ 
tialities. 
Perceptual potentialities: "Perceptual competence refers to the 
capacity to differentiate sensory information and integrate that infor¬ 
mation into generalizable patterns which constitute interpretations of 
reality that enable the organism to make meaningful decisions and to 
,,16 
act. Some of the processes recognized to this date are associated 
with: vision, audition, olfaction (smell), taste, the cutaneous senses 
(touch, cold, hot) and the vestibular senses (equilibrium). When com¬ 
bined, these processes establish a structure analogous to the motor 
base, namely the perceptual base. This base not only has functions 
related to perception itself, but with internal structuring and organi¬ 
zation incoming stimuli are interpreted "in terms of past experience, 
present needs, and aspirations or intuitions which concern the 
future."'*'7 Differentiation, integration and generalization act as a 
set of processes governed by the perceptual base leading to further 
structuring of perceptual knowledge. Changes in the perceptual base 
assist to keep the perceptual world of reality in concert with changes 
in the cognitive or affective worlds of reality. 
Cognitive Potentialities: Cognitive competence evolves through 
successive stages of development and has its origin in the psycho—motor 
and perceptual bases. Cognitive competence, which is most closely 
■^Ibid. , p. 299. 
17Ibid. , p. 299. 
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related to the "knowing" end of the bi-polar axis of man's poten¬ 
tiality, the ability to know and to love, represents one of the main 
avenues through which man moves beyond himself in the creative advance 
into novelty; although cognition has its origins in a psycho-motor and 
perceptual base (physical reality) it moves beyond them into the world 
of abstract knowledge. This advance represents a large portion of what 
is described as consciousness and it accounts for much of man's adap¬ 
tive control over his environment. In knowledge is the construction of 
man's reality which is by nature unlimited in possibilities. 
Some of the basic thinking processes which have been identified 
involve operations such as: analysis, syntheses, classification, seria- 
tion, number relations, deductive and inductive inference, interpola¬ 
tion, extrapolation, analogy, conservation and transitive relations. 
Many of these operations are interrelated with other operations. All 
are gradually structured through interaction with man's environments 
over time. All involve the abilities to transform, displace, connect, 
and combine the abstractions or differentiations of thought. Thought 
begins with differentiations which are integrated or combined in some 
fashion according to the rules of the structure or operation dealing 
with the abstraction, and is completed when the integration is 
generalized to new situations. 
Affective Potentialities: Affective competence "refers to the 
ability to organize one's emotions and feelings that energize the 
system and support in a positive manner the release of further 
24 
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potentiality." Affective competence refers to the ability to love, 
the second aspect of the bi-polor axis, referred to earlier. "The 
organization of emotional life depends on being able to differentiate 
emotions, integrate them in reference to objects, events or ideals and 
to generalize them in ways that provide basic stability in life."19 
Volitional Potentialities: Volitional competence "is the capacity 
to form ultimate aims, differentiate them into operable goals and 
integrate them into a perpetual flow of intentional behavior directed 
toward the achievement of those goals.' Volitional competence is at 
the core of conscious control; i.e., is central to man achieving control 
over his destiny. Moreover it is essential to the process of translating 
potentiality into actuality. Alfred North Whitehead terms this process 
"concrescence" (1929). "Concrescence not only includes everything 
normally conveyed by the word development but also encompasses man's 
unique ability to go beyond himself—the ability to accumulate the past, 
bring it to bear on the present while structuring the future, thereby 
moving perpetually beyond any present state of being. Learning is the 
means of that 'moving beyond' which Whitehead calls the 'creative 
21 
advance into novelty.'" 
Volition, so often overlooked in today's educational world, is at 
18Ibid., P- 300. 
19Ibid., P- 300. 
20Ibid., P- 300-301 
21Ibid. , P- 295. 
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the very heart of the construction "learning competence." It charac¬ 
terizes the ontological principle spoken of earlier, namely, that learn¬ 
ing competence depends on a conscious activity which is directed by 
intention, will, aim and purpose. The role of volition in learning is 
applied to the very processes of learning competence when Jordan and 
Streets state: "The processes of differentiation, integration, and 
generalization are neither random or haphazard. In most instances, 
they are directed by intention or subjective aim, which determines what 
becomes abstracted and how the abstracted or differentiated elements 
22 
are then integrated and generalized." 
3. The Classification of Man's Environments 
The classification of man’s environments is important to learning 
competence from two perspectives. First, learning is an active process 
(differentiation, integration and generalization) which occurs when the 
learner interacts with the environment. This can be summarized by the 
following simple diagram: 
Potentiality-^ Actuality 
Experience (encounters and interactions 
with the environment which 
sustains biological matura¬ 
tion and learning)23 
22Ibid. , p. 297. 
23Jordan, "Learning Competence and the Release of Human Potential 
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Second, the content of curriculum is information about the world 
organized around these environments. These environments are: 
The physical environment: includes everything except 
human beings. It can be broken down into three 
sub-categories; mineral, vegetable and animal. The 
curriculum content expressed in this environment is 
exemplified by the following examples: mathematics, 
natural sciences, natural history, and technology. 
The human environment: includes all human beings and is 
characterized by such curriculum content as language, 
communications (reading, writing and speaking), 
social sciences, human relations, ethics, and other 
unspecified aspects of culture. 
The unknown environment: includes all that we know that 
we do not know; i.e., man has the ability to 
describe what he does not know. Curriculum content 
areas are art, aesthetics, philosophy, literature, 
religion, etc. 
The Self: represents a combination of the physical, 
humar. and the unknown environments. "The self is 
a special case of the human environment, special 
because for a particular person it becomes the most 
constant aspect of his total environment. It can 
never be abandoned or left behind. Though con¬ 
stantly present, it is also changing. Whitehead 
reminds us that process and a Self require each 
othe1'; in separation all meaning evaporates and 
neither can be understood. The forms of process 
derive their character from the individuals involved 
and the environments in which they exist; the charac¬ 
ters of the individuals can only be understood in 
terms of the process in which they are implicated. 
... As the self interacts with the environment, 
its potentialities (expressed through the processes) 
are actualized—that is, they become powers."24 
24Michae] F. Kalinowski and Daniel C. Jordan, "Being and Becoming 
The ANISA Theory of Development," World Order, Vol. 7, Ho. A, p. 21; 
Donald T. Streets and Daniel C. Jordan, "Guiding the Process of 
Becoming: The ANISA Theories of Curriculum and Teaching, World Order, 
Vol. 7, No. A, p. 33. 
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The characterization of the environments with which the learner 
interacts is important when attempting to describe the nature of the 
learning, hence, the nature of the differentiation, integration and 
generalization which occurs. This is especially important when consid¬ 
ered by the teacher who is responsible for organizing the type of 
environment, which by its organization may encourage a type of dif¬ 
ferentiation, integration, or generalization. 
As "differentiation, integration, and generalization comprise the 
common denominator of all types of learning reflected in the different 
categories of potentialities ..." (psycho-motor, perceptual, etc.) 
and as "the child develops through an interaction with his total 
2 5 
environment" (physical, human, etc.), then the processes of dif¬ 
ferentiation, integration and generalization must mediate the inter¬ 
action with the environments. 
For example, as the child interacts with the physical environment 
various cognitive potentials may be exercised and developed. Streets 
and Jordan26 describe an example of the way in which the physical 
environment can be arranged to facilitate differentiation, integration 
and generalization in pursuit of the development of the cognitive 
process of inductive inference. The specific content is Archimedes' 
principle of bouyancy which states that a floating body sinks until it 
25Street and Jordan, "Guiding the Process of Becoming," pp. 30, 
34. 
26 Ibid., p. 37. 
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displaces its own weight in water. Materials suggested are a water 
table and a bottle cap. Initially the empty cap floats; however, as 
the child adds water drop by drop (adding weight to the cap), it 
gradually sinks lower and lower. If three or four caps are used 
simultaneously, each with a different amount of water in the cap, 
a comparison (or differentiation) can be made as to the effect of dif¬ 
ferent weights. This comparison is extended (integrated) when all four 
caps are considered simultaneously, at which time an inference regard¬ 
ing both the effect of weight in the specific instance and in the 
generalized condition to other similar objects placed in the water 
table can be made. 
The classification and definition of each environment allows 
prescription of the type of interaction which is appropriate in an 
ANISA classroom where the types of experiences reinforce the content 
to be developed as well as the processes of differentiation, integra¬ 
tion and generalization. 
The processes of differentiation, integration and generalization 
remain fundamental across all forms of interaction which are incorpo¬ 
rated in the ANISA curriculum. However, the type of interaction and 
content varies depending upon the environment interacted with. 
To apply the basic principle underlying the achievement of 
learning competence look for the possibilities of express¬ 
ing differentiation and integration in any given situation, 
and make the alterations in the situation needed to provide 
such opportunities; then make certain the child can take 
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advantage of those opportunities appropriate to his develop¬ 
mental level.27 
Mention of developmental level brings us to a consideration of the 
relationship between stages and learning competence. 
4. Stages of Development and Learning Competence 
Development from an ANISA perspective is viewed as an orderly 
process to which there is a rhythm which is characterized by pattern 
and timing. 
Pattern. In development, pattern is reflected in sequence. 
Because development is an orderly process and because we 
conceive it to be any change which has a continuous direc¬ 
tion and which culminates in a phase that is qualitatively 
new, we define a developmental sequence as the order of 
those changes in an organism that yield relatively perma¬ 
nent but novel increments not only in its structure but in 
its modes of functioning as well. ° 
The increments of change are assumed by some theorists to occur in 
a universally invariant pattern which gives rise to the notion of stage, 
as each stage is fundamentally different from the preceding stage and is 
viewed as a prerequisite to its successor. Philosophical justification 
for adopting a stage-related-sequence of development is found in 
ANISA's reliance upon Alfred N. Whitehead and Michael Polyani. Polyani 
"refers to the hierarchical structure of creation, rising from inani¬ 
mate to the living and on to the subsequent layers of each biotic level, 
as the process of emergence which has culminated in the reality of man. 
27Jordan, "Learning Competence and the Release of Human Potential, 
p. 59. 
2®Kalinowski and Jordan, "Being and Becoming, p. 22. 
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"In Whitehead's terms, the already realized data when fused with sub¬ 
jective aim or purpose, enables one to transcend that 'boundary' and 
attain a higher level of organizational complexity."29 Whitehead has 
identified here subjective aim or purpose as the causal factor which 
enables passage from one stage to another. In addition, because Jordan 
found differentiation and integration to be common to all of the learn¬ 
ing theories referred to earlier, one can hypothesize that they are 
three substages which characterize the orderly progression through a 
stage. The three substages are: (1) differentiation, (2) integration, 
and (3) generalization. 
Recalling that learning competence is motivated by Whitehead's 
subjective aim or purpose, the above stages can be related to the 
gradual unfoldment and development of intentioned behavior. "The 
orderly process of development is guided by conscious or unconscious 
intention or subjective aim, which determines what becomes abstracted, 
and how the abstracted or differentiated elements are integrated and 
generalized. "3<9 
The second major aspect of rhythm is timing. As pattern or a 
theory of stages applies universally to all children, the concept of 
timing is meant to apply to the individual child who develops at his 
own individual rate. The development or unfoldment of potentiality, a 
process to which an educational model must be sensitive, occurs within 
29Ibid. , pp. 23-24. 
30Ibid., p. 23. 
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the individual child. 
The concept of timing has also been extended to the hypothesized 
presence of sensitive periods within development. "A sensitive period 
is a limited period during which an organism is particularly amenable 
to certain experiences that will usually bring about significant and 
lasting changes in tissue growth, physiological functioning, and/or 
psychological functioning."31 in a broad educational sense the concept 
of a sensitive period adds to the general concept of stage when optimum 
growth factors are sought. This becomes even more important when some 
sensitive periods are thought to be critical periods. "If the suscepti¬ 
bility to a particular developmental modifier is limited only to the 
sensitive period and if the presence or absence of that modifier 
during the sensitive period results in permanent damage or change, the 
32 
sensitive period should be designated a critical period." 
Both the concept of the sensitive period and the more limited 
critical period are hypothetical constructs at this time, as little 
psychological research has been conducted which would support them. 
From an educational perspective, they are valuable hypotheses to be 
explored, for if they do exist they are obviously of great importance 
to the release of all of man's potential. 
It should be noted that the notion of stages in development is 
not central to the ANISA Theory of Development. Stage has been explored 
31Ibid., p. 24. 
32Ibid., p. 24. 
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by ANISA staff members as an adjunct to the central theory and the 
general conclusion has been that stage in no way contradicts but, in 
fact, may lend some of the needed specificity to general concepts such 
as learning competence. At this time, however, no recognized pattern 
to development has been found which cuts across all of the domains of 
man s potentials, although patterns have been recognized in each of the 
domains separately. A close and natural connection has been noted 
between the psycho—motor base and perceptual base as precursors to 
cognitive development, and thus a notion of stage has begun to emerge. 
Further, one attempt to generalize stage has been made in the article 
by Kalinowski and Jordan (1973). 
It is my intent to show later in this work that a necessary con¬ 
nection must be made between Piagetian notion of stage and the achieve¬ 
ment of learning competence, as they relate to number development. As 
learning competence relates to the processes of learning through dif¬ 
ferentiation, integration and generalization and as Piaget recognizes 
that the manner or process by which man relates to his environment 
changes in its fundamental character through a series of invariantly 
ordered stages in the cognitive domain, then the processes of dif¬ 
ferentiation, integration and generalization must fundamentally change 
form and evolve through each stage. 
5. A Description of Behavior Expressed as Actualized Potentiali¬ 
ties Which Provides Criteria for Judging Learning Competence 
Criteria for judging learning competence must fundamentally and 
broadly be based upon behavior evidence of the conscious control over 
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the processes of learning; namely, differentiation, integration and 
generalization. Diagnostic instruments need to be designed to analyze 
the child’s ability in a learning situation, i.e., his ability to first 
differentiate aspects of experience arising out of the environment 
interacted with, then integrate them as required in many cognitive 
inference schemes or schemes where some sort of coordination between 
the attributes is required, as in conservation exercises, and finally 
to generalize what has been learned to new situations. 
On a more specific level, learning competence becomes manifest 
as each of the five areas of potentiality becomes actualized. Compe¬ 
tence in the psycho-motor domain, for example, would be described by a 
wide variety or behaviors which manifest the ability to control, 
coordinate and direct the movement and position of the voluntary muscles. 
Specific examples among the wide variety of psycho-motor compe¬ 
tencies involve balance, posture, locomotion and manipulations of many 
sorts. In the cognitive domain, competency would manifest itself in 
many of the traditional areas included in curriculum, such as language, 
math, reading, etc. In each of these broad cognitive areas are many 
specific abilities. In mathematics and in number relations, for 
example, are found such abilities as classification, of which there 
are many types such as simple classifications or hierarchical classifi¬ 
cations that are eventually extended to include the quantitative 
properties of number. The volitional domain is generally characterized 
by the ability to differentiate purpose into operable goals and inte¬ 
grate them into a perpetual flow of intentional behavior directed 
towards the achievement of goals. Some of the processes which relate 
to the development of volition and therefore to possible areas of 
diagnostic analysis are "attention, goal-setting, self-arousal, 
perseverance, effecting closure and fantasizing a state of goal attain¬ 
ment."33 
Higher order competencies comprise the most complex levels of 
evidence of learning competence as they represent a fusion of all five 
areas of potentiality, each one contributing in various proportions to 
any specific higher-order competency, in combination with attitudes and 
values. The higher-order competencies are technological, moral, and 
spiritual, and personal effectance which is a combination of the other 
three. Higher-order competencies develop with respect to each of the 
environments described previously. For example, technological compe¬ 
tence results from an interaction with the physical environment. Each 
one of the five areas of human potential is developed in various degrees 
in this interaction with the physical environment. As potentialities 
are actualized, they are structured. These resultant structures are 
called attitudes and values. Each higher-order competency rests on its 
corresponding value base. Thus, technological competence rests on 
material values; moral competence rests on social values; and philo¬ 
sophical competence rests on religious values. 
One of the important contributions of the ANISA model deals with 
moral competence. Individual moral competence is recognized by ANISA 
33Streets and Jordan, "Guiding the Process of Becoming," p. 33. 
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as a crucial expression of societal responsibility. One aspect of this 
competency delineated by ANISA is the recognition of the unity of man¬ 
kind which is a fusion of information about mankind with social atti¬ 
tudes and values. This aspect and many others necessary to the well¬ 
being of specific societies and mankind in general comprise moral 
competence. 
Personal effectance is the "highest" of the higher-order compe¬ 
tencies because it represents an integration of technological compe¬ 
tence, moral competence and philosophical competence. Personal 
effectance is fundamental to expression of creativity in the human 
being, is fundamental to a person's sense of well being about himself 
and hence governs mastery of dealing with the environments and "thus 
,,34 
the capacity for self-transcendence and continuing development. 
The ANISA Theory of Curriculum and Teaching 
The ANISA theories of Curriculum and Pedagogy are logical deriva¬ 
tives of the Theory of Development presented in previous pages. In 
support of its logical relation to the Theory of Development, specific 
criteria have been established and met by the theories. Prior to the 
practical implementation of the model which has occurred in subsequent 
years, Jordan (1971) established five criteria which provided guidelines 
for the development of a Theory of Learning which would guide the Theory 
of Curriculum: 
34Jordan and Streets, "The ANISA Model," p. 302. 
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(1) They (components of a Theory of Learning) should 
provide the basis for understanding all types and 
processes of human learning (i.e., they should be 
as comprehensive as possible). 
(2) They should shed light on what kinds of environ¬ 
ments, forces, factors, or experiences stimulate 
learning. 
(3) They should account for things in the environment 
or within the individual which inhibit or block 
learning. 
(4) They should enable us to make fairly reliable pre¬ 
dictions about outcomes. 
(5) They should enable us to generate a variety of 
hypotheses about learning competence which can 
be tested out so that we can begin to identify 
the really critical factors in the teaching¬ 
learning process.35 
Most of the criteria presented here have been discussed in pre¬ 
vious sections and will be reviewed here as they apply to the Theory 
of Curriculum. Foshay and Beilin have also briefly outlined a few 
additional criteria which have been accepted by Jordan and colleagues 
with respect to the Theory of Curriculum. 
When a comprehensive curriculum theory is built, it will 
have to take into account not only the learning methods 
and teaching methods (strategies of instruction and the 
like), but also the knowledge to be learned, the nature of 
the student who will learn it, and the nature of the 
societal responsibility shared by teacher and student. 
For if education is a moral affair before it is a techni¬ 
cal affair, then the grounds for moral behavior have to be 
incorporated in one's theory of educational action. 
Jordan, "Learning Competence and the Release of Human Potential," 
pp. 8-9. 
36"Curriculum" in Robert L. Ebel, et al., eds.. Encyclopedia of 
Educational Research, Fourth Edition, N. 2 quoted in Donald T. Streets 
and Daniel C. Jordan, "Guiding the Process of Becoming," World Order, 
Vol. 7, No. 4, 1973, p. 29. 
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"Curriculum, as we define it, is comprised of two interrelated 
sets of goals and what children do, usually with the help of peers and 
adults, to achieve those goals." One set of goals relates to the infor¬ 
mation or content of curriculum, the other to the process goals. The 
organization of the content goals rests on the "classification of 
environments (physical, human, unknown and the Self), and includes 
three basic symbol systems (mathematics, language and art) used to con¬ 
vey information." The organization of the "process goals rests upon 
the classification of the potentialities of the human organism (psycho¬ 
motor, perceptual, cognitive, affective and volitional) and the means 
by which those potentialities become actualized. 
The Environments and the Content of Curriculum 
Classification of the environments provides a conceptual framework 
in which to organize all of those elements which we inherit from our 
cultures, which are the content of curriculum. The content curriculum 
organized around the physical environment includes mathematics, natural 
sciences, natural history and technology. The content curriculum 
organized around the human environment includes language and communica¬ 
tion (reading, writing and speaking), social sciences, human relations, 
and ethics. The content curriculum organized around the unknown 
environment includes art, aesthetics, philosophy, and religion. The 
"curriculum of the Self" is an accumulation of all of the above as they 
37Streets and Jordan, "Guiding the Process of Becoming," p. 30. 
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relate to the Self. The information relating to the Self is "organized 
around the categories of potentialities and includes body-awareness, 
Perception, self-concept, self-esteem, self-determination, physi¬ 
cal health, the social self and the ideal-self."38 
The three symbol systems or systems of representation mediate both 
the assimilation of the content curriculum and the mastery of the 
process of curriculum. They are mathematics for the physical environ¬ 
ment, language for the human environment and art for the environment of 
the unknown. Since these symbol systems are relatively recent additions 
to ANISA theory, the exact relationship with respect to representational 
knowing in the empiricist tradition (S-R psychology) or with respect to 
the nature of knowing and representation from Piagetian perspective has 
not been fully explored; i.e., the exact functional relationship of a 
symbol system to develop or the process of becoming has not been fully 
determined. 
In the empiricist (S-R) tradition, internalized representation of 
the overt sign or symbol is a sufficient explanation of knowledge. The 
causal factor of the development of knowledge is the stimulus or the 
external sign which causes the internal sign. Knowledge, therefore, 
has as its adequate source the external reality, sign or symbol, such as 
language. In ANISA terms, knowledge has its origin in learning, in the 
processes of differentiation, integration and generalization. Although 
the role of the processes has not yet been as clearly defined in ANISA 
38lbid., pp. 33-34. 
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theory as they have in Piagetian theory, where the functional signifi¬ 
cance of the internal system or structure is transformational in 
character, i.e., knowledge is not copied but is transformed through 
assimilation and accommodation mechanisms, it is clear that both ANISA 
and Piaget rely upon the intervention of processes as causal agents to 
development. 
The Five Categories of Potentiality 
and the Process of Curriculum 
The process goals relate to the actualization of potentiality in 
the five categories of potentiality. Learning has been identified as 
the key to the release of potential in each one of the five categories. 
More specifically, the process of learning is defined as the ability to 
know how to learn or learning competence. Through knowing how to learn 
or the conscious control of the processes of learning, the child attains 
mastery over the fundamental factor in the release of his potential. 
According to Harlow, this capacity of "learning to learn transforms 
the organism from a creature that adapts to a changing environment by 
39 
trial and error to one that adapts by seeming hypothesis and insight." 
Each one of the categories of potential has been explored from a 
perspective of the function of the processes of differentiation, inte¬ 
gration and generalization. What remains to be discussed is the fusion 
39"The Fermation of Learning Sets," N. 59, quoted in Daniel C. 
Jordan, "Learning Competence and the Release of Human Potential, 
unpublished manuscript, 1971, p. 54. 
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o f the content and process in curriculum. 
One important aspect of this fusion of content and process relates 
to the formation of attitudes and values which "collectively constitute 
character and personality."^0 As the child develops through an inter¬ 
action with his environment, his potentialities become actualized, that 
is they become structured. As they become structured, the environment 
of the Self is gradually built, which has already been described as the 
fusion of all cf the other environments. One important aspect of the 
Self is the character and personality, partly made up of values and 
attitudes, which are structured through interaction with the various 
environments. 
For example, as a child interacts with the physical environ¬ 
ment, potentialities (psycho-motor, perceptual, cognitive, 
affective and volitional) are collectively released (process) 
and blended with selected information (content) about that 
environment to form material attitudes and values on which 
technological competence rests. . . . 
Interaction with the human environment, in similar fashion, 
translates those same basic potentialities into structured 
powers which collectively and interrelatedly combine with 
information about mankind to form social attitudes and 
values on which a person's moral competence rests. 
As one attempts to interact with the ultimate unknowns and 
to structure them, he forms ideals. This kind of inter¬ 
action leads to the formation of religious attitudes and 
values on which spiritual competence rests. . . . 
As the Self interacts with its own self within the context 
of the other environments, all the other values become 
integrated. This integration constitutes the structural 
and functional reality of personal identity—the funda¬ 
mental expression of creativity inherent in all human 
40 Streets and Jordan, "Guiding the Process of Becoming," p. 34. 
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beings. Personal effectance is determined by the quality 
of this integrated structuring. If the quality is good, 
the person will be both confident and competent to deal with 
the environment; and his capacity for transformation and 
continual development will be insured. In other words, per¬ 
sonal effectance is 'self-competence'—a combination of tech¬ 
nological competence, psychological competence, moral compe¬ 
tence, and spiritual competence.^1 
An analysis of the foregoing with respect to the initial criteria 
for a comprehensive curriculum theory cited at the beginning of this 
section reveals that most, if not all, of the criteria have been 
addressed, such as learning processes, types of learning, the environ¬ 
ment, forces, factors and experiences which stimulate or block learning 
and the nature of culture and societal responsibility. This was accom¬ 
plished through the content and process issues of curriculum which com¬ 
prise two aspects of a unified curriculum theory. The concept of per¬ 
sonal effectance which includes motive factors, and the union of tech¬ 
nological, psychological, moral and spiritual competencies directly 
addresses the need to clarify societal responsibility and makes educa¬ 
tion a moral affair as well as a technical affair. 
ANISA's Theory of Pedagogy 
The ANISA Theory of Teaching flows directly from the Theory of 
Development and Curriculum. 
According to the theory of development, development is sus¬ 
tained by the organism's interaction with the environment. 
Thus it follows that teaching will take its definition from 
this premise. Teaching, therefore, means arranging environ¬ 
ments and guiding interactions with them to achieve the goals 
41 Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
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specified by the theory of curriculum. The theory of 
pedagogy classifies arrangements and interactions in terms 
of these goals. Since the main goal is the development or 
achievement of learning competence, and since learning 
competence means the ability to differentiate, integrate, 
and generalize aspects of experience, environmental arrange¬ 
ments and interactions with them can be classified in terms 
of the particular aspect of learning competence they facili¬ 
tate.^2 
The teacher then has the role of arranging environments and guiding 
interactions of the child in order that learning competence is achieved 
by the individual. The teacher in this frame of reference must then 
deal with the individual child as each child is at a different level of 
development and has unique strengths and deficiencies. Therefore, the 
teacher must not only be skilled at guiding interactions with the 
environment but mast also assume a diagnostic and prescriptive role with 
respect to each child. As various levels of competency are achieved by 
the child and "as the child grows and develops, he will come to take a 
more active role in diagnosing his own needs and prescribing the arrange¬ 
ment of his own environments and his own interactions with them. He 
/ 'X 
then becomes a teacher of his own Self—an independent learner." 
Implementation and Evaluation of the ANISA Model 
As stated in the introduction, ANISA has been under development as 
an educational model for the past thirteen years. Over the past several 
years it has been implemented in three sites, in Maine, in Kansas, and 
A2Ibid., p. 36. 
A3Ibid., p. 37. 
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in Connecticut. (Implementation began at the kindergarten level in 
1973 and was extended to include the first and second grades of several 
classrooms in September 1974.) Two studies of the effectiveness of the 
ANISA Model have been conducted at the Connecticut site which is in the 
Suffield Public School System.^ 
The conclusions reached, although they were very encouraging as 
to the effectiveness of the model, were limited due to the shortness of 
time that it was implemented in the first and second grades. ANISA was 
evaluated by Pjissell with respect to "the adequacy of ANISA per se—its 
strengths as an educational theory, its potential for generating contin¬ 
uously dynamic learning environments, for meeting needs of parents, 
teachers and staff, etc.,"4"1 and with respect to the "achievement of 
Suffield’s educational goals. 
Three fundamental aspects of the ANISA theory were analyzed. They 
were: "its assumptions, its definitions or ’data language,' and its 
potential for empirical verification."^ The underlying assumptions 
44The first of the studies was coordinated by Ronald Hambleton and 
assistants, and is titled "Final Report, 1973-74: An Evaluation Study 
of Selected Outcomes of the ANISA Program, Suffield, Connecticut" 
(University of Massachusetts, Laboratory of Psychometric and Evaluative 
Research, 1974). The second study was conducted by Joan S. Bissell, 
Sharon L. Hazelkorn and Cynthia Longfellow, and is titled "An Evaluation 
of ANISA in Suffield: 1974-75," (Harvard Graduate School of Education, 
Laboratory of Human Development, February 1975), mimeographed. 
^Bissell, Hazelkorn and Longfellow, "An Evaluation of ANISA in 
Suffield: 1974-75," p. 1.1. 
46Ibid., p. 11.1. 
47Ibid. , p. 1.3, 1.4. 
and its definitions have been presented in detail prior to this, hence 
they will not be repeated here. As for the generation of hypotheses 
and empirical verfication, some of these were "predicted relationships 
between the children participating in well-implemented ANISA class¬ 
room and improved competencies in the cognitive, perceptual, psycho¬ 
motor, affective and volitional domains, and predicted efforts on 
teachers and aides participating in ANISA; e.g., the model makes the 
teacher look at children individually and constantly—not only when 
they do something unusual or outstanding, and a host of other hypothe¬ 
ses generated by Ronald Hambleton, et al., 1974."48 
Their analysis of the ANISA theory concludes: 
ANISA possesses all of the elements traditionally found in 
a scientific or educational theory. It has a number of 
explicit assumptions, most of which provide an extremely 
idealistic basis for educational planning. It has a compre¬ 
hensive and straightforward set of definitions of key educa¬ 
tional concepts. These definitions are broad enough to be 
used in a wide range of educational settings. Finally, 
ANISA specifies numerous testable hypotheses concerning 
relationships between experiences in the model and student 
growth. It is because each of these fundamental elements 
of an adequate theory is found in ANISA that it can provide 
the basis for Suffield’s educational planning and practice. 
Because of the abstract and general nature of the theory, 
specific applications in classroom situations will have to 
be derived by Suffield staff as the model is implemented. 
What is perhaps most important is the fact that ANISA pro¬ 
vides a highly flexible theoretical umbrella which can be 
modified as necessary during the process of implementa- 
48Ibid. , p. 1.7. 
49Ibid., p. 1.8. 
45 
The second part of an analysis was measuring the effectiveness of 
ANISA with respect to Suffield’s goals. The goals were clearly 
established and extensive tests were performed with respect to each one. 
An example of one of Suffield's goals concerned the teacher's ability 
to act as a facilitator of learning, and the student's capacity to 
achieve at his highest level of ability. The conclusions suggested 
there was a high degree of success evident in spite of the shortness of 
time that the model has been implemented in Suffield, and in spite of 
the fact that in especially the first and second grade classrooms there 
was a need for more ANISA materials. The closing third of the report 
made recommendations for such materials. In addition, various diagnos¬ 
tic tools were suggested and an extensive and helpful ANISA implementa¬ 
tion checklist was included. 
As the model theorizes about the importance of the child's develop¬ 
ment of personal effectance, that sense of self-competence which comes 
about through the feedback from an affirmative and supportive environ¬ 
ment, so also will the model develop at an optimum rate and achieve an 
effectance of its own through research efforts such as were conducted 
by Bissell, Hazelkom and Longfellow. 
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CHAPTER II 
PIAGET: A THEORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 
Introduction 
Jean Piaget has formulated a theory which addresses the issues of 
the origin, nature, structure and development of man's intelligence 
and knowledge. Such concerns fall within the domain of epistemology, 
which is that branch of science, philosophy, and psychology which 
investigates the nature of knowledge. Further, Piaget is a genetic 
epistemologist, not only addressing the question of "What is knowl¬ 
edge?", but also what are the "conditions" and "laws" which govern its 
genesis. To this point, Barbel Inhelder, one of Piaget's close associ¬ 
ates, states: "The development of knowledge seems to be the result of 
a process of elaboration that is based essentially on the activity of 
the child."''' 
This chapter will address Piaget's theory of "What is knowledge?", 
"How is it organized?", and "What are the processes of elaboration?" 
Under these headings, Piaget's three forms of knowledge (the 
innate, figurative and logico-mathematical) will be derived from three 
types of cognitive activity: the innate, perceptive, and acquired 
behavior. The three forms of knowledge will be integrated with the 
1Barbel Inhelder, "Some Aspects of Piaget's Genetic Approach to 
Cognition," in Piaget and Knowledge: Theoretical Foundations, Hans G. 
Furth (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 23. 
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notions of the schemata, the scheme, and the operation, which are 
respectively related to the reflexive scheme, sensori-motor schemes, 
and the preoperative, concrete operative and formal operational struc¬ 
tures of thinking. These structures comprise characteristic patterns 
of the manner in which thinking develops. Further, this development 
occurs in an invariant sequence which is hierarchically arranged. 
Within this context is the Piagetian notion of stage. Last, and of 
most crucial importance to the ANISA Theory of Development, is a dis¬ 
cussion of Piaget’s notions of the processes of elaboration. This will 
include a discussion of the relationship between biology and knowledge 
from which is derived the model of the functioning of cognitive struc¬ 
tures; namely, the equilibration model. Under this will be discussed 
accommodation and assimilation, homeorhesis (after Waddington) and 
homeostasis (after the biological model), the relationship between 
development and learning, the mechanisms which control and influence 
transition from one level of thinking to the next, such as the inter¬ 
active conflict which develops between parallel structures. 
What Is Knowledge? 
Piaget states: "The fundamental hypothesis of genetic episte¬ 
mology is that there is a parallelism between the progress made in the 
logical and rational organization of knowledge and the corresponding 
2 
formative psychological processes." Hence, we begin by stating that 
2Jean Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, translator Eleanor Duckworth 
(New York: The Norton Library, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1971), 
p. 13. 
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knowledge is not a "simple copy of reality, because it always includes 
a process of assimilation to previous structures."^ A discussion of 
What is knowledge?" is not one of static knowledge structures but is 
possible only after the processes of formation and function are intro¬ 
duced. 
According to Piaget, knowledge has its origin in three types of 
cognitive activity or functions, the most simple and fundamental being 
the "innate."* * * 4 5 The very young child's instinctive or reflexive actions 
(such as characterize the innate), for example, the grasping reflex, 
are gradually structured through the ordering and patterning of the 
basic reflexes into reflexive schemata which give rise to sensori¬ 
motor schemes. This Piaget classifies as "innate" knowledge. 
The facts reveal (particularly in the course of the first 
year's development in the human being) the existence of 
remarkably stable agencies between the forming of basic 
habits and the dawning of sensori-motor intelligence. 
These stable agencies are restricted in scope in man; however, 
they constitute the beginning of "knowledge structured by hereditary 
programming.Hereditary programming implies that man has accumu¬ 
lated in the genome, as a result of adaptations to the external 
^Jean Piaget, Biology and Knowledge: An Essay on the Relations 
Between Organic Regulations and Cognitive Processes, translator 
Beatrix Walsh (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Second 
Edition, 1974), p. 4. 
4Ibid., p. 2. 
5Ibid., p. 3. 
^Ibid., p. 226. 
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environment (the equilibratory response), certain patterns of behavior, 
such as the before-mentioned grasping reflex or "as may be the case 
with certain perceptual structures (seeing colors and two’or three 
dimensions in space)."7 
The second type of cognitive function is "perception."8 This 
activity is characteristically more oriented toward sensory data or 
perceptions of the environment. Resulting from this function is 
sensori-motor intelligence which is gradually structured or patterned 
through perceptions of the environment and is referred to as figura¬ 
tive knowledge (the recognition of images).9 
The figurative aspect in an imitation of states taken as 
momentary and static. In the cognitive area the figurative 
functions are, above all, perception, imitation and mental 
imagery, which is in fact interiorized imitation.10 
It is obvious that with respect to innate functions, much of what 
happens both in immediate behavior, and in development, is under the 
control of internal mechanisms, whereas the figurative aspect of 
"knowledge gained by physical experience . . . experience of external 
objects or of whatever appertains to them, abstractions being made of 
objects as such"^ involves the learner in an interaction with the 
environment. This type of interaction results in a static knowledge 
7Ibid. , p. 226. 
8Ibid., p. 2. 
9Ibid. , p. 3. 
10Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, p. 14. 
"^Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, p. 226. 
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which is unlike knowledge which results from the third cognitive func¬ 
tion; namely, "acquired behavior."12 
Piaget differentiates two forms of acquired behavior: the logico- 
mathematical (which is primarily endogenetic in origin; i.e., its 
activity, origin and organization are largely internal) and that of the 
empirical apprenticeship and experimental behavior (knowledge based 
upon physical and external experience).13 Logico-mathematical knowl¬ 
edge and operative knowing are used synonymously in this section. In 
a strict sense, logico-mathematical knowledge is operational, although 
in a wider sense aspects of logical and mathematical knowledge are evi¬ 
dent during the pre-logical and pre-numerical period.1^ 
The differentiation of acquired forms of behavior becomes impor¬ 
tant for Piaget when he considers the role of learning versus develop¬ 
ment. Learning is mainly provoked and involves the external environ¬ 
ment, whereas the development of knowledge of the logico-mathematical 
type is largely the result of an internal process.13 This differentia¬ 
tion is also important when Piaget considers the mental "operation" and 
distinguishes it from all other forms of mental activity. 
12Ibid. , p. 2. 
13Ibid. , p. 2. 
■^Jean Piaget, "Development and Learning," Journal of Research in 
Science Teaching, 2 (1964), p. 184. 
15A specific definition of the operation, and operative knowing, 
is developed later in this chapter. A discussion of the pre-logical 
and the pre—numerical period is to be found in the introduction to the 
next chapter. 
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The acquired behavior function gives rise to the third major cate¬ 
gory of knowledge, the logico-mathematical. Logico-mathematical knowl¬ 
edge represents the highest form of thought and, according to Piaget, 
develops through internal (endogenetic) processes. 
To summarize, the three cognitive functions give rise to three 
distinct forms of knowledge: the innate, the figurative and the logico- 
mathematical. A practical example cited by Inhelder and Piaget will 
serve to introduce important distinctions between each of the forms of 
knowledge. In the example, reflexive schemata (innate) are used and 
extended to elementary forms of classification (grouping) and seria- 
tion (finding ordered differences) schemes, at the sensori-motor or 
figurative (perceptual) level of intelligent behavior. These are then 
easily distinguishable from the "operative" or logico-mathematical 
forms of classificatory or seriation schema. 
Between the ages of six to eight and eighteen to twenty-four 
months, which is well before the acquisition of language, we 
find a number of behavior patterns which are suggestive of 
both classification and seriation. A child may be given a 
familiar object: immediately he recognizes its possible 
uses; the object is assimilated to the habitual schemata of 
rocking, shaking, striking, throwing to the ground, etc. If 
the object is completely new to him, he may apply a number of 
familiar schemata in succession, as if he is trying to under¬ 
stand the nature of the strange object by determining whether 
it is for rocking, or for rattling, or rubbing, etc. We have 
here a sort of practical classification (Cf. J. Piaget, The 
Origin of Intelligence in the Child, 1952, pp. 235-252), 
somewhat reminiscent of the latter definition by use. But 
this rudimentary classification is realized only in the course 
of successive trials and does not give rise to a number of 
simultaneous collections. However, even these later are 
foreshadowed very early when the children pile a number of 
similar objects together or when they construct a complex 
object. These two kinds of behaviors may be regarded as 
pre-verbal precursors of the graphic collections. 
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As for seriations, some approximation to these can be found 
in various constructions. One such example is a tower made 
of nesting boxes. To begin with, children may choose the 
boxes at random but in time they manage to arrange them 
approximately in order of decreasing volume. . . . Neverthe¬ 
less, these elementary organizations are still far removed 
from the corresponding operational structures. A sensori¬ 
motor schema is the functional equivalent of a concept inas¬ 
much as it results in intelligibility and generalization, 
lrom a structural point of view the two are by no means 
identical. It is characteristic of the sensori-motor schema 
that its various possible applications cannot be realized 
simultaneously, so that 'extension' and 'intension' cannot 
be coordinated by reference to one another.16 
In this example, the first two forms of knowledge to develop 
involve the child's use of elementary psycho-motor actions (innate) to 
discover possible practical uses for the unknown object in a perceptual 
figurative sense. This form of behavior is easily distinguishable from 
classification behavior at the logico-roathematical level, where through 
the operative schemes the child is able to coordinate qualities of the 
object in an intensive sense (qualities within the immediate set or 
environment) and in an extensive sense (qualities of the object out¬ 
side the immediate set or environment). 
Innate knowledge is, therefore, a result of the patterning of a 
reflexive action, such as shaking the object. The sensori-motor knowl¬ 
edge or figurative knowledge results from the experimental use of the 
reflexive schema to determine the practical use of the object by 
combining rocking, shaking, looking, listening and/or throwing, etc., 
16Barbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, The Early Growth of Logic in 
The Child; Classification and Seriation, translators E. A. Lunzer 
and D. Papert; Introduction, Lunzer (New York: The Norton Library, 
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 13-14. 
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to determine "what is it like." The logico-mathematical or operative 
knowledge occurs at a much later stage as it characteristically does 
not appertain to states or objects (the physical experience) but to 
transformation of one state to another; i.e., actions which coordinate 
or transform states and objects. The type of thinking involves the 
Piagetian notion of the operation. An operation is, above all, an 
action which transforms or coordinates an object or group of objects 
in some manner. For example, number operations do not deal with the 
actual qualities of the objects but with a set of rules of transforma¬ 
tion whereby the differentiated qualities of the objects are trans¬ 
formed into a quantitative property. Or, as from the previous 
example of classification, the qualities of the object are compared 
and coordinated with the qualities of other objects and an entirely 
new classification is determined for the object based on a set of 
rules of transformation. For example, the object is a toy because it 
can be played with and not because it is soft and wooly like another 
toy. 
Examining these three categories of knowledge from another per¬ 
spective serves to bring out two more features: (1) their inter¬ 
relationship, and (2) the method or mechanisms of development. Piaget, 
in his work Biology and Knowledge, develops the theme that all knowl¬ 
edge, even innate knowledge, has been acquired by the organism in 
response to the environment. He distinguishes two broad categories on 
the basis of the time that it takes to acquire the knowledge: innate 
or long-term acquisition, which develops over generations, and acquired 
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behavior, which is learned and develops during the life of the 
organism. He further distinguishes in the latter category knowledge 
of an endogenetic nature (a preponderant share of activity and organi¬ 
zation that is internal as in the case of logico-mathematical struc¬ 
tures) and exogenetic (or the emperical apprenticeship and experimental 
behavior; knowledge based on physical or external experience).17 Each 
is recognized as being at a different stage or degree of organization. 
Use of the root word "genetic" implies that there is a mechanism 
(equilibration) which is common to both types of knowledge acquisition. 
A chart on the following page diagrams this. The vertical arrows 
indicate that logico-mathematical knowledge is constantly being fused 
with data from the other two sources. Piaget, in hypothesizing about 
the development of the higher forms of acquired behavior through the 
equilibration model, states: 
If all types of knowledge, innate or acquired, necessarily 
presuppose a certain permanent functioning, which gives rise 
to assimilatory schemata and their coordinations, then the 
hereditary forms of cognitive behavior, which predominate 
among animals (reflexes, instincts, and so on) as the field 
of adaptation or equilibrium is limited, will divide up in 
two complementary ways as soon as this field is extended by 
means of representation or thought. First, it will tend 
toward externalization or pheno-type accommodation to 
environment, in other words, to learning, to experiment and 
to physical knowledge of the first category; then it will 
tend toward internalization or formal structuration through 
consciousness or, to put it more exactly, through reflec¬ 
tive abstraction based on the internal conditions of each 
functioning (that is, on those general forms of organiza¬ 
tion which extend beyond cognitive assimilation and back 
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into the common mechanisms, hence, to those processes which 
lie at the heart of any living organization). 
The processes referred to here will be explored in a later section, 
however, some important assumptions of Piaget's theory have been intro¬ 
duced and others implied. 
Briefly, for Piaget intellectual growth is developmental in con¬ 
struction; i.e., development includes the notion of a series of stages 
of growth which occur in an invariant sequence. These stages are 
hierarchically organized, each a logical outgrowth or consequence of 
the preceding stage. Implied within each stage are both horizontal and 
vertical relationships among the constructs of intelligence. Each of 
the three forms of knowledge has its own construction or structure, 
however, it is important to note that in a vertical fashion the three 
aspects of knowledge are hierarchically integrated, resulting in the 
building of successively more complex total structures of knowledge. 
The logico-mathematical aspect is the last to develop, and by imple¬ 
mentation has its origin in the innate and figurative aspects. 
The proposed manner or mechanism by which knowledge develops is 
most closely associated with a biological model. Piaget sees the 
epistemic child as an adaptive and coordinating organism, in constant 
interaction with his environment. Further, since for Piaget knowledge 
is never a simple copy of reality but exists because of an action per¬ 
formed by the knower, the process of interaction is fundamentally 
transformational in character. This is because that which is 
18 Ibid., p. 267. 
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experienced as reality always exists with respect to what is already 
inside the knowtr's structures. This fundamental relationship serves 
to shape or limit what the child chooses to make meaningful at each 
stage of development. The process of integration into previously 
existent structures is referred to as assimilation. The process of 
adaptation completes itself as the child's knowing structures are 
changed or accommodated as a reaction to what has been integrated or 
assimilated. The process is one of a dynamic state of equilibrium 
where interaction with the environment creates new knowledge, a new 
state of development, therefore a new state of adaptation. 
The relationship between figurative knowledge and logico- 
mathematical (operative) knowledge provides an interesting example of 
a new state of adaptation or development, emphasizing the "internaliza¬ 
tion or formal structuration" Piaget referred to earlier. This 
hierarchy of thought processes (use of types of knowledge) has lead 
Piaget to emphasize two of the aspects of knowledge in thinking, and 
the development of logical structures. A summary of the two aspects 
of thought is presented in Figure II on the following page. 
An example drawn from the manner in which the child deals with 
the conservation of substance in the physical world provides reason 
for establishing essential differences between figurative and logico- 
mathematical or operative thinking. Remembering that Piaget's central 
thesis is that knowledge is not a simple copy of reality but actions 
performed on that object, research has demonstrated that the young 
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consideration one at a time, such that a clay object which has dimen¬ 
sions of length, width, and depth is judged by one dimension only. 
For the child who is not yet reasoning in an operative sense (i.e., 
able to transform or compensate change in one dimension with change in 
another), the size of the object may be determined by its perceived 
length alone. When the object is reshaped such that it becomes 
shorter than it was originally, then he judges there to be less 
material. The child neglects to account for the material's increase 
along other dimensions (compensation). Piaget cites a similar example 
involving number, where the child, by counting ten objects in a 
straight line, first from the right and then from the left, rearranges 
them in a circle and other shapes, each time discovering that number 
is independent of shape and that the order of addition does not matter 
19 (the property of commutativity). 
In each example, the operative aspect of thinking is a transforma¬ 
tion or an action of thought upon the abstracted perception. Piaget 
refers to this type of action or thought as reflective abstraction and 
defines it as a "process of reconstruction with new combinations, which 
allows for any operational structure at any previous stage or level to 
20 be integrated into a richer structure at a higher level. Further, 
Piaget differentiates three levels of the abstraction process: "First, 
of taking cognizance of the existance of one of these actions or 
19Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, p. 17. 
^Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, p. 320. 
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operations (as in the perception of correspondence between sets of 
objects); second, the action noted has to be 'reflected' (in the 
practical sense of the term) by being projected into another plane— 
for example, the plane of thought as opposed to that of practical 
action . . third, it has to be integrated into a new structure, 
which means that a new structure has to be set up, but this is only 
possible if two conditions are fulfilled: (a) the new structure must 
first of all be a reconstruction of the preceding one if it is not to 
lack coherence and congruity; it will thus be a product of the pre¬ 
ceding one on a plane chosen by it; (b) it must also, however, widen 
the scope of the preceding one, making it general by combining it with 
elements proper to the new plane of thought; otherwise there will be 
21 
nothing new about it." These three levels of reflective abstraction 
will be used to explain progress in the development of the operations 
of number. 
The next major questions to be dealt with, namely, "What is the 
structure of knowledge and how is it organized?" will now be addressed 
as they have been only suggested in generality to this point. In pur¬ 
suance of this, it has been established that the roots of logical and 
mathematical thought lie within coordination of actions, and as these 
actions are coordinated, the fundamental structure is established in 
what Piaget terms the "operation." Further, mental operations 
eventually constitute "structures" which are totalities of thought. 
21 
Ibid., p. 320. 
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Before proceeding with the discussion of the operation, it is 
timely to reflect on Piaget's fundamental hypothesis of genetic 
epistemology, that of the parallel between the progress made in the 
(logical and rational) organization of knowledge and the corresponding 
psychological processes. So far, a basic pattern of organization has 
emerged to include the notion of three forms of knowledge which, as 
development proceeds, become transformed from the most basic to the 
most complex by means of reflective abstraction which is fundamentally 
a process of equilibration. By means of reflective abstraction, 
knowledge is reflected to new planes of meaning or intelligent 
behavior. These new planes are characterized by the operation and the 
major structures which are both organizational and processes in nature. 
In addition, the achievement of each plane of reasoning is referred to 
as a stage of thinking, such as the sensori-motor stage or the opera¬ 
tional stages (pre-concrete and formal). 
What Is the Structure of Knowledge? 
The Operation 
The child, through an interactive relationship with his environ¬ 
ment, gradually forms the mental operation, which is the main struc¬ 
tural component of the major structures. An operation has four basic 
characteristics: "(1) an operation is an action that can be internal¬ 
ized; that is, it can be carried out in thought as well as executed 
materially; (2) it is a reversible action; that is, it can take place 
in one direction or in the opposite direction; (3) it always supposes 
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some conservation, some invariant; (4) no operation exists alone . . . 
as every operation is related to a system of operations."22 
The first characteristic, that of an operation being an internal¬ 
ized action, can be clarified with a comparison between what Piaget 
has identified as a sensori-motor scheme and an operation. Early in 
development, the child evolves patterns of action which involve ways 
of physically responding to the environment in act-specific ways. 
Acquiring these patterns or schemes represent learning behavior on the 
part of the child and signalize the early manifestations of the child's 
efforts to bring order and coherence to the world around him. Often 
they incorporate innate reflexes into patterns of external or physical 
action. Furth states, "we can assert that a sensori-motor scheme is 
related to a coordinated external act in the same way as an operation 
is related to a thinking act. ... To put it succinctly, an active 
scheme is an external action of coordination while an active operation 
is an internal action of coordination."23 This is illustrated by 
recalling the example cited earlier of Inhelder and Piaget involving 
classification first as a sensori-motor act, the latter as true 
classification involving the thinking act of coordination and trans¬ 
formation. 
As for the second characteristic of the operation, reversibility, 
99 
Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, pp. 21-22. 
O O 
^JHans G. Furth, Piaget and Knowledge: Theoretical Foundations 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 56. 
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Piaget differentiates two main types of reversibility. The first is 
reversibility by inversion or negation.24 
Inversion and negation follow the mathematical format of 
+A-A=0 or +1-1=0. The addition of positive and negative 
numbers or the addition of two numbers and then the reversal or sub¬ 
traction of them serve as examples. Another example is that the effect 
of decreasing the length of a row of objects thereby increasing its 
density can be negated by lengthening the row to decrease the density. 
In general, return to the starting point is accomplished "by 
cancelling the operation which has already been performed; i.e., by 
inversion or negation. In this case, the product of the direct 
25 
operation and its inverse is the null or identical operation." Again, 
this is reasoning by inversion or negation. 
The second form of reversibility is called reciprocity and 
involves "return to the starting point by compensating a difference 
(in the logical sense of the term); i.e., by reciprocity. In this 
case, the product of the two reciprocal operations is not a null opera- 
26 
tion but an equivalence." For example, with the row of objects with 
length and density relations, a change in one dimension is conceptually 
compensated for by a change in the other dimension, and the number in 
24Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, p. 22. 
25Barbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, The Growth of Logical Thinking: 
From Childhood to Adolescence, translated by Anne Parsons and Stanley 
Milgram (Basic Books Inc., Publishers, 1958), p. 272. 
26 
Ibid. , p. 273. 
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the set remains the same. For example, the child reasons that 
shortening the row will increase the density but will not change the 
number of objects because the child realizes there Is a reciprocal 
relationship between length and density. Before reversibility reason¬ 
ing, either change would have changed the number in the set, in the 
child's mind. 
The third characteristic, invariance or conservation, is crucial 
to the functioning of operative thinking, for it allows the "dissocia¬ 
tion" of form and content, between the general scheme and the self¬ 
specific action in which it is expressed. The child begins to know 
that things are "out there" and independent of his own actions.27 In 
the above examples of reversibility, the objects or relations dealt 
with must have an independent and invariant existence. As in the 
case of the operations of addition and subtraction, the numbers dealt 
with must be conserved in order that addition (7 + 4 = 11) can be 
reversed to subtraction (11 -4=7). In a reciprocal relation involv¬ 
ing length and density, the number of objects in a set must be con¬ 
served and the relations compensated. 
Before proceeding with the fourth and last characteristic of the 
operation, a distinction should be made between the terms scheme and 
schemata. For Piaget, the term scheme is used in conjunction with a 
description of sensori-motor intelligence where there is a generaliz- 
able aspect to the coordination of external acts and the term schemata 
27 Furth, Piaget and Knowledge, p. 247. 
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is used in conjunction with reflexive action patterns. In a previous 
example when the young baby is given an unfamiliar object, he applies 
reflexive schemata, such as shaking, striking or throwing, to the 
object. Initially, the reflexive schemata may not be used with a 
specific coordinated pattern of action. However, gradually the child 
comes to be able to coordinate these reflexive schemata in order to 
determine, for example, a more generalizable aspect of the external 
actions, such as the use of the object. Then this can be referred to 
as a sensori-motor scheme. Aspects of the operative mode are still 
conspicuously absent however. For instance, there is no conservation; 
i.e., the object once thrown out of the crib no longer has an existence. 
In addition, were the unfamiliar object a rattle, there would be no 
causal links between shaking the rattle and the noise made, nor would 
the noise made by the shaken rattle be internalized and extended to 
other objects not making a noise when shaken. In other words, the 
action performed on the object and the resulting noise have not as yet 
been internalized as thinking acts which would permit cause and effect 
thinking. Yet because the actions of the baby are directed toward 
finding uses, by coordinating reflexive schemata it becomes a sensori¬ 
motor scheme which is an advance over the uncoordinated use of reflex¬ 
ive schemata. 
The fourth characteristic of the operation is that it never exists 
alone but is integrated with other operations as part of a totality of 
thought, the structure. 
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What Is a Structure of Knowledge? 
The notion of structure is important to Piagetian theory in that 
it provides a framework for the integration of many separate elements 
or operations of thought. In addition, it is a totality, that is, 
there is a unity and self-sufficiency possible in which all that is 
needed to carry out a specific task is present. This includes the 
specific operation(s) that are needed and a set of rules that apply 
equality to all parts of the structure. Last, this framework is not 
important as a static form but rather is important as a function or 
process, as a framework in which all elements needed for a thinking 
process are united. 
As a first approximation, we may say that a structure is 
a system of transformations. Inasmuch as it is a system 
and not a mere collection of elements and their properties, 
these transformations involve laws: the structure is pre¬ 
served or enriched by the interplay of its transformation 
laws, which never yield results external to the system nor 
employ elements that are external to it. In short, the 
notion of structure is comprised of three key ideas: the 
idea of wholeness, the idea of transformation, and the 
idea of self-regulation.^8 
A structure is a totality of thought, a complete system of ele¬ 
ments or operations which is governed by laws (of transformation) 
applying to the whole system and not just to one of the elements. The 
structure is not defined by its elements of sub-parts, rather, "it is 
in terms of these laws that the structure qua whole or system is 
OO 
Jean Piaget, Structuralism, translated and edited by Chaninah 
Maschler (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row, 1971), p. 5. 
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efined. The laws of the structure are transformational in effect; 
i.e., a structure is active in the sense that as the operation is an 
internalized action which deals "not with states but with transforma¬ 
tions from one state to another,"30 not with the static and figurative 
but with a coordination of relations, for example, so is the structure 
\ 
by means of the application of a law transformational. Piaget mentions, 
for instance, that there are many different mathematical structures or 
systems in the series of whole numbers, one of which is the "additive 
31 
group. The rules or laws of the structure, such as associativity, 
commutativity, transitivity and closure, hold for the series of whole 
numbers as well as for the "substructure" addition. (Recognized here 
is a fluid conception of the structure, where the major structure with 
its rules of transformation has within it a sub-structure, the addi¬ 
tive group, for which the same rules hold.) When two whole numbers 
are added or subtracted and a third whole number is obtained, it is 
accomplished by use of the laws of the "additive group." 
"The third characteristic is that a structure is self-regulating; 
that is, in order to carry out these laws of transformation, we need 
not go outside the system to find some external element. Similarly, 
once a law of transformation has been applied, the result does not end 
^Ibid., p. 7. 
30Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, p. 14. 
31 Ibid. , p. 22. 
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up outside the system."32 I„ the example of the addition or subtrac¬ 
tion of whole numbers, both the rules necessary and the product of 
their application exist within the structure. 
Of particular importance to the development of number are the 
three mother" or "parent" structures which the Bourbaki group of 
mathematicians have identified and Piaget has incorporated.33 The 
Bourbaki structures are important to mathematics in general in that 
they unite all of the diverse branches, such as geometry, calculus and 
number theory, and they are fundamental, that is, they are not reducible 
to simpler self-sufficient structures. The algebraic structure applies 
primarily to classes and numbers, and this structure is a prototype for 
the mathematical "group,an example of which is the previously men¬ 
tioned "additive group." In general, in children's thinking the 
algebraic structure is found "most readily in the logic of classes—in 
35 
the logic of classification and in mathematics, many "groups" are 
found, such as the "group of displacements found in geometry. The 
algebraic structure is characterized by the form of reversibility 
identified as inversion or negation; e.g., by inversion, all oranges 
plus all other forms of fruit equal fruit whereas all forms of fruit 
32Ibid. , p. 23. 
33Ibid. , pp. 23-24. 
34Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
35Ibid., p. 27. 
36 Ibid., p. 25. 
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minus every form of fruit except oranges equals oranges, (Or + f - F), 
whereas (F - f = Or) or by negation, all fruit minus all fruit equals 
no fruit (F - F = 0). Another example of negation would be if one took 
two steps forward and two steps backward, the result would be zero dis¬ 
tance gained. 
The application of this structure to the operation of classifica¬ 
tion can be seen, for instance, in the class of all fruit. Prior to 
the structure becoming operational (in the child five years or younger), 
the class of all fruit does not exist in the sense that it requires 
that the child has been able to transcend perceptual or figurative 
limitations of fruit which come in a multitude of colors, shapes and 
tastes, none of which taken separately define the class of all fruit. 
Second, the application of the rule of reversibility requires reason¬ 
ing which supposes conservation and the attainment of the class inclu¬ 
sion relation. For example, the orange is a class of objects which is 
a member of the larger class of citrus fruit which is, in turn, a mem¬ 
ber of the still larger class of all fruit. The manipulation of these 
classes involves a mental coordination of hierarchically related 
classes. 
The second parent structure or ordering structure applies to rela¬ 
tionships such as in seriation. Reversibility in this structure takes 
the form of reciprocity. In a seriation problem, such as ordering 
sticks according to size, the child coordinates the relationships 
"bigger than" and "smaller than," (this one is bigger than this one, 
however they are both smaller than this one). Coordination of the 
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"bigger than” and "smaller than” relation is an example of reasoning by 
reciprocity. This last example of comparing three sticks is an example 
of the transitive relation where A ^ B and B < C, therefore A < C. 
The algebraic structure and ordering structure eventually merge, 
the result of which is the structure of number. This theme will be 
developed in the chapter on number. 
The third Bourbaki mother structure is the topological structure 
based on notions such as neighborhood, borders, and approaching 
limits. ' Topological relations are recognized as the foundation of 
two forms of geometry and as having application to many other areas of 
mathematics. 
Although this discussion has been theoretical, in the chapter on 
number these structures will be discussed in greater practical detail. 
In addition, Piaget extends the concept of structure beyond the logico- 
mathematical to the organization of other forms of knowledge, such as 
linguistic structures, sociological structures, and psychological 
38 
structures. 
The Concept of Stages of Development 
As the structures of knowledge divide thought into characteristic 
patterns, the development of intellect occurs in a sequence of stages 
which are invariant in order and hierarchically arranged. Each stage 
"^Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, pp. 25-26. 
38 Piaget, Structuralism, p. 15. 
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is characterized by a particular approach to knowledge, and an applica¬ 
tion of knowledge, which is fundamentally different from other stages, 
and is progressively dependent upon the previous stage. 
Inhelder has identified four main criteria of each stage: 
(1) Each stage involves a period of formation (genesis) 
and a period of attainment. Attainment is charac¬ 
terized by the progressive organization of a com¬ 
posite structure of mental operations. 
(2) Each structure constitutes at the same time the 
attainment of one stage and the starting point of 
the next stage, of a new evolutionary process. 
(3) The order of succession of the stages is constant. 
Ages of attainment can vary within certain limits as 
a function of factors of motivation, exercise, cul¬ 
tural milieu, and so forth. 
(4) The transition from an earlier to a later stage 
follows a law of implication analogous to the process 
of integration, preceding structures becoming a part 
of later structures.39 
These four criteria were advanced as hypotheses which were sug¬ 
gested by previous research; since the writing of the article, much 
evidence has been gathered in support of them. In addition, Inhelder 
identifies three additional supportive criteria: 
(5) When the child is given a series of reasoning proce¬ 
dures, we notice a tendency to homogeneity and 
generalization in his reasoning behavior which, 
though slight in the course of the formation of a 
structure, manifests itself more clearly once the 
structure lias been achieved. 
(6) The events (of trials and errors as the child's 
justifications become more coherent) seem to suggest 
39Barbel Inhelder, "Some Aspects of Piaget's Genetic Approach to 
Cognition," p. 27. 
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series "771*1 "“7“", U prepared by a continuous 
series of trials, but that once it is established 
invol«7inruf f1:rlytlon?Pendent °f “* Pr°“aa 
<?> thirdfirSi/°n?ltUdlnal ‘nvostigations led us to a 
hird notion (as a hypothesis); namely, that in the 
con777nt ?' lntellectual operations, phases of 
continuity alternate with phases of discontinuity.40 
These seven criteria or hypotheses will provide a format for the 
discussion of stage and provide valuable criteria for examining the 
educational importance of Piaget’s work to the ANISA Theory of Develop- 
ment. 
Piaget differentiates three major stages of growth: Stage I, the 
Sensory-Motor; Stage II, Concrete Thinking Operations; and Stage III, 
Formal Thinking Operations. Both innate and figurative knowledge are 
structured in Stage I, although figurative knowledge extends into the 
first part of Stage II where knowledge is in a preoperational stage of 
development. Later, in Stage II the operation attains its full 
character. Stage II offers a particularly clear example of the process 
of formation followed by a period of attainment mentioned in Inhelder's 
criteria number one. Stage III represents the period when thought 
attains its full and destined character. 
The diagram on the following page will serve to introduce a general 
format. (The letter "R" stands for reflexive schemata, MS" for the 
preoperative scnema of Stages I and II, and "0" for the operation.) 
In keeping with Inhelder's fourth criterion, each of the preceding 
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structures, such as a preoperative scheme "S’', are integrated and 
transformed into the later structure, the operation "0". The process 
of integration and transformation imply that the later structure are 
not simply composed of co-existent structures where previous structures 
exist along side of the advanced structure, but the later structures 
represent a fundamental change in the nature of thinking. During the 
last stage (the formal operational stage), the operations are grouped 
or integrated into complex systems or structures. In this stage, 
operations are performed upon operations. 
Stage I; The Sensori-Motor Stage 
The first major stage occupies approximately the first 
eighteen months. It is characterized by the progressive 
formation of the scheme of the permanent object and by 
the sensori—motor structuration of one’s immediate spatial 
surroundings.^-*- 
Characteristically, sensori-motor intelligence begins with the 
coordination of reflex movements into action schemes. The reflex move¬ 
ments derive from a class of ready-made, highly organized behavioral 
systems; e.g., (a) sucking, (b) looking, (c) listening, (d) vocalizing, 
(e) grasping, and (f) various ready-made sensori-motor organizations 
of the trunk and limbs. These have all been discussed in the context 
of "innate" knowledge structures. In addition to reflexive coordina¬ 
tions, the development of the "precursor" class of operational intelli¬ 
gence in the form of the scheme begins here, such as time, space, 
object permanence, means-end relations, causality and intentional 
41 Ibid., p. 29. 
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behavior. Most of the sensori-motor schemes are perceptual In origin 
and although it cannot be said that there is a linear evolution from 
the reflexive schema through perceptual structures and sensori-motor 
schemes to operational intelligence, there is a general pattern of 
moving from the simple to the complex, from the innate and figurative 
knowledge to operational knowledge. 
Piaget identifies six "sub-stages” within the sensori-motor 
period. They are important in that they further clarify the type of 
mental activity which undergoes an orderly development. They are 
(1) Sub-Stage One: "The Use of Reflexes"; (2) Sub-Stage Two: "The 
First Acquired Adaptations and the Primary Circular Reaction"; (3) Sub- 
Stage Three: "The Secondary Circular Reactions"; (4) Sub-Stage Four: 
"The Coordination of the Secondary Schemata and Their Application to 
New Situations"; (5) Sub-Stage Five: "The Tertiary Circular Reaction" 
and "The Discovery of New Means Through Active Experimentation"; and 
(6) Sub-Stage Six: "The Invention of New Means Through Mental Combina- 
A 2 
tions". The six sub-stages are divided into two groups, Stages I 
and II, comprising elementary sensori-motor adaptations, and Stages III, 
IV, V, and VI are characterized by the clear introduction of intentional 
behavior or intentional sensori-motor adaptations. 
Sub-Stage One is very brief and basically Involves the infant's 
first uses of many of the reflexive schema, which in itself involves 
42 Jean Piaget, The Origins of Intelligence in Children, trans. 
Margaret Cook (New York: The Norton Library, W. W. Norton and Co., 
Inc., 1963). 
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very complex innate adaptive behavior. Sub-Stage Two is characterized 
by the beginning of the coordinated use of these schema, such as a 
coordination with the recognition of the mother's breast whereon the 
sucking reflex is employed. During this period, the infant also begins 
to center his attention on objects (although they are as yet not perma¬ 
nent) and on events around him. In general, patterns of reflexive 
movements are structured into habits and sensori-motor schema. 
Beginning with Sub-Stage Three, we find that to the patterns which 
were established in previous stages is added intentional behavior which 
serves to reinforce developing habits through repetition and experience. 
Thus, they are "circular" in a certain respect. Intelligence for 
Piaget presupposes intention,^3 hence with the inception of clearly 
demonstrable intentioned acts is found the origin of intelligence. 
From the theoretical point of view, intention, therefore, 
denotes the extension of the totalities and relationships 
acquired during the preceding stage and, by the fact of 
their extension, their greater dissociation into real totali¬ 
ties and ideal totalities in relationships of fact and rela¬ 
tionships of value. As soon as there is intention, in 
effect, there is a goal to reach and a means to use, conse¬ 
quently, the influence of consciousness of values (the 
value or the interest of the intermediary acts serving as 
means is subordinated to that of the goal) and of the ideal 
(the act to be accomplished is part of an ideal totality or 
goal, in relation to the real totality of the acts already 
organized). Thus, it may be seen that the functional cate¬ 
gories related to the function of organization will hence 
forth become more precise, from the time of the global 
schemata of the preceding stage.^4 
^3Ibid. , p. 147. 
^Ibid. , p. 44 . 
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In the third sub-stage, the means-end goal-oriented behavior is 
not yet quite established but there is "secondary circular reaction," 
that is to say, behavior which consists in rediscovering the gestures 
which by chance exercised an advantageous action upon things"45 becomes 
evident. The fourth sub-stage is apparent from its title and is 
characterized by the appearance of certain behavior patterns which 
are superimposed on the preceding ones and their essence is the applica¬ 
tion of known means to new situations."4^ 
Here in the fourth sub-stage is found intelligence functioning as 
an adaptation to new circumstances, intention now being fully evident. 
"If this stage is to be distinguished from the preceding one with 
respect to the functioning of intelligence, it is to be distinguished 
still more with regard to the structure of objects, space and causality: 
it marks the beginnings of the permanence of things, of 'objective' 
47 
spatial 'groups' and of spatial and objectified causality." 
"At the beginning of the second year, a fifth sub-stage makes 
itself manifest, characterized by the first real experimentations and 
hence the possibility of a 'discovery of new means through active 
experimentation.' This is the impetus of the instrumental behavior 
patterns and the acme of empirical intelligence. Finally, this totality 
of the behavior patterns, the application of which determines the 
45Ibid. , P- 151. 
46Ibid. , P- 151. 
47Ibid., P- 151. 
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beginning of the sixth sub-stage, will be crowned by the 'invention of 
new means through mental combination.'"48 
In summary, the sensori-motor period is characterized by several 
major developments which include the patterning of reflexive movements, 
and their subsequent use; the growth of means-end relations which mark 
the beginnings of goal-oriented behavior; the inception of intentional 
behavior marking the beginning of consciousness and human intelligence; 
and finally, experimental behavior which begins trial and error of 
empirical intelligence. Of no less importance are events such as the 
structuring of object permanence, the structuring of space and 
causality, etc. 
Stage II: The Stage of Concrete Thinking Operations 
This stage is "characterized by a long process of elaboration of 
49 
mental operations." This process of elaboration is divided into two 
major parts, a period of formation or elaboration (the preoperational 
period) , and a period of attainment or structuration from which the 
period gains its name (the concrete operations period). It is during 
this stage that the operation attains its fully functional status; 
during the first period, preoperational structures are characterized 
by neither reversibility nor conservation, whereas during the latter 
part (the concrete operational period), all four criteria of the 
48Ibid., pp. 151-152. 
49Inhelder, "Some Aspects of Piaget's Genetic Approach to 
Cognition," p. 30. 
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operation become functional. During this stage, however, the opera¬ 
tion is not yet separated from its concrete content, the here and now, 
because they relate directly to objects and not yet to verbally stated 
hypotheses. 
When Piaget analyzes the preoperational period as a transitional 
period between the stage of sensori-motor intelligence (where thought 
begins as actions upon things) and the stage of the concrete opera¬ 
tions thought (where thought is an internalized action), then it is 
possible to designate the sensori-motor stage as Stage I and the pre- 
operational or transitional period as the first part of Stage II and 
the attainment of the operational structure in the concrete as the 
latter part of Stage II; Stage I roughly corresponds to the chrono¬ 
logical ages zero to two, and Stage II, first sub-part, between two 
and six or seven, and second sub-part, between seven and eleven. 
The Preoperational Period 
The preoperational period is characterized by the organization of 
elementary representations or symbolic functions or the "beginning of 
the interiorization of schemes of action in representations."^ This 
period is an advance over Stage I's characteristics where the primary 
task is the coordination of reflex movements into action schemes. 
5®Jean Piaget and Barbel Inhelder, The Psychology of the Child, 
trans. Helen Weaver (New York: Harper Torchbook, Basic Books, Inc., 
1969), p. 100. 
^Jean Piaget, The Child and Reality: Problems of Genetic 
Psychology, trans. Arnold Rosin (New York: A Viking Compass Book, 
Grossman Publishers, 1974), p. 57. 
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With the advent of the symbolic function, the child is able to 
form mental representations which stand for something that is not 
present. Forms of the symbolic function recognized by Piaget in this 
period include language, symbolic play (or imagination) in contrast to 
the simple play of exercise, postponed imitation, and probably begin¬ 
nings of the mental image conceived as internal imitation.52 
The process of interiorization is begun in the preoperational 
period and is not complete until the end of Stage II, the concrete 
operational period. Symbolic representations at the beginning of 
Stage II are not truly internalized actions nor do they possess the 
second characteristic of the true operation, that of reversibility; 
that is, the child is still limited by the necessary presence'Of the 
environment or its representation in the symbol signifying the object 
and is incapable of performing an action on the object mentally and, 
by a reversal in reasoning, returning to the original state of the 
object. The operation does not become fully functional until the 
latter part of Stage II, the concrete-operational period. Through 
Stages I and II, there is a gradual transition from action schemes in 
a sensori-motor sense, to the mental image or figurative knowledge, 
to operative knowing in Stage II. 
The symbol in the preoperational period is understood on a 
figurative or perceptual basis. For example, even though a child may 
have memorized the sequence of numbers one through ten at a relatively 
52 Ibid. , p. 57. 
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early age, he is unable to apply his reasoning with respect to the use 
of number. For a child whose reasoning is percept-bound, two equiva¬ 
lent sets of objects (seven each) can become unequal in number simply 
by arranging the two sets in parallel rows, one of which is short and 
the other long. For the child, the number of objects in each set is 
determined by the spatial arrangement, i.e., by the density or amount 
of area covered. 
In addition to the symbolic function, interiorization and the 
figurative knowledge characteristics of the preoperational period is 
a transition in the mobility of thought. Piaget recognized that a 
child’s thought initially is centered on himself (ego-centric) and as 
a result is immobile. During the sensori-motor stage, for example, 
the child comes to first recognize an object as existing apart from 
himself, where previously no differentiation was made. Once the object 
becomes separate, it can have its own identity and, therefore, become 
permanent. Ego-centric thought continues for some time, however. 
Through a gradual process, it is less centered on self and more on 
mental images and the figurative aspects of thought. Finally, when 
dealing with relations and logical thinking, thought is decentered or 
mobile. 
Sensori-Motor Versus Preoperative Thinking 
Contrasting the gains made in the preoperational period with the 
characteristics of sensori-motor intelligence serves to highlight the 
characteristics jnst discussed as advances in thought. 
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In summary, Flavell identifies four major ways in which pre 
operational intelligence differs from sensori-motor intelligence 
because of the presence of the symbolic function. 
(1) First, sensori-motor intelligence is capable only of 
linking, one by one, the successive actions or per¬ 
ceptual stages with which it gets involved. Repre¬ 
sentational thought, on the other hand, through its 
symbolic capacity, has the potential for simultaneous 
grasping, in a single, internal epitome, a whole sweep 
of separate events. It is a much faster and more 
mobile device which can recall the past, represent 
the present, and anticipate the future in one tempo¬ 
rally brief, organized act. 
(2) Second, sensori-motor intelligence, being an intelli¬ 
gence of action, is limited to the pursuit of concrete 
goals of action rather than to the quest for knowl¬ 
edge or truth as such. Representational thought by 
its very nature can (not that it will) reflect on the 
organization of its acts as they bear on things rather 
than simply register empirical success or failure. It 
has indigenous to it the wherewithal to be action- 
contemplative rather than simply active. 
(3) Third, by its very potential to get outside the 
immediate present, representational thought can 
eventually extend its scope well beyond actual, con¬ 
crete acts of the subject and actual concrete objects 
in the environment. 
(A) And finally, since it is confined to action in reality 
rather than to representations of reality, sensori¬ 
motor cognition is inevitably a private event, an 
individual, non-shared affair. Conceptual intelli¬ 
gence, on the other hand, can and eventually does 
become socialized through the medium of a system of 
codified symbols which the whole culture can share. 
Three Sub-Stages of the Preoperative Period 
The preoperative period is viewed mainly as a stage of preparation 
->3john H. Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1964), pp. 151-15~. 
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of the operations which become functional in a later phase of the 
stage. During this transitional state, there are three sub-periods. 
The first sub-period, the child's reasoning, demonstrates that he has 
begun the process of the interiorization of thought but can demonstrate 
no mastery and may even fall back to the previous stage's type of 
reasoning. The second sub-stage is transitional in nature, where 
progress is apparent at one moment and not apparent at the next. The 
third sub-period is one of attainment, where the type of reasoning which 
began developing is achieved. 
Piaget outlines the three stages as follows: 
(1) From two to three-and-a-half or four years: appear¬ 
ance of the symbolic function and the beginning of 
the interiorization of schemes of action in repre¬ 
sentations. 
(2) From four to five-and-a-half years: representative 
organizations founded either on static configura¬ 
tions or on assimilations to the action itself. 
(3) From five-and-a-half to seven or eight years: 
articulated representative regulations. 
Sub-Stage I. The symbolic functions which make their appearance 
in this period are language, symbolic play, imitation and the mental 
image. 
In this first part of the preoperational period, language repre¬ 
sents an advance over the first use of words in the sensori-motor stage, 
as they begin to be used in a truly symbolic manner instead of relating 
to the immediate surroundings and actions as in Stage I. This progress 
is gradual as is the case with the growth of all major developments. 
54piaget, The Child and Reality, pp. 57-38. 
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Symbolic language can represent events which occur in the past, present 
or future, and it can represent absent things or events, and, most 
importantly, it serves as an instrument to convey changes in the struc¬ 
ture of thought and the growth of logic. The coordination and trans¬ 
formation of abstractions of the signs of knowledge is associated with 
operational thought, the beginning stages of which are constructed in 
Stages I and II. 
Play is another highly symbolic activity as it often involves 
deferred imitation of acts the child has seen other adults or children 
do, and it often involves substitute items, such as toys, in place of 
real things. Because this involves intellectual activity, play was 
recognized by Piaget to be an important intellectual activity. In 
addition, play is an important part of emotional development. 
The image and deferred imitation represent a third form of sym¬ 
bolic activity because an activity observed by the child has been 
internalized and reappears at some later time, which is evidence that 
the child has represented that activity in the form of a mental image. 
Sub-Stage II. Progress in the internalization of thought is evi¬ 
dent through elementary organization and structuring of coordinated 
action schemes. At this stage, the child is able to coordinate proper¬ 
ties of static configurations in a manner that indicates that associa¬ 
tions and connections have taken form in either classification or rela¬ 
tions of order (seriation) schemes. 
Number develops as a combination of these operations, and this 
synthesis will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
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S-Ub-.St:age III. In this last phase of this period, the process of 
internalization is completed and the operations begin to appear func¬ 
tional, that is, the four characteristics of the operation are evi- 
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dent. Reversibility reasoning is present. In addition, conservation 
reasoning as an aspect of the operation begins to attain stability, 
although many specific forms of conservation have yet to become fully 
operational. 
The Development of Logic, Hindsight and Anticipation 
Two additional characteristics begin to emerge near the end of 
the preoperational period. One is the transition from pre-logical 
thought to logical thought. The second involves hindsight and antici¬ 
patory behavior. 
Piaget states: "The difference between what is logical (or pre- 
logical) and what is sub-logical is simply that the former deals with 
the relations between discontinuous elements while the latter relates 
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to elements forming part of a spatial continuum. 
One recognizes here that the quality of reasoning undergoes a 
fundamental change, from a sub-logical level at the beginning of the 
period to a logical level at its end. In an example involving two sets 
of objects and the number of objects in each set explored earlier, we 
see that reasoning at the sub-logical level is limited by relations in 
“^See the discussion of the operation where the four characteris¬ 
tics are listed, p. 61. 
56Inhelder and Piaget, The Early Growth of Logic in the Child, 
p. 282. 
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the spatial continuum or in the figurative domain, whereas reasoning 
at a logical level is able to transcend and coordinate spatial quali¬ 
ties as such and to focus on the relationship of the density of the 
sets of objects and the length of the rows while conserving the fact 
that the equality of number in the two sets remains uneffected. 
The second characteristic, hindsight and anticipation, is an impor¬ 
tant aspect of the reversibility of thought and trial and error think- 
in8> for it allows coherence between the beginning and what comes 
after, and it may even lead them to alter what they have already done 
in the light of what followed. In other words, as soon as an assimila- 
tory schema becomes retroactive, it also takes an anticipatory charac¬ 
ter, because one cannot be consistent with the past without eventually 
making choices and forming intentions as to the future. As you 
will recall, making choices and forming intentions about the future is 
a crucial aspect of gaining volitional competence in ANISA theory. 
For Piaget, the addition of hindsight or retroactive thought and antici¬ 
patory possibilities have tremendous implications for the type of 
interaction that can occur. This quality is important, for example. 
In the construction of various levels of classificatory reasoning. 
Still more important, this quality has recently been explored 
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as a fundamental of the process of cognitive development. An 
^^Ibid. , p. 286. 
"^See Barbel Inhelder, Hermine Sinclair, and Magati Bovet, 
Learning and the Development of Cognition (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1974). 
I 
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interactive relationship between the substructures of knowledge in the 
form of implication gives rise to assimilatory mechanisms of equilibra¬ 
tion between the substructures. This will be discussed in the next 
major section, "What Are the Processes of Elaboration?" 
Differentiating Preoperational and Operational Thought 
Inhelder and Piaget have summarized the qualities of preopera¬ 
tional (pre-logical) thought in a manner which serves to contrast it 
from operational thought. Their analysis is summarized in the follow¬ 
ing three points: 
(1) When the child considers static situations, he is more 
likely to explain them in terms of the characteristics 
of their configurations at a given moment than in terms 
of the changes leading from one situation to another. 
(2) When he does consider transformations, he assimilates 
them to his own actions, and not as yet to reversible 
operations. We can reduce these two differences to 
one by saying that at the level of preoperational 
thought the static states of a given system and its 
modifications do not yet form a single system, whereas 
at the level of concrete operations the static states 
will be conceived as resulting from transformations in 
the same way as the results of various operations are 
also subordinate to the operations. 
(3) Nevertheless, even at this level we find tendencies 
toward the organization of integrated systems and we 
can discern in them an orientation toward certain 
forms of equilibrium. However, the only instruments 
available to the subject for the organization of such 
systems are preceptual or representational (regula¬ 
tions) in contrast to actual operations (regulations 
are incomplete or approximate compensations, in con¬ 
trast to operations which entail complete compensa¬ 
tions) . The difference between these two sorts of 
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mechanisms is that reversibility remains incomplete 
in the first case but is achieved in the second.^9 
The Concrete Operational Period 
This period signalizes the attainment of the functional property 
of many of the schemes or operations which began elaboration or ele¬ 
mentary structuration in the preoperational period. Operations which 
were previously unstable now reach a period of stability or equilibrium. 
A characteristic of this structural stability is full reversibility of 
the operation. The period, however, is referred to as concrete, as 
the thought structure is not yet fully separated from the concrete 
content of the event or thing and is limited in that it cannot be 
generalized to all properties or contents. With this period, however, 
comes a more fully functional transformational character of adaptive 
thought. Also, a more extensive horizontal integration of the various 
operational schemes is begun. 
Of this sub-period of concrete operations, Flavell simply states: 
It is simply that the older child seems to have at his com¬ 
mand a coherent and integrated cognitive system with which 
he organizes and manipulates the world around him. Much 
more than his younger counterpart, he gives the decided 
impression of possessing a solid cognitive bedrock, some¬ 
thing flexible and plastic and yet consistent and enduring, 
with which he can structure the present in terms of the 
past without malice, strain and dislocation, that is, with¬ 
out the ever-present tendency to trouble into perplexity 
and contradiction which mark the pre-schooler. Restated in 
Piaget’s lexicon, the concrete operational child behaves in 
a wide variety of tasks as though a rich and integrated 
■^Inhelder and Piaget, The Growth of Logical Thinking, p. 246 
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assimilatory organization were functioning in equilibrium 
or balance with a finely tuned, discriminative, accommoda- 
tory mechanism.60 
Piaget and Inhelder mention several important limitations on con¬ 
crete operational thinking, however: 
(1) From the standpoint of content, concrete thought can¬ 
not be immediately generalized to all physical proper¬ 
ties. Instead, it proceeds from one factor to another, 
sometimes with a true lag of several years between the 
organization of one (for example, lengths) and next 
(for example, weights). This is because it is more 
difficult to order serially, to equalize, etc., objects 
whose properties are less easy to dissociate from ones 
own action, such as weight, than to apply the same 
operations to properties which can be objectified more 
readily, such as length. 
(2) Thus, from the standpoint of content, the 'potential 
transformations compatible with the system links' 
which determine the boundary line between real and 
possible operations are still more limited than is 
implied by the form of the operations involved. 
(3) (There remains an instability when fields or systems 
have to be coordinated.) There is no general con¬ 
crete compositions; that is to say after the subject 
has classified or has ordered a set of properties 
serially, etc., . . . concrete thought does not solve 
all the problems raised by the interference of 
heterogeneous operations or by interaction of dif¬ 
ferent properties. 61 
Structures Attaining Stability in the Period. Many of Piaget's 
observations center on the operations of classification and seriation 
which are established during the concrete operational period. Support¬ 
ing these operations are various types of conservation reasoning, such 
^Opiavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, p. 165. 
^Inhelder and Piaget, The Growth of Logical Thinking, pp. 249-250. 
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as the conservation of numerical correspondence, of length, of weight. 
and of volume. The operations relating numbers and their relations 
are also established. 
Piaget also observes that, "this period of concrete operations 
can be divided into two stages: one of simple operations and the other 
of the completion of certain whole systems, especially in the fields 
of space and time." 
In addition to the whole system mentioned here are the parent 
structures previously referred to, such as the algebraic structure or 
the ordering structure. Because of the complexities of possible inter¬ 
relationships among the operations, Piaget uses several terms (actually 
borrowed from mathematics and logic) to describe the operations during 
the concrete operational stage and the formal operational stage which 
follows. The terms are "groupings" and "the group." "The first opera¬ 
tional structures are called 'groupings' and give the child the means 
to know the world within the stable systems of logical classification, 
fil 
seriation, numbers, spatial and temporal coordinates, and causality." 
During the stage of formal operations, these "groupings" are 
associated into more complex stable structures called "groups." Tn 
essence, they permit operations to be performed on operations and they 
are governed by sets of rules, as has been previously discussed under 
the section on structures. 
^Piaget, The Child and Reality, p. 58. 
OJFurth, Piaget and Knowledge, p. 247. 
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Stage III: The Formal Operational Stage 
This is the last and culminating stage in the development of a 
fully functioning intelligence. It commences at about the age of 
eleven or twelve and several years later may attain a functional 
maturity. This stage is characterized by the combination of operations 
into complex networks of thought, groups and lattices. In addition, 
thought becomes propositional in nature and the period is sometimes 
titled the hypothetical-deductive stage. At this stage, thought is 
freed from the limitations characteristic of the concrete stage. 
Finally, in formal thought there is a reversal of the direc¬ 
tion of thinking between reality and possibility in the 
subjects' method of approach. Possibility no longer appears 
merely as an extension of an empirical situation or of 
actions actually performed. Instead, it is reality that is 
now secondary to possibility. Henceforth, they conceive of 
the given facts as that sector of a set of possible trans¬ 
formations that has actually come about; for they are 
neither explained nor even regarded as facts until the sub¬ 
ject undertakes verifying procedures that pertain to the 
entire set of possible hypotheses compatible with a given 
situation.64 
Formal Thought and The Combinatory System 
(Interpropositional Operations) 
The most general property in terms which we can charac¬ 
terize formal thought is that it constitutes a combina¬ 
torial system, in the strict sense of the term. ... So 
the main feature of propositional logic is not that it is 
verbal logic but that it requires a combinatorial system. 
Secondly, the combinatorial operations are second degree 
operations: permutations are serial orders of serial 
orders; combinations are multiplications of multiplica¬ 
tions, etc.^ 
6^Inhelder and Piaget, The Growth of Logical Thinking, p. 251. 
65Ibid. , p. 254. 
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Piaget and Tnhelder go on to state that this most general princi¬ 
ple of combinatorial operations is a direct result of an even more 
general principle, the most important distinguishing characteristic of 
formal thought, namely, the reversal from a reality-centered to 
propositionally-centered system. 
By way of introduction to these last and crowning structures of 
the intellect, it is important to note the variety of characteristics 
that an operation can have. First, operations can function as single 
unintegrated structures, as is characteristic of the preoperational 
stage. Beginning with the concrete operations stage, there is a higher 
degree of both horizontal and vertical integration as is witnessed in 
the grouping, lattice, and group structure operations. In this stage, 
operations can function within an intrapropositional context. Finally, 
in the formal operations stage there is attained an interpropositional 
function of operations. This is where all of the structures function 
in a truly integrated manner, that is, they can "operate" on one 
another in combination. Finally, for conceptual clarity, it is impor¬ 
tant to state that operations vary with respect to their level of 
generality; i.e., there are specific or limited task-oriented opera¬ 
tions such as conservation, classification, seriation, etc., as there 
are also more general operations (because of the width of potential 
applications), such as those in the sixteen binary operations and the 
INRC (Identity, Negation, Reciprocity, Correlation) group. 
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The Binary Operations: The Formal Combinatorial System, 
Forming an Interpropositional Lattice 
Inhelder and Piaget, in exploring the nature of propositional 
logic, have identified sixteen rules of logic which the adolescent uses 
in solving complex problems. They constitute part of what is the 
mature form of thought. The basic sixteen binary operations form a 
very flexible system of combinations. Each of the binary operations 
is derived from logic and mathematics. The system utilizes in a 
language of expression the discrete and separate elements of "p" and 
"q". A line above the element p (p) means not p or "it's false." 
Since this system of logic does not appear in reasoning until 
adolescence is reached (after twelve years of age) and since the major 
thrust of development which is concern to the development of number 
occurs much earlier than this, I shall limit myself to a brief presenta¬ 
tion of these operations.^ 
(1) Disjunction (p v q) = (p • q)v(p • q)v(p • q), 
either, or 
(2) Its inverse, conjunction negation (p • q), neither 
(3) Conjunction (p * q) , both 
(4) Its inverse, incompatibility 
(p . q) = (p • q)v(p • q)v(p • q) 
(5) Implication (p q) = (p * q)v(P * q)v(P * 9) 
(6) Its inverse (p • q) 
(7) Converse implication (q p) = (p * q)v(p • q)v(p • q) 
(8) Its inverse (p • q) 
66Ibid., pp. 103-104. 
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(9) Equivalence (p = q) = (p • q)v(p . q) 
(10) Its inverse, reciprocal exclusion (p v q) = 
(p ’ q)v(p • q) 
(11) Independence of p in relation to q p (q) = 
(P * q)v(p • q) 
(12) Its inverse (which is also its reciprocal) 
p(q) = (p • q)v(p . q) 
(13) Independence of q and q in relation to p, 
i.e., q(p) and q(p) : 
(14) These operations are found in (15) 
(15) Complete affirmation or tautology (p * q) = 
(P • q)v(p • q)v(p . q)v(p . q) 
(16) Its inverse, complete negation or contradiction (0). 
Piaget and Inhelder derived these combinatory operations through 
observations of the propositional logic which adolescents use to solve 
complex problems. They observe when commenting on the reasoning used 
by one boy in solution of a problem: "When formal equilibrium has 
been attained the combinational system which characterizes the 'struc¬ 
tured whole' pays off in full, and the subject is no longer satisfied 
with reasoning based on simple concrete correspondence. For example, 
when GOU has observed the non-correspondence of the stopping points 
with weights, he does not feel that his proof is adequate ('rigorous') 
because he realizes that if weight acted to produce an inclination of 
the plane, it could be combined with other factors. 
^Ibid., pp. 103-104. 
67Ibid., p. 67. 
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The problem presented to the boy was to determine why a metal bar 
attached to a non-metallic rotating disk stops when the metal bar 
points to one pair of boxes instead of any other boxes placed around 
the disk. The crucial pair of boxes contained several magnets con¬ 
cealed in wax. 
In summary, Inhelder and Piaget state with respect to the dif¬ 
ference between concrete and formal operational thought: 
Although concrete operations consist of organized systems 
(classification, serial ordering, correspondence, etc.), 
they proceed from one partial link to the next in step- 
by-step fashion, without relating each partial link to all 
others. Formal operations differ in that all of the possi¬ 
ble combinations are considered in each case. Consequently, 
each partial link is grouped in relation to the whole, in 
other words, reasoning moves continually as a function of 
a 'structural whole. 
What Are the Processes of Elaboration? 
According to Piaget, a similar mechanism (biological 
adaptive mechanism) must account for the first cognitively 
adaptive behavior of the child. Adaptive behavior results 
from functional assimilation of pre-existing biological 
structures. The first signs of mental activity are those 
behaviors through which new elements are incorporated 
(i.e., assimilated) into genetically pre-programmed struc¬ 
tures, such as sucking objects and extended to a variety 
of objects, and, since it has to be slightly modified 
(i.e., accommodated) to each different object, it leads to 
sensori-motor recognition of objects and events. Herein 
lies the origin of the first 'knowing' activities of the 
subject. (Emphasis is mine.)6^ 
Piaget's model for the elaboration or development of cognitive 
68Ibid. , p. 16. 
69Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development^ 
Cognition, p. 3. 
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structures is based on a biological model by analogy, i.e., as the 
origin of biological man is accounted for by biological laws and 
mechanisms, so also is Piaget's theory of intellectual development. 
The living functioning organism seeks a dynamic interaction with its 
environment, constantly extending itself into the environment and yet 
striving to maintain its own organization. Interaction creates a con¬ 
dition such that the organism must constantly adapt or change, must 
coordinate and transform things around and within its own organization 
to survive. This interaction in the realm of intellectual development 
is accounted for by Piaget in the equilibration theory. 
For Piaget, this parallelism between morphogenic development and 
the development of knowing structures is so fundamental it is an 
unavoidable conclusion: 
To sum up, in biological terms it would be out of the ques¬ 
tion to consider the organization of action schemata inde¬ 
pendently of endogenetic factors, if for no other reason 
than that, as was fundamentally the case with all previous 
ones, these schemata constitute dynamic or functional forms 
indissolubly linked to the static or anatomical forms 
represented by the structure of the organs. . . . Most 
instincts are allied to specialized organs, it is true, but 
it is nonetheless true that perception and acquired 
behavior, including the higher types of operative intelli¬ 
gence, do, in a more supple way, manifest certain func¬ 
tional possibilities or 'reaction norms' of the anatomical 
and physiological structure of the species. In a word, 
the general coordinations of action upon which the building 
up of the most basic types of knowledge is conditional, 
presuppose not only nervous conditions but coordinations 
of a much more deep-seated kind, those which are, in fact, 
interactions dominating the entire morphogenesis.70 
70Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, pp. 9-10. 
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In short, Piaget states: "It is not possible to understand 
psychological development without considering its organic roots. 
Explication of this thesis lies within the theory of equilibration and 
auto-regulation. 
Equilibrium and Auto-Regulation 
The essential starting point here is the fact that no form 
of knowledge, not even perceptual knowledge, constitutes 
a simple copy of reality, because it always includes a 
process of assimilation to previous structures. We use 
the term assimilation in the wide sense of integration into 
prevous structures.' A 
Organisms interacting with their environment incorporate into the 
basic structure the materials of the environment. These materials are 
modified or transformed during the process of incorporation or assimi¬ 
lation. The process of assimilation is governed by the nature and 
state of development of the organism; i.e., a plant cell assimilates 
different materials than does an animal cell according to the internal 
makeup of the cell. Before the organism’s structures are completely 
established, that is, during the period of growth many environmental 
factors can determine the ultimate form of the adult; i.e., an organism 
can adapt to environmental pressures. An example used by Piaget 
involves the growth of a type of mollusk. Due to varying conditions 
71Piaget The Child's Conception of Space, trans. F. L. Langdon 
and J. L. Lunzer (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), cited by 
Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development o£_Co^niL on> 
p. 5. 
7^Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, p. A. 
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of growth, specifically, the roughness of the water in which develop¬ 
ment takes place, the shell can develop in a widened or shortened man¬ 
ner. Rough water requires greater muscular activity of the snail's 
foot under these conditions which in turn determines the modification 
of the shell's structure. The potential for this response to environ¬ 
mental pressure is built into the snail's genetic endowment, as was 
the case with innate knowledge; however, it does not become evident 
unless conditions demand it. So also, for Piaget, the development of 
human intelligence is adaptive and coordinating in character, con¬ 
stantly responding to the environment in an interactive manner. 
Adaptation is either in the form of acquired behavior during the life¬ 
time of the child or in long term change in the genome. 
Piaget's interactionist or constructivist model of development 
represents a significant addition to existent models of the evolution 
of psychological development. His is an extension of modern theories 
of biological evolution. Piaget, in the work Biology and Knowledge, 
traces the development of evolutionary theory from Aristotle to Lamark 
and Darwin and then to modern theorists such as Waddington. Lamark 
emphasized the importance of environmental pressures which produced 
changes, adaptations and characteristics in the organism. He hypothe¬ 
sized that these changes are incorporated into the genetic endowment of 
the individual and are passed on to future generations. Darwin 
accounted for the evolution of the species through natural selection. 
Support for this thesis was gained through the advent of modern genet¬ 
ics which suggested the mechanism of mutation. 
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Waddington, according to Piaget, was responsible for solving the 
conflict between these two views of evolution "of the double notions 
of structure or organization and of genesis or development, so as to 
include the recognition that all development is an organization, and 
all organization a development." 
The idea that all development is a kind of organization 
became obvious from the moment that phylogenetic evolution 
was seen to be partly dependent on embryological growth and 
on the ontogenetic formation of phenotypes, and not simply 
the inverse. It took a great embryologist turned geneti¬ 
cist, like Waddington, to make clear, at last, how out of 
the question it is to explain evolutive variation simply in 
terms of preformation or chance, ruling out any ideas of 
intervention by environment. As soon as it is recognized 
that selection is brought to bear only on phenotypes and 
that, throughout their period of development, all pheno¬ 
types continue to be a series of 'responses’ made by the 
genome to tensions set up by the environment, or that the 
environment is just as much organized by the organism as 
phenotype variation is directed by the environment, then it 
becomes possible to speak of the 'cybernetic circuits' 
. . . and development can be seen as a series of organiza¬ 
tional ladders, all different and all perpetually subject 
to cyclic causality. 
Piaget's model of psychological development is based upon this 
idea that all life is essentially an organization and that this organi¬ 
zation forms an interactive whole with the environment. As the knowl¬ 
edge structures or intellectual organization of the child are in an 
active relationship with the environment, so they respond or adapt and 
change with environmental pressures or tensions. At the same time, the 
environment is being organized and changed by the child, hence the 
organizational ladders and the perpetual cyclic causality. Within the 
73Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, p. 135. 
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context of the interactive whole is the idea that organization places 
constraints or limits on the amount and nature of the change that can 
take place; e.g., the phenotype, as in the case of the mollusk men¬ 
tioned earlier, has a limited response to the environmental pressure 
of rough water in the form of enlarging the foot and changing the size 
of the shell. For the developing child, a similar limitation exists; 
i.e., the internal organization through a progressive series of 
equilibrations is modified bit by bit. However, the internal organiza¬ 
tion imposes a directionality to the course of development. 
Equilibrium in action is defined as: "an active compensation set 
up by the subject against exterior disturbances, whether experienced or 
anticipated. Further, equilibrium is a state of balance, a state 
of dynamic tension between the organism and the environment function¬ 
ing as a "regulatory organ." As a "regulatory organ," it governs the 
nature of the interaction taking place between the organism and the 
environment. This is accomplished through change in the internal 
structure. Knowledge at any one time can be at a certain state of 
development. Through contact and interaction with the environment, 
the child assimilates or takes from the experience what can be 
incorporated. Again, from the biological sciences comes an analogy 
to intellectual growth: "Embryological research has shown that the 
organism must have reached a certain level of competence, or 
sensitivity, to specific environmental stimuli before it can respond 
75 Ibid., p. 12. 
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to them. This new approach no longer stresses the role of external 
stimuli, but concentrates on the internal competence or sensitivity 
of the organism: stages of embryonic development are characterized by 
changes in competence. The state of internal competence of the 
structure of knowing determines what can be assimilated. That which 
is assimilated has an effect or influence on the action schemata or 
knowing structure, the result of which is a modification or accommoda¬ 
tion of the knowing structure. This modification produces a new state 
of competence. This dynamic relationship between assimilation and 
accommodation constitutes the foundation for the equilibration model. 
Equilibrium and Equilibration: Product and 
Process—Homeostasis and Homeorhesis 
Piaget makes distinction between the formatory process and the 
state of equilibrium resulting from it. Again from the biological 
model, systems once established tend to withstand the pressure to 
change; i.e., the ability to remain in balance, returning to the 
original state. This is called homeostasis. For example, warm 
blooded animals maintain internal temperatures within certain limits. 
Exposure to cold brings into play many homeostasis mechanisms; e.g., 
changing the pattern of blood circulation away from the outer layers 
of skin thereby increasing the depth of the insulation layer. Another 
such mechanism is the shivering reflex. Homeostasis is responsible 
76Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development of 
Cognition, p. 5. 
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for maintaining balance in the structure or organization. So also, 
Piaget describes the effects of environmental perturbations on the 
functional structures of intelligence. The process of equilibrium in 
an intellectual sense is much like the biological homeostasis. 
This process, however, is inadequate to explain the regulation of 
systems which are as yet not established. Tt is inadequate for the 
following reason. 
No theory which seeks to explain the origin of knowledge as a 
system of assimilations and accommodations during interaction with the 
environment is able theoretically to account for the fact that no 
matter how different the experiences or culture of a child may be, the 
learning pattern always passes through the same stages, develops the 
same schemes and operations, and encounters the same developmental 
problems, because there is a developmental course. Further, a condi¬ 
tion of balance or return to the original state, as would be the case 
with a homeostatic equilibrium, would not allow for the changes which 
occur bit by bit during the normal developmental course. 
For this reason, Waddington's internal regulatory mechanism of 
"homeorhesis" and his notion of "necessary routes" to development or 
"Chreods" have been adopted by Piaget.77 The concept of chreod recog¬ 
nizes the potentially troublesome possibility of explaining the observa¬ 
tion of common learning patterns and stages among all children through 
a preformation argument. Preformation would imply, for instance, that 
77Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, pp. 12-25. 
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any particular piece of knowledge already exists within genetic endow¬ 
ment. As such, this answer is completely unacceptable. Yet, the 
problem of common patterns and stages of learning remains. However, 
within the concept of the chreod (necessary routes to development) is 
the explanation that development is channeled through a complex inter¬ 
play of regulations, or homeorhesis. This idea of channeled formations 
relates to the just discussed constraints that a state of internal 
organization places on the path of development. The concept of 
homeorhetic equilibrium incorporates the idea that there will be a 
change or adaptations to the state of development or internal organiza¬ 
tion and the idea that this change will occur bit by bit within the 
context of constraints placed upon development because there is an 
organization. In the example at the very beginning of this section, 
new elements are assimilated into genetically preprogrammed structures 
and as a result mental structures are extended. Within this context, 
Piaget accounts for organic growth through the complex interaction of 
three developmental regulations: (1) programming by the genome, 
(2) environmental influence, and (3) equilibration or auto-regulation 
* „ 78 factors. 
In cognitive growth, Piaget interprets these three developmental 
regulators as (1) maturation of the nervous system, (2) interaction 
with the physical reality, (3) interaction with the social milieu, 
and (4) equilibration or auto-regulation. Maturation defined in this 
78 Ibid., p. 35. 
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way takes programming by the genome into consideration as it is this 
factor which controls the development of the nervous system. 
"The nervous system exerts its influence upon the whole field of 
functional regulations in their twin aspects of internal regulation 
(coordination of the various physiological mechanisms) and regulation 
of exchanges within the environment."^ Environmental influence is 
divided into recognizably important spheres of interaction sites for 
the developing child, the physical and human environments. 
All of these factors combine in a complex interactive manner 
during the process of formation acting as a system of internal controls 
which Waddington has described as homeorhesis and which serve to guide 
or channel development within its normal course. Without the con¬ 
trolling influence and because the environment provides no bounds to 
the possible interactions, the growth of the intellect would vary 
greatly from person to person, culture to culture. 
To sum up, throughout development there is a progression in the 
type of equilibration observed. During the formation process, the 
regulatory functions are described as homeorhetic. Formation leads to 
the establishment of structures which maintain balance through a 
homeostatic equilibrium. This differentiation between processes and 
function has lead Piaget to distinguish levels of equilibration. These 
levels or states of equilibrium are reflections of the state of the 
development of the inner structure. For example, structures tend to 
79 Ibid., p. 33. 
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become more mobile or flexible as the child progresses from a pre- 
operational to the operational stage. This is accomplished through 
progressive change in the fields of application or fields concentrated 
on. The child tends at first to be ego centered (self-centered), then 
progresses to a perceptual centration on objects, and finally on to a 
free or decentered state, which is characterized chiefly by reversi¬ 
bility (inversion or negation). This last state Piaget describes as a 
state of operational equilibrium or a "stable form of compensation 
„ ,.80 
systems. 
The Assimilation-Accommodation Continuum 
Assimilation and accommodation are the specific processes of 
equilibration model. Assimilation basically describes the incorpora- 
tive mode of intellectual activity, that is, it describes the process 
by which an event or thing is taken into the inner structure of the 
organism. For Piaget, this is part of the auto-regulatory mechanism 
of equilibration. As a result of assimilation, new schemes and struc¬ 
tures are built, which in turn can assimilate new and different material 
as the structure is progressively established. Assimilation then is 
closely related to Piaget’s thesis that knowledge is not a copy of 
reality but is transformed by the action schema when it is incorporated. 
Knowledge is also conditioned by meaning, that is, the meaning that a 
specific environmental reality can have is dependent upon the state of 
80 Ibid. , p. 25. 
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internal development. Hence, assimilation is closely linked with mean- 
ing, as an assimilation cannot take place without it. Assimilation 
also relates to the active aspect of knowing, because knowledge func¬ 
tions as a transforming system. 
Accommodation describes the process of modification as a result 
of that which is assimilated, in other words, accommodation is at the 
heart of adaptive mechanisms of change in the structure. As each 
accommodation or modification occurs, new assimilations can take place. 
In fact, these twin processes are inseparably linked. Flavell observes 
that: 
Although assimilation and accommodation are distinguished 
conceptually, they are obviously indissociable in the con¬ 
crete reality of any adaptational act. As will become 
clear, when intellectual adaptation is discussed, every 
assimilation of an object of the organism simultaneously 
involves an accommodation of the organism to the object, con¬ 
versely, every accommodation is at the same time an assimila- 
tory modification of the object accommodated to. Taken 
together, they make up the constant attributes of even the 
most elementary adaptational act. 
Adaptation, through its twin components, assimilation and 
accommodation, express the dynamic, outer aspect of bio¬ 
logical functioning. But an adaptive act always pre¬ 
supposes an underlying organization, and is the second major 
functional invariant. 1 
The Developmental Relationships and Connections Between the 
Acquisition Processes and Various Cognitive Structures 
Recently, Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet (1974) published a summary 
of research directed toward a study of the developmental relationships 
81piavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, p. 45 
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and connections between the acquisition processes and various cognitive 
structures. Their conclusions lend important support to Piaget's 
general equilibration model and constitutes a significant contribution 
to our understanding of the processes of learning and the development 
of cognition. 
The main goal of our learning studies was to get a better 
insight into the transition (or construction) mechanisms 
which enable children to attain certain concepts that are 
essential for scientific thought. . . . The epistemologi¬ 
cal conviction that progress in human knowledge results 
from dynamic processes which imply self-regulatory mechan¬ 
isms led us to pay close attention to clashes between the 
different patterns of thought that constitute a subject's 
competence at a certain level of his development, to the 
conflicts resulting from these clashes, and, especially, to 
the different ways these conflicts can be resolved. Two 
different types of conflict can be observed. First, dif¬ 
ferent subsystems, each developing at its own developmental 
rate, can create a conflictual situation, since once system 
may already have reached a more advanced state than another. 
Second, the child's reasoning may be at a level where he 
becomes aware that experimental reality does not conform 
to his deductions or inferences.82 
The subsystems which were studied were different concepts of con¬ 
servation (numerical, physical and spatial). These were linked in 
learning studies to determine the relationships between them. As 
reported, many of these interactions resulted in conflict of two dif¬ 
ferent types. In some instances, the clash did not produce observable 
progress in the elaboration of the structures but seemingly functioned 
to disturb the state of equilibrium. In other cases, however, progress 
or growth in the structures did occur. This was particularly evident 
82Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development of 
Cognition, p. 242. 
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when problems that required a logical system (class inclusion problems 
where logic is most important) were compared with those which seemingly 
could be solved by physical manipulations (conservation problems where 
objects are of greater importance). Two chapters are devoted to this 
comparison. The children in Chapter VII were trained in class inclu¬ 
sion problems and post tested in conservation reasoning. The opposite 
was true in Chapter VIII where the children were trained in conserva¬ 
tion problems and post tested in class inclusion problems. The con¬ 
clusion reached was that: "exercises in inclusion, if successful, 
have a more marked effect on conservation than vice versa. 
There seems to be a fundamental difference between these 
reactions to the different types of problems, although both 
show the dynamic features of an imminent transition to 
operatory situations. The difference is due to the fact that 
in logic it is the subject himself who introduces an organi¬ 
zation; this organization concerns the hierarchical relation¬ 
ships of the classes, which may be modified at will, pro¬ 
vided that this does not entail modification of the logical 
system itself. By contrast, the subject cannot introduce 
or exclude at will a property of an object (e.g., weight in 
a problem of density), nor modify the dimensions of objects 
displaced in a problem of spatial conservation. To solve 
problems where schemes are enriched and modified by the 
properties of the object, the subject plans actions whose 
result does not necessarily match his prediction; in the 
case of logic, there must of necessity be identity, whence 
the absence of contradiction and compromise in the solution 
of logical problems. 
The existence, and even the frequency, of the compromises 
in physical problems and their absence in that of logico- 
arithmetic operations (apart from the modifications of 
schemes in the handling of the classes and subclasses 
referred to above) must be regarded in the light of the 
fact that in logical problems the contradictions lead either 
83 Ibid., p. 240. 
109 
to regression or to rapid progress, while in physical ques¬ 
tions conflicts between the resistances of reality and the 
subject's schemes, or between various, but still isolated 
schemes, are far from tenacious.8^ 
In keeping with the fundamental purpose of this entire work, 
namely, to explore the relationship between learning and the development 
of cognition, they conclude: "The problem is, therefore, to determine 
which psychological mechanism is responsible for the progressive improve¬ 
ments in the successive forms of equilibrium improvements, and perfec¬ 
tions that Piaget refers to today as 'equilibration majorante— 
heightening equilibration.' The source of the progress is to be sought 
in the disequilibrium which incites the subject to go beyond his 
O C 
present state in search of new solutions." 
Many specific transition mechanisms are explored in this work 
when considering the specific interaction between subsystems. As these 
subsystems are important to the development of number and as the transi¬ 
tion mechanisms are important to elaboration of the ANISA Theory of 
Development, Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet's specific result will be 
discussed in the next two chapters. The general conclusion, however, 
which indicates that it is the child's emerging sense of awareness, 
ability to make inferences and implications brought about by conflicts 
arising between the structures of knowing, which determines much of 
the cognitive development at this stage is an important addition to a 
discussion of the Piagetian notion of equilibration. 
8^Ibid., pp. 263-264. 
85Ibid., p. 264. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUMERICAL THINKING 
Introduction 
Once upon a time, so the story goes, there was a squire who wanted 
to catch a crow who lives in a nearby tower in a castle. The squire 
found, however, that as soon as anyone entered the base of the tower 
the crow would fly away and stay away until the person left. The 
squire was determined to catch the crow and entered the tower with one 
other person. One left and the squire stayed, but the crow stayed 
away until the squire had left also. So next, he entered the tower 
with two others, then three others and still the crow stayed away until 
all three or four persons had left. When five entered the tower, the 
crow returned after only four had left. The crow’s inability to 
"count" beyond four proved to be a fatal shortcoming. This inability 
to "count" on the part of the crow is not actually hypothesized to be 
an inability to count, but rather relates to a "visual number sense." 
Zimiles, in a study of the development of numbers, found that in 
a series of training exercises in the use of numbers, young children 
demonstrate a capacity similar to that of the crow's, regarding work¬ 
ing with and learning from small groups of objects. This intuitive 
1Herbert Zimiles, "The Development of Conservation and Differentia 
tion of Number," Society for Research in Child Development (monographs) 
Vol. 31, No. 103-108 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1966), pp. 1-46. 
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sense of the "how manyness" (numerosity) of small collections of num¬ 
bers has been substantiated in many studies that will be reported 
later. It is interesting to note that a study of the structure of 
many languages reveals that early man, when first beginning to build 
languages, incorporated this intuitive aspect of number in the form 
of singular, dual, and plural, and in words that express one, two and 
three in the form of single, more, and many. 
In most Indo-European languages, the original significance 
of the word for ’three* was roughly ’over,' 'across,' or 
beyond, one would imagine, to groups of three being 
formerly among those regarded as 'many,' and later, when 
distinguished from other forms of 'many,' still seem as 
more than or beyond, groups of two. There is a possibi- 
bility a further linguistic indication of man's early aware¬ 
ness of only 'one,' 'two,' and 'many' in the distinction 
made in ancient languages and still retained in some modern 
languages, between the singular, dual and plural.2 
Man's abilities with number have obviously developed far beyond 
these elementary forms. In general, number as now used, requires an 
ability to organize and conceptualize information from the environment 
in a highly complex abstract way. The nature of that construction is 
the subject of this chapter. 
In a recent and interesting review of the development of the con¬ 
cept of number, Brainerd (1973) traces its origins from the philosopher- 
mathematician Pathogoras to the more modern mathematicians and 
philosophers Frege, Peano and Russell. Anita Riess (1947) in a review 
of "number readiness" research (1900-1947), as it was titled then. 
2 
Donald Smeltzer, Man and Number, Second Edition (London: A. & C. 
Black, Ltd., 1970), p. 5. 
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indicates a trend toward the recognition of the importance of dealing 
with the cognitive prerequisites of number instead of a reliance upon 
rote memorization of counting from one to ten and rote learning or 
addition and subtraction problems which characterized (and to some 
extent still characterize) educational approaches. A notable example 
is the recent television series of young children called "Sesame 
Street, whose major thrust in mathematics has been oriented toward 
rote—memorization of the number sequence. 
Although there is no universally accepted theory of the cognitive 
prerequisites and foundation of number, Piaget’s theoretical formula¬ 
tions have come to dominate much of the research and educational prac¬ 
tice around the world. 
Piaget, after devoting his attention to an inquiry of the way 
children think, to the changes in their thinking and to the growth of 
a structure such as number, has theorized that the period of develop¬ 
ment of number (of pre-number to number thinking) corresponds to the 
period of the development of logic (of pre-logical to logical thinking). 
In fact, number and logic form a single and natural system which 
culminates in logico-mathematical thought. 
This chapter will, therefore, be devoted to an exploration of the 
topic of the growth of the system of logical and number thinking. This 
development, as was discussed in the previous chapter, occurs in a 
gradual and hierarchically arranged series of stages. The major struc¬ 
tures which are developed through these stages which contribute to 
number and logic are the systems of the inclusion relation and the 
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asymmetrical relation. Their eventual operational synthesis forms the 
single system of number. The first part of the chapter is, therefore, 
theoretical in orientation. The second half of the chapter will be 
devoted to a review of research as it relates to the major topics of 
number development. A portion of the review of research is incor¬ 
porated into the next chapter as it is of direct relevance to the 
learning to learn of number. 
Logic, Number and Inference 
Our hypothesis is that the construction of number goes 
hand-in-hand with the development of logic, and that a pre- 
numerical period corresponds to a pre-logical level. Our 
results do, in fact, show that number is organized, stage 
after stage, in close connection with the gradual elabora¬ 
tion of systems of inclusions (hierarchy of logical classes) 
and systems of asymmetrical relations (qualitative seria- 
tions), the sequence of numbers resulting from an operational 
synthesis of classification and seriation. 
This hypothesis is a highly condensed statement of the central con¬ 
cerns important to a description of the development of number. In a 
broad sense, the themes evident are: (1) the construction of number 
goes hand-in-hand with the development of logic; (2) there is a close 
connection between the gradual elaboration of systems of class and 
seriation and the organization of number; and (3) number results from 
the operational synthesis of classification and seriation. 
The thesis that number and logic develop hand-in-hand provides a 
framework for a developmental description of number. Number and logic 
3Jean Piaget, The Child’s 
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. 
Conception of Number (New York: 
, The Norton Library, 1965), p. viii. 
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both reflect a basic capacity of man to organize what are the qualita¬ 
tive and quantitative, similarity and difference relations or attributes 
of the world. Logic imposes the rules and structures whereby such an 
organization occurs. Piaget, in the following reference, outlines 
generally how number and logic form a single system and how the qualita¬ 
tive and quantitative relations are organized through the two major 
structures of the inclusion of classes (based on relations of similar¬ 
ity) and asymmetrical relations (based on relations of difference). 
In our view, logical and arithmetical operations therefore 
constitute a single system that is psychologically natural, 
the second resulting from generalization and fusion of the 
first, under the two complementary headings of inclusion of 
classes and seriation of relations, quality being dis¬ 
regarded. When the child applies this operational system to 
sets that are defined by the qualities of the elements, he 
is compelled to consider separately classes (which depend on 
the qualitative equivalence of elements) and asymmetrical 
relations (which express the seriable differences). Hence, 
the dualism of logic of classes and logic of asymmetrical 
relations. But when the same system is applied to sets 
irrespective of their qualities, the fusion of inclusion and 
seriation of the elements into a single operational totality 
takes place, and this totality constitutes the sequence of 
whole numbers, which are indissociably cardinal and 
ordinal A 
In a certain sense, logic can be thought of as the larger category 
of the two (number and logic) and will therefore provide an orientation 
to the major changes which are taking place in development at this 
time. From the above reference, however, it can be seen that this dis¬ 
tinction between logic and number is artificial, for they form a single. 
^Ibid., p. viii. See also the discussion in the previous chapter 
on the Bourbaki "parent" structures, p. 68 
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natural system which eventually expresses itself as logico-mathematical 
thought in the concrete operational stage. 
Piaget describes two basic levels In the development of logic. 
The first is the pre-logical and the second is the logical. During 
the sensori-motor stage, Sub-Stage IV,5 6 7 which occurs sometime around 
the end of the first year, the child's reasoning is characterized by 
a coordination of action schemes serving as means to an end relations. 
In this stage, "the child is no longer at the mercy of chance encounters 
but begins to follow a 'logic of action' according to the method of 
trial and error. The child will now eagerly explore new things by 
means of numerous action schemes with which he is familiar. If he can¬ 
not reach a desired object by himself, he will pull his mother's apron 
to make her bring it to him. Schemes are active and mutually coordi¬ 
nated to serve as means to an end in an action sense. Piaget illus¬ 
trates this by numerous observations of the child's removing an 
obstacle in order to reach a desire, but inaccessible object."6 The 
"logic of action" is limited in that it applies to external actions 
only, however, it does signalize the beginning of the organization of 
reality on the basis of general schemes of action. "These schemes 
include the organization of space and time, of causality, and, most 
importantly, of permanent objects, among which is found the self. 
5See the discussion of Chapter Two concerning the sub-stages of 
the sensori—motor period on p. 74. 
6Furth, Piaget and Knowledge, p. 47. 
7Ibid., p. 51. 
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The next advance in the pre-logical period has been described by 
Piaget as the logic of functions." It occurs during the pre- 
operational period. It "refers to the child's ability to understand 
not merely simple cause-effect relations such as fire-heat, cooking- 
dinner, but functional correlations of dependency. A four—year-old 
will know that the relative size of different containers determines the 
quantity of fluid that he can pour into them or that the force of a 
push required to displace an object is proportional to its weight. In 
these law-like generalizations, there is a clear affinity to more mature 
logical and causal concepts and a stopping short of the mature opera- 
g 
tional level." The logic in this period, the pre-operational stage, 
is still of limited form, as the coordinations are of external actions 
now represented in symbolic form but are limited in direction; i.e., 
the actions are not simultaneously reversible as in operational logic. 
During these early stages of development, Piaget explains that 
there is an important relationship between causal links made by the 
child with respect to actions on objects, such as pushing and pulling, 
and the coordination of these actions into action schemes which are the 
precursors of logico-mathematical structures. 
Every sensori-motor action is causal in its psycho- 
physiological mechanism and in its results on objects, 
since it amounts to using them materially by displacing 
them, linking them together, etc. However, none of these 
particular actions remain exclusively causal, since by 
being repeated, by being generalized, by being connected 
with others, etc., it becomes part of the continuous 
8Ibid. , p. 97. 
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construction of a schematism dominated by the requirements 
of a general coordination, this second aspect of actions 
providing the basis for future operations of intelligence. 
At the outset, therefore, there are both a close connection 
between the causal aspect of actions and the aspect that 
can be called logical.9 
The importance then of these early causal functions or the "logic 
of functions" is that gradually actions are coordinated into what 
remains at this stage action schemes which are the precursors to the 
latter structures of logic. There is then a linking or coordination of 
discrete or separate actions into coordinated action schemes of con¬ 
tinuous functions. 
With the advent of operational reasoning in the concrete opera¬ 
tional period, Piaget describes the beginnings of the mature and natural 
logic. This period is divided into two parts also. The first is the 
period of operational logic, where reasoning is fully internal and 
coordinations are fully and simultaneously reversible. During this 
period, the logic of classes and of asymmetrical relations becomes 
evident. 
During the last and culminating stage of development, the formal 
operational period, logical reasoning becomes propositional in form. 
Here a mature and formalized system of logico-mathematical thought 
characterizes the reasoning of the adolescent. This period occurs well 
after the period of the formation of number; however, it is clearly 
dependent upon earlier formulations. 
^Jean Piaget, with the collaboration of R. Garcia, Understanding 
Causality, trans. Donald and Marguerite Miles (New York: W. W. Norton 
and Company, Inc., 1974), p. 114. 
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Two dimensions of the growth of logic are to be found in Piaget's 
descriptions of the levels of abstraction and inference. Three levels 
of abstraction were introduced in Chapter Two. They were: (1) recogni- 
tive assimilation, (2) practical reflection, and (3) reflective abstrac¬ 
tion. During the first stage, the child becomes aware of an action or 
a pre-logical class. For example, a chair may be recognized on the 
basis of use as when the child sits down on it or uses it as a stool 
to get something out of reach. At this stage, however, there is no 
coordinated or simultaneous recognition of the uses of the chair, as 
properties of the same object. This type of recognitive assimilation 
corresponds to the earlier stage of pre-logic, the logic of action. 
At this stage, there is a practical or perceptual recognition of 
means-end relation. Reasoning at this stage, because it is based on 
perceptual characteristics, is often arbitrary and ambiguous; i.e., 
the child does not use logical criteria. For this reason, the type 
of inference used by the child is referred to by Piaget as pre- 
inf erential. Because the criteria used to classify an object are 
perceptual and not logical, children often are lead to incorrect solu¬ 
tions to problems. 
Lunzer, in tracing the development of inferential reasoning, cites 
an example used by Piaget in The Growth of Logical Thinking. The 
example involves the reasoning used by children to predict why objects 
10E. A. Lunzer, Translator's Introduction to the Early Growth of 
Logic in the Child; Classification and Seriation, by Barbel Inhelder 
and Jean Piaget (New York: The Norton Library, W. W. Norton and 
Company, Inc., 1969), pp. xxi-xxii. 
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sink or float. At a logical inferential stage, children will invoke 
explanations which approximate Archimedes' law which is fundamentally 
based upon a concept of density. The concept of density requires the 
coordination of the dimensions of weight and volume; i.e., density is 
directly proportional to the weight or mass and inversely proportional 
to the volume £d = . As mass increases, density increases per unit 
of volume, but as volume increases, density decreases if the mass is 
held constant. Archimedes' law involves a further coordination or 
comparison of the relative density of the material compared to an 
equal volume of water. Prior to this, operational coordination pre¬ 
dictions of inferences are based solely on perceptual criteria that 
are chosen outside of any logical framework. As a consequence, often 
the predictions made by children are incorrect and, therefore, 
arbitrary. 
During the transitional stage, the arbitrary use of criteria and 
incorrect judgments begin to conflict in the child s mind with observa¬ 
tions of the data. The child becomes aware of the conflict as logical 
inferences begin to be made, however, these inferences are often 
unstable; i.e., the child may fall back on purely perceptual arguments 
partly because the criteria chosen remain arbitrary and ambiguous and 
because a frame of reference of logical "necessity" is not yet present. 
Logical necessity would require a deliberate use of criteria, which is 
to occur in the next stage. It is the awareness of conflict during 
this stage, however, that provides the incentive to eliminate the 
arbitrary and ambiguous use of criteria. The state of logical necessity 
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results from the successful resolution of the problem. 
At this level, a certain "practical reflection" of knowledge 
becomes evident. Practical reflection is the second level of abstrac¬ 
tion. It is a great advance over simple recognitive abstraction which 
involves mere recognition of the uses of an object, for logic begins to 
intervene. There is a coordination of criteria through trial and error 
problem-solving. 
During the last of these three stages, reasoning becomes logical 
and systematic. This is the stage of reflective abstraction which is 
characterized by a logical coordination of actions or events. In the 
example cited involving Archimedes’ Law, the child at this stage is 
able to take into account the relative weights of equal amounts of 
water and object. This requires both a deliberate selection of the 
criteria of volume and weight and their comparison with the relative 
volume and weight of an object. The child is able to reason in this 
manner because experiential data are assimilated into operational 
structures and a kind of feedback or reflecting abstraction occurs 
between elements of the internal structure.11 This process of reflec¬ 
tive abstraction is, in essence, a process of reconstruction where 
existent structures are reflected and coordinated into new structures 
at a higher, more stable level. In a sense, it represents the triumph 
of the internal operational structure which is logical in form over the 
physical (perceptual) environment and knowledge structures; for instead 
^1See Appendix I, which is Furth’s schematic of "The Knowing 
Circle," part of which shows how reflective abstraction functions. 
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of the imposition of the perceptual field, logic and the internal 
operational structure govern thinking. 
Relationships are now conceptual representations at a symbolic 
level. Manipulation of these relationships is now governed by the 
rules of transformation characteristic of each structure.12 In con¬ 
trast to a child at a pre-inferential level who is unaware of the 
chain" of reasoning steps used in making the inference, the child at 
this stage is consciously aware of the steps used to solve a problem. 
The young child, when asked a question requiring a logical and inferen¬ 
tial explanation of why an event occurred, will often use a one-step 
answer to solve the problem. Mosher (Bruner, 1964) asked children, 
six through eleven years of age, "What caused a car to go off the road 
and hit a tree?" The young child simply would ask, "Did the driver 
fall asleep?" or "Was it slippery?" The older the child, however, the 
more structured became inferentiallv consecutive questions of a 
"constraint-locating" type. As the child develops, logic matures and 
the child is able to handle greater numbers of connected steps to more 
complex problems. In a fourth stage, the formal operational stage, 
inferential mechanisms fully mature and reasoning is hypothetico- 
deductive or propositional in form. This stage of reasoning occurs 
12See discussion in the previous chapter under What Is a Structure 
of Knowledge, p. 61* 
13F. A. Mosher, Strategies for Information Gathering, paper read 
at Eastern Psychological Association (Atlantic City, New Jersey, 
April, 1962), cited by J. Bruner, Studies in Cognitive Growth, "The 
Course of Cognitive Growth," American Psychologist, 1964, 19, pp. 1-15. 
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long after number has been established. 
To this point, the discussion of logic has been general. As was 
quoted in the beginning of this section, Piaget mentions that "logical 
and arithmetical operations constitute a single system." The specific 
operations which apply to both systems are classification (inclusion 
of classes) and seriation (asymmetrical relations). When qualitative 
aspects alone are considered, the logical operation is emphasized. 
When, however, the system is defined by quantitative aspects, then the 
arithmetical or number operation emerges. A discussion of the qualita¬ 
tive and quantitative aspects of thought relates directly to the 
development of conservation reasoning; hence, this will be discussed 
next. 
Conservation 
Earlier mention was made of Piaget's contention that conservation 
is a necessary condition of all rational activity. Indeed, there must 
be a permanence to the definitions used in language, to matter dealt 
with physically, as conservation is the ability to preserve the whole¬ 
ness of an object or concept when it is transformed in shape or form. 
Naturally, this must also be the case with respect to number as: 
A set or collection is only conceivable if it remains 
unchanged irrespective of the changes occurring in the 
relationship between the elements. For instance, the permu¬ 
tations of the elements in a given set do not change its 
value. A number is only intelligible if it remains identi¬ 
cal with itself, whatever the distribution of the units of 
which it is composed. In a word, whether it be a matter of 
continuous or discontinuous qualities, of quantitative 
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relations perceived In the sensible universe, or of sets 
and numbers conceived by thought, whether it be a matter of 
the child’s earliest contacts with number or of the most 
refined axiomatizations of any intuitive system, in each 
and every case the conservation of something is postulated 
as a necessary condition for any mathematical understand- 
ing.w 
The ability to attribute constancy to the environment is one which 
is so fundamental to thought that Zimiles refers to it as a "mode of 
thinking about reality, a logical orientation that recognizes that the 
number of objects constituting an aggregate is not changed merely by 
rearrangement. He (Piaget) has regarded the understanding of number as 
signalizing the onset of logical reasoning, and the ability to conserve 
number as an indication of the presence of an operational mode of 
cognition, that is, the ability to deal with reality in representa¬ 
tional terms. 
When the child applies an operational system to sets that are 
defined by the qualities of their elements (color, shape, width, etc.), 
he is compelled to consider separately classes (which depend on the 
qualitative equivalence of the elements) and asymmetrical relations 
which express the seriable differences. Through perceptual judgment, 
qualities are attributed to objects. Resemblance between these 
qualities results in the classification of objects, e.g., a set of 
blue objects, no matter what their shape and size, are grouped on the 
basis of the quality blue. Asymmetrical differences, however, can imply 
lApiaget, The Child's Conception of Number, pp. 3-4. 
l5Zimiles, "The Development of Conservation and Differentiation of 
Number," p. 1. 
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more and less and "thus indicate the beginnings of quantification 
(e.g., 'A is larger than B,' or 'A is narrower than D'). In its primi¬ 
tive form, therefore, quantity is given at the same time as quality, 
since it is constituted by the asymmetrical relations that necessarily 
link any qualities one to another. Qualities, per se, do not, in fact, 
exist; they are always compared and differentiated, and this differen¬ 
tiation, since it includes asymmetrical relations or difference, is the 
16 germ of quantity." 
From a psychological and educational point of view, quantity has 
its origin in the early differentiations of perceptual judgments. 
Piaget formulates three stages in the development of operational 
quantification. Further, he hypothesizes that the notions of quantity 
and the notion of the conservation of quantity are one and the same. 
The child does not first acquire the notion of quantity 
and then attribute constancy to it; he discovers true 
quantification only when he is capable of constructing 
wholes that are preserved.^ 
If we consider conservation and the conservation of quantity one 
and the same, then the following discussion of the stages of conserva¬ 
tion directly relate to the stages of the development of number to be 
discussed. 
l6Piaget, The Child’s Conception of Number, pp. 10-11. 
17 Ibid., p. 5. 
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Conservation and Number 
Stage I 
At the level of the first stage, quantity is therefore 
no more than asymmetrical relations between qualities, 
i.e., comparisons of the type 'more' or 'less' contrived 
in judgments such as 'it's higher,' 'not so wide,' etc. 
These relations depend on perception, and are not as yet 
relations in the true sense, since they cannot be coordi¬ 
nated one with another in additive or multiplicative 
operations.IS 
Comparisons of the type "more or less" characterize this first 
stage as a stage of simple qualitative difference. Piaget refers to 
this type of comparison as that of "gross quantification," i.e., 
"quantification is restricted to immediate perceptual relationships."^ 
During this stage, which is prior to conservation reasoning, quantity 
can increase or decrease according to the perceptual dimensions which 
have been differentiated. 
The first two chapters of Piaget's treatise on number are devoted 
to a study of the stages of the development of conservation of continu¬ 
ous and discontinuous substances. An example of continuous quantity 
studies is liquid, where beads is an example of discontinuous quantity. 
Conceptually, these two types of matter were treated separately because 
of the aspect of correspondence; i.e., it was hypothesized to be easier 
to see a one-to-one correspondence between a discrete or discontinuous 
substance such as beads than it would be to see a correspondence between 
18Ibid., p. 5. 
l9Ibid. , p. 11. 
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an amount of liquid volume. In the case of continuous quantity, for 
example, when a liquid is transferred from Cylinder (short with a 
wide diameter) to Cylinder A2 (tall with a smaller diameter), the 
level of the liquid perceived by the child rises, hence there is more 
in A2 than in A^ according to the child. In the case of discontinuous 
quantity, for example, when two equal sets of beads are poured into 
differing containers, placed one by one into different shaped con¬ 
tainers or made into lines with varying density and length, the largest 
perceptual display (height of container or length of chain) determines 
the greater amount for the child. Typically, the child when asked, 
"Which has more?" before any transformation, will answer, "They are the 
same." After pouring the liquid into another container or shortening 
or lengthening the line of beads and being asked which has more, the 
child will respond that the tallest or the longest has more. 
(2) 888888888 -> 8808080800 000 
In all of the cases mentioned, there exists a gross quantification, 
a perceptually based differentiation. The criteria singled out, such 
as height, width, etc., which form the basis for judgment as solution 
to the problem, remain in a single and uncoordinated relation with the 
other criteria; further, the child chooses and applies them incon¬ 
sistently, first one then the other. Clearly then, it is not a problem 
of having no basis for judgment, but rather one of not taking into 
account the relationships among the criteria available that leads us to 
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the conclusion that the child as yet cannot conserve quantity. "In 
every case (cited by Piaget), perception and concrete judgment attri¬ 
bute qualities to objects, but they cannot grasp these qualities with- 
20 
out thereby relating them one to another." 
In a conservation of liquid problem, where the liquid changes 
shape, there are a variety of available criteria from which to choose. 
The child in Stage I consistently applies one and only one criterion 
at a time, choosing from among available criteria; e.g., height, cross- 
section (diameter) , or the number of containers. This is characteris¬ 
tic of pre-logical judgment where these criteria are applied in an 
arbitrary and inconsistent manner. 
The application of one criterion gives a different answer to the 
same problem depending upon which is chosen. As a result, the child 
constantly contradicts himself. Further, "the child behaves as though 
he had no notion of a multi-dimensional quantity and could only reason 
with respect to one dimension at a time without coordinating it with 
others. 
"The main characteristic of the perceptual relationships of gross 
quantity used by the child at the first level is that they cannot be 
22 
composed one with another either additively or multiplicatively. 
In general, this simply means, for example, that as the height of a 
20Ibid., p. 10. 
21Piaget, The Child's Conception of Number, p. 10 
22 Ibid., p. 11. 
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liquid seems to rise as you place it in a narrower container, the 
child judges there to be more liquid because he is unable to coordi¬ 
nate the dimensions of both weight and diameter. 
A second important dimension of the development of the conserva¬ 
tion of quantity is that of part-whole relationship; i.e., the ability 
to partition a quantity into equal units. For example, the child in 
Stage I, upon seeing a single large glass of lemonade poured into three 
equal, but smaller glasses will judge there to be more liquid in the 
smaller glasses because there are more of them. During a recent visit 
to a pre-school Head Start program, I observed a boy, who had been 
given two cookies and milk, proceed to break his cookies into many 
pieces spreading them out over a large area in front of him. Accord¬ 
ing to his explanation, he then had more cookies than he was given. 
This apparently had been a daily routine for some time. 
It is evident that during this first stage the child’s reasoning 
is governed by the perception of apparent change. Because of this, 
judgments are not corrected by a system of the coordination of rela¬ 
tions and partition which can alone insure the invariance of quantity. 
Stage II 
During the first stage, the child establishes the ability to dif¬ 
ferentiate gross quantity. During the second stage, the child begins 
to coordinate relationships with respect to the multi-dimension nature 
of quantity, and begins to partition quantity into equal units. 
At this stage, the child is attempting to coordinate the per¬ 
ceptual relations involved and thus to transform them into 
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true, operational relations. Whereas the child at the 
first stage is satisfied that two quantities of liquid 
are equal if the two levels are the same, irrespective 
of the width of the containers. The child at the second 
stage tries to take the two relations into account simul¬ 
taneously, but without success, hesitating continually 
between this attempt at coordination and the influence of 
perceptual illusions. 3 
Gradually, reasoning based on the perceptions of apparent change 
gives way to attempts to coordinate the perceptual relations thus 
transforming them into operational relations. During this, the second 
stage, this attempt on the part of the child is, however, not consis¬ 
tently applied, hence this is referred to as a transitional stage. It 
is, nevertheless, a period of great importance for in the previous 
stage the child was satisfied with his judgments of quantity. During 
this stage, however, the incorrectness of a judgment becomes apparent 
to the child and judgments based solely on criteria alone conflict 
with judgments made using another dimension. "This liquid is higher in 
the tall, narrow glass, therefore it looks like there is more but it 
is the same liquid as before which means that it hasn t changed, but it 
looks like there is more, so there is more." The child realizes his 
judgments are in conflict and he, therefore, begins to coordinate 
them or to logically multiply them to use Piaget’s term. As the length 
of the row of counters gets longer, the density lessens. 
These coordinations, however, remain incomplete at this stage. 
In addition, the second major aspect necessary for conservation (parti¬ 
tion) has yet to develop. Partition is the part-whole, whole-part 
23 Ibid., p. 15. 
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1stionship. You can divide the lemonade into three small glasses of 
lemonade but you still have the same amount. 
Relationships are coordinated by the child, according to Piaget, 
in one of two ways, i.e., through addition or multiplication (not to 
be confused with arithmetic operations of addition and multiplication). 
What, in fact, is logical multiplication of the relationships 
of height and width? If we have a series of containers of 
the type A (A^, A2, A3, etc.) containing liquid at increasing 
levels, we shall say that the child can add relations if from 
Ai < A2 and A2 A3 he can deduce that A^ A3. The operation 
obviously taking place only on the practical plane, the levels 
being clearly perceptible. If we take another series of con¬ 
tainers of increasing width (L, B, A, P, etc.) we shall again 
say there is addition if there is undimensional coordination 
of the relationships. But we shall say that there is logical 
multiplication of the relationships when the child compares 
the containers from the point of view of the two relationships 
simultaneously, e.g., when the column of liquid L is both 
higher and narrower than that in A.24 
To logically multiply relations then, the perceptual relations can¬ 
not simply be taken one at a time (or added) but must be considered 
simultaneously whereby the change in one dimension is compensated for 
by a change in another dimension. In order to simultaneously consider 
that an increase in one dimension is compensated for by a decrease in 
another, it is clear that a new level of the internalization and mean¬ 
ing of the dimension considered by the child is being constructed. The 
operation is beginning to emerge. 
Piaget also uses the terms "intensive and extensive quantifica¬ 
tion" in order to further distinguish the difference between types of 
quantitative judgments which can result from additive and multiplicative 
24 Ibid., p. 20. 
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relations respectively. An example of an intensive quantitative rela¬ 
tion is where the child coordinates one dimension at a time. The effect 
of this uni-dimensional coordination is to limit the additive effect 
of the dimensions considered. Extensive judgments typically begin to 
be made in this, the second stage, but they are not stable. Extensive 
quantification is where dimensions are considered simultaneously and 
the effect is able to be added. An example involving number might be 
where ..... is changed to ..... and the child realizes 
that lengthening is compensated for by a decrease in density. 
The transition from addition of relations described as 
intensive quantification to multiplication of relations 
described as extensive quantification is bound up with the 
introduction of the possibility of using numerical data 
and measurement to make more accurate what is merely a 
qualitative comparison in the form of, for example, more 
or less, wider or narrower.^ 
During this stage with regard to number, the transition from quali¬ 
tative correspondence to numerical equivalence is begun, although not 
completed until the next stage. Qualitative correspondence is based 
upon the perceptual correspondence of, for example, two sets of counters 
| * * * * . As long as the one-to-one correspondence is maintained, 
the quantity remains equal for the child. It is as yet not a numerical 
equivalence, however, as when the perceptual correspondence is destroyed, 
as in .*.* *. Y . , then the quantitative equality is destroyed for 
the child; i.e., the equivalence is not lasting because it is not based 
upon "numerical data and measurement." 
^Ibid. , pp. 20-21. 
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This stage is then referred to as the stage of intuitive 
qualitative correspondence because there is no lasting equivalence 
between sets, "because the equivalence of the sets is recognized only 
when the correspondence is actually perceived, and ceases to exist 
when it is no longer in the field of perception. "2® 
This particular stage in the development of number occurs just 
prior to the third stage. With regard to number reasoning, it has been 
referred to as the notion of "quotity." The term originated with 
Cournot and was used by P. Greco and is intended to distinguish a state 
of reasoning just prior to the attainment of numerical quantity."27 
"The child of the level of 'quotity' is quite capable of giving the 
correct answer when asked how many objects there are in one collection 
after he has counted those in the other, but he still thinks that there 
are more objects in one of the collections: 'There are six there, and 
six there, the same number of counters when you count them, but it's 
not the same; there are more counters there.' Furthermore, children 
sometimes affirm the invariance of the correspondence between the ele¬ 
ments of the two collections—'there's one red for each blue'—but con¬ 
tinue to maintain that all the same 'there's more there than here.'"2® 
2®Ibid., p. 65. 
27P. Greco, "Quantite et Quotite," In Structures Numeriques 
Elementaires (Vol. 13 of "Etudes de'epistemologie genetique" by 
P. Greco and A. Morf). Paris: P.U.F., cited by Inhelder, Sinclair 
and Bovet, Learning and the Development of Cognition, p. 37. 
28 Ibid. , p. 37. 
The notion of quotity provides insight into the level of develop¬ 
ment at this stage. Clearly, the child can count and can assert that 
there is a numerical equivalence between the sets. This equivalence 
is based on the perceptual strength of one-to-one correspondence, how¬ 
ever, when the collection is altered, it is evident that a true 
logical equivalence or numerically based notion of quantity has not 
yet been established. Compensation reasoning does begin during this 
stage, but it is not firmly established as yet; nor has the notion of 
partition (whole-part, part-whole) come in to being for the unit which 
is basic to number requires logical partition of the quantity dealt 
with. These developments take place during Stage III. 
Stage III 
This is the last and culmination stage in the construction of 
number conservation and numerical equivalence. Invariance, in the form 
of conservation and numerical equivalence, involves a processes whereby 
compensation and partition are coordinated to create the unit, which 
is the fundamental quantitative unit. This processes essentially occur 
through what Piaget describes as an equating of differences. Several 
examples follow. 
The first example, although it is not one involving number, is 
nevertheless similar in process to that of number conservation. It is 
an example of the construction of continuous quantity conservation. 
First of all, Piaget states that in pouring a quantity of liquid from 
one beaker to a taller, narrower beaker should be sufficient in itself 
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to establish equivalence (it is the same liquid), however, for the child 
at either Stage I or II, it is not sufficient. The child in Stage II 
begins to be able to make what are described as qualitative seriations; 
i.e., he is able to compare the two levels of liquid poured from the 
wide, short beaker to the tall, narrow beaker concluding that the liquid 
is higher in the second beaker. Qualitative seriation also means that 
he is able to coordinate the two relationships of level and width 
together. Piaget designates the two beakers A and L and states: "This 
means that on comparing the liquids in A and L he can at once see that 
the level in L is higher than that in A; i.e., that it is equal to that 
in A plus a difference. Similarly, he can compare the liquids and see 
that L is narrower than A, the width of L thus being equal to that of 
A, less a difference. But there is no means in these simple comparisons 
of quantifying these relationships otherwise than as 'more* or ’less.’" 
This is so for two reasons; first, the child does not see conservation 
or invariance as a necessity, and second, he has not constructed the 
notion of partition as yet. "Our contention is that at a given moment 
the child grasps that differences compensate one another, and this is 
the beginning of extensive quantification, because then the heterogeneous 
qualitative relationship (increase in level and decrease in width) are 
seen to be equal, though still preserving their value of asymmetrical 
difference. It is thus that proportion comes into being, through the 
2 9 
combination of equality and asymmetrical relationship." 
^Piaget, The Child’s Conception of Number, pp. 22-23. 
135 
This is an example of what Piaget calls the equating of difference. 
In essence, it is when the child is able to understand that the increase 
in height in the tall-narrow container establishes the difference in 
height and that difference is accounted for or equated through being 
able to compensate the change in width and height of the two containers. 
"There is arithmetical partition as soon as the elements of a whole 
can be equated with one another and yet remain distinct. Moreover, the 
equating of difference, which we have just stated to be the principle 
of extensive quantification, gives rise during the third stage to truly 
numerical partition, which is not only synchronic but complementary to 
the discovery of proportions."^ 
The second example involves establishing this same equating of dif¬ 
ferences through use of discrete quantities in the form of counters or 
objects in correspondence with one another. 
At the second stage, the child is still on the intuitive 
plane. He sees that length and density of the rows are 
variable and he is perfectly coherent from the point of view 
of the perception in assuming that this variation involves 
variation in number, and this prevents him from attempting 
composition. Where he ceases to be logical, however, is in 
failing to grasp that in a contracted series the decrease in 
length carries with it increase in density. Instead of 
deducing that the result of composition is uncertain, he 
dissociates length and density and makes the mistake of 
assuming that the number of elements depends on one of the 
two only.31 
The numerosity of the two comparison sets at this stage is clearly based 
on the perceptual value of the type "more" and "less, for there is no 
30Ibid., p. 23. 
33Ibid., p. 92. 
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numerical or quantitative equivalence but rather there is a qualita¬ 
tive correspondence. Qualitative correspondence is based, for example, 
on the relative positions in the two sets. Piaget cites the example of 
two sets of three counters, one blue set and the other red, each set 
being arranged in a triangular shape, or in a row. Correspondence and 
hence number is related to the position of the counters and not to the 
absolute number of elements in the set. 
The explanation of the transition from qualitative to numeri¬ 
cal correspondence can perhaps best be given in terms of 
classes. Let us again consider the case of three blue 
counters in a triangle with a corresponding set of three 
red counters also in a triangle. Obviously, any one of the 
counters can be used to start the correspondence, but once 
it is in the figure, its position is defined absolutely, and 
the correspondence is defined by the spatial properties of 
the counter chosen. Order in no way intervenes in the 
definition of the total classes formed by the corresponding 
elements. Such is the qualitative correspondence used by 
the child (and also frequently by adults). If instead of 
making a triangle with red counters, the child puts them in 
a heap or row, or distributes them at random, the one-one 
correspondence he makes is a new type, since each counter 
no longer carries with it qualities that distinguish it from 
the others, but becomes a unit equal to the others. Each red 
counter can then correspond to any one of the blue counters, 
but to only one. Hence the set of red counters acquires its 
quality of number three, and is no longer the class of 
counters forming a triangle, just as a pair of counters 
acquires the number two and is no longer the class of counters 
forming the ends of one side of the triangle. Moreover, any 
union of a pair of counters will provide the same class con¬ 
taining two elements irrespective of their qualities. 
Piaget then goes on to directly relate this to the equating of dif 
ferences. In the above example or the other involving longer rows of 
counters, it is easily seen that perceptual one-to-one correspondence 
32 Ibid., p. 93. 
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between rows or classes that have qualities of position, length and 
density is overcome when the perceptual qualities are compensated for. 
When length and density are compensated for and combined with the 
notion of partition, then the transition from qualitative correspondence 
to numerical equivalence occurs. 
The correspondence, therefore, ceases to be qualitative and 
becomes numerical when the elements are grasped as being 
equivalent in all respects, and when the differential pro¬ 
perties that distinguish them within the set are replaced 
by the only difference compatible with their equality; i.e., 
their relative position in the order of the correspondence. 
Once again, therefore, we find it is the equating of dif¬ 
ferences that is the origin of the unit, and consequently 
of number. J 
In the third stage then, the child establishes equivalence in spite 
of distortion of the corresponding rows. Qualitative judgments become 
numerical or quantitative when increasing length is compensated for by 
decreasing density. The difference between the corresponding rows is 
equated through the establishment of extensive quantity and partition 
into equal units. 
Piaget summarizes the transition through all three stages of 
development as follows: 
At the first stage, the child confines himself to estab¬ 
lishing simple, qualitative differences. During the fol¬ 
lowing stages, where he is using only logical multiplica¬ 
tion of relationships, he progressively grades these^dif¬ 
ferences, in one or more dimensions, into intensive 
seriation of two or more terms. But these series, except 
when there is complete equality, involve only asymmetrical 
relationships of difference. Since these differences can 
be seriated, they result in intensive quantification, but 
33Ibid. , p. 94. 
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when two given quantities show two relationships of dif¬ 
ference, there is no means of equalling them. In other 
words, multiplication of relationships is multi¬ 
dimensional seriation leading only to further seriations, 
and in no way allowing of the division of a given quan¬ 
tity into units that are recognized as equal yet dis¬ 
tinct. On the other hand, both proportion and numeri¬ 
cal partition imply the fusion of asymmetrical relation¬ 
ships of difference with those of equality and it is this 
combination of equalities and differences, or, to put it 
more briefly, this equality of differences, which consti¬ 
tutes the transition from intensive to extensive quantity, 
and explains the arithmetication of logical multiplica¬ 
tion.3* 
Classification and Seriation 
Reflecting for a moment on the original hypothesis which was 
presented at the beginning of the chapter, the only aspect that remains 
to be shown is how the development and operational synthesis of the 
specific abilities to use the basic qualities of similarity in the 
class inclusion relation and difference in the asymmetrical relation of 
seriation relates to the formation of number. In the just concluded 
section on the developmental stages of conservation of number, the 
fundamental concern has already been established, i.e., the formation 
of the unit and hence number depends upon the ability to equate dif¬ 
ferences, to equate qualitative seriations (differences) and qualita¬ 
tive classes (similarity) so that true numerical equivalence is estab¬ 
lished . 
Piaget summarizes the central issues in that pursuit as 
follows: 
34 Ibid., p. 22. 
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A class is, in fact, a union of terms seen as equivalent 
irrespective of their differences. For instance, all the 
counters of a series form a class to which those at the 
ends belong on the same terms as the others; red and blue 
counters are counters irrespective of their colour; i.e., 
two classes are united to form a third by disregarding 
their difference, in this case colour. An asymmetrical 
relation, on the other hand, is the expression of a dif¬ 
ference; e.g., when counter B is on the right of A and a 
certain distance away, A and B are conceived as different. 
To unite two asymmetrical relationships in one is to add 
two differences. Symmetrical relationships are those which 
unite the elements of the same class, without thereby add¬ 
ing anything. None of these qualitative compositions, 
therefore, would make it possible to define units properly 
so called. The union of two classes in a third does not 
constitute two units, because their union results from 
their common qualities, and in the new class their dif¬ 
ferences are disregarded. The union of two asymmetrical 
relationships also does not produce two units, since the 
partial differences which are composed are not necessarily 
equivalent. The construction of number, however, consists 
in the equating of differences; i.e., in uniting in a 
single operation the class and the asymmetrical relation- 
ship. The elements in question are both equivalent to one 
another, thus participating of the class, and different 
from one another by their position in the enumeration, 
thus participating of the asymmetrical relationship. More¬ 
over, since these differences are differences only of order, 
they are equivalent one to the other.33 
From a developmental perspective, it is clear that the use of the 
class inclusion relation and the asymmetrical relation upon which the 
ponstruction of number depends is far from their beginnings. The 
uniting of both similarity and difference in a single operational 
system is a development which occurs usually between the ages of five 
to eight. Prior to this operational synthesis, important preparations 
are occurring in the child’s thought with respect to classification 
and seriation. 
35Ibid., pp. 94-95 (emphasis is mine). 
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Classification: Developmentally, classification skills begin 
with the differentiation of qualitative attributes of objects. These 
attributes are, for example, shape, color, size and use. Earlier men¬ 
tion was made of the child's use of a chair in connection with recogni- 
tive assimilation. Early in development, pre-logical forms of classi¬ 
fication are demonstrated through the logic of action with respect to 
objects; i.e., the child knows that a chair and stool can be used to 
sit on. As there is no coordination or relationship between these 
objects with respect ot use, Piaget notes that this is prior to even 
simple classification. Children nearing four years of age when given 
a set of attribute blocks which have size, color and shape can form a 
simple class usually on the basis of size first. Color and shape fol¬ 
low as attributes to be used in simple classification. However, chil¬ 
dren of this stage, because attributes are selected arbitrarily, are 
unable to demonstrate the presence of a consistent sorting scheme. 
This is typical of the child in the first stage of the construction of 
conservation reasoning, of the use of inferential reasoning. 
Consistent use of criteria is naturally the next logical step 
to be taken by the child, which allows more complete classes to be 
constructed. After this development occurs, more complex patterns of 
classificatory schemes become possible. Described here is a general 
pattern of development and not a strict order in which development takes 
place. Kof sky (1966) , in a study to see if there is a consistent order 
to the development of classificatory skills, administered a series of 
tasks typical of types of levels of classification to one hundred and 
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twenty-two children between the ages of four and nine. Results were 
analyzed by scalogram analysis. The tasks used were resemblance sort¬ 
ing, consistent sorting, exhaustive classes, conservation, multiple 
class membership, horizontal reclassification and hierarchical classi¬ 
fication. Resemblance sorting is based on the idea that objects 
are equivalent because they look alike in some way. Consistent sort¬ 
ing involves placing more than two objects considered equivalent in 
a class. Exhaustive sorting extends to all the objects in the class 
without number limit. Multiple class membership required that objects 
not belong exclusively to one or another category. The test of 
multiple class membership used involved two different sized sets of 
triangles (small and large). The large triangles were either red or 
green and the small ones were all red. First using just the red ones, 
the child was asked if they all belong together. Then the others were 
introduced and the child was asked, "Do the green ones go in the bag 
for triangles?" Horizontal classification required using one attri¬ 
bute at a time to form different groupings with the same objects. 
Hierarchical classification involves the establishment of a relation 
between sets grouped on the basis of a single attribute: e.g., rodents 
are members of the class mammalia which is in turn a member of the 
larger class vertebrata.36 Although her results did not support a 
strict order to the attainment of skills, the first three, resemblance, 
consistent and exhaustive classification, did clearly fall respectively 
■^Ellin Kofsky, "A Scalogram Study of Classification Development, 
Child Development, 1966, 37, pp. 191-204. 
into a pattern of order of difficulty. In addition, multiple class 
membership, hierarchical classification and the inclusion relation 
proved to be most difficult and were attained at a later age. 
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Piaget and Inhelder see the "coordination of extension and inten¬ 
sion as the central problem in the development of classificatory 
behavior." As has been mentioned previously, intension refers to 
those properties "specific to the given class that differentiate it, 
such as 'web feet,' 'color' and 'shape.'" Extension refers to 
"properties that are common to a given class and the other classes to 
which it belongs (ducks are birds as well as ducks since they 'have 
OO 
feathers,' 'can fly,' and so on)." 
These properties of intension and extension involve relations 
which the child must learn to coordinate before multiple and 
hierarchical classification can be managed. These higher forms of 
classification therefore involve what is an operational form of 
classification in the form of the class inclusion relation. The class 
inclusion relation involves the ability to coordinate common properties 
in various ways, such as a set of objects includes heavy objects, or a 
family includes father, mother, sisters and brothers. At this point 
of reasoning, obviously conservation must be well established as 
implied in the relation is the part-whole, whole-part relation. It is 
37Inhelder and Piaget, The Early Growth of Logic in the Child, 
p. 283. 
38Richard Copeland, How Children Learn Mathematics: Teaching. 
Implications of Piaget's Research, Second Edition (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1974), p. 59. 
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easy to understand that after this development has taken place, 
quantifiers such as "All," "None" and "One" are now capable of being 
understood and used. Before proceeding with this aspect which relates 
to number, seriation is discussed. 
Seriation: Seriation implies the development of the schemes by 
which the child is able to order differences. Difference is elemental 
to attributes of objects since a differentiation and comparison necessi¬ 
tates the realization of the uniqueness of the specific attribute among 
all others. Therefore, even classification which is a system of com¬ 
parison based on similarity depends upon differentiation of difference. 
The scheme of seriation involves the ability to bring differences 
into an ordered relationship. Simple seriation typically is demon¬ 
strated through an ability to order different lengths of wood, for 
example, on the basis of increasing or decreasing length. Initially, 
the child, as in classification, applies inconsistent and arbitrary 
criteria, hence, is unable to seriate large numbers of pieces. Grad¬ 
ually, as logic develops the ability to serially order, larger groups 
of objects are developed by the child. Higher orders of seriation 
include double seriation where the child, for example, is able to 
seriate one at a time sets of different size dolls and different size 
walking sticks, then position the sets so that there is a correspon¬ 
dence between doll and walking stick. A second method of simple seria¬ 
tion with correspondence is where the child seriates the dolls first 
and then directly puts the walking sticks with the proper doll. The 
third and most advanced method of direct correspondence involves 
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placing members of each set in direct one-to-one correspondence with¬ 
out previous seriation.39 
The most important aspect of seriation to develop with respect to 
number is the transitive relation. Simply, this involves the ability 
to take, for example, three sticks of different lengths: A is shorter 
than B, and B is shorter than C, therefore A is shorter than C. The 
conclusion that A is shorter than C without direct comparison is an 
example of an operational transitivity. 
Now that the basic characteristics of the structuring of simi¬ 
larity into classes and the ordering of difference into seriations or 
asymmetrical relation has been explored, the problem remains to show how 
these two systems are synthesized into the structure of number. 
Classes are formed on the basis of similar qualities, for example, 
Object A (a purple wooden bead) and A^ (a red wooden bead) forms the 
class B (wooden beads) such that A + A^ m B. If the qualitative pro¬ 
perties of the set B are considered, they do not lead to number for 
the addition of the qualities of beads, for example, such that all sub¬ 
classes A + A-^ + A2 + A3 still equals B, the class of wooden beads. 
Further, B + B = B. Hence, the addition of qualitative attributes of 
similarity or equality, as in the addition of classes, does not lead 
to number. 
In the same sense, neither can the addition of differences or non¬ 
equalities in the form of asymmetrical relations when added together 
39Piaget, The Child’s Conception of Number, pp. 100-101. 
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account for the origin of number. If A ^ B and B<C, as in differ¬ 
ences of length, combining A and C gives us the relation A < C, which 
is expressive of difference but can in no way be considered a number as 
differences added to differences only increases the size of the dif¬ 
ference. 
Piaget mentions two basic conditions for the conversion of classes 
and seriations into number. The first essential condition is that the 
terms in a class have to be "regarded as equivalent from all points of 
view simultaneously." Essentially, this means that the qualities that 
define classes A and Aj^ have to be disregarded (e.g., color, shape, 
wooden, etc.) and the A + A^ = two objects and A + A-^ + B = three 
objects. The second condition is that "the equivalent terms must remain 
distinct. In saying that A + Ai = two beads, we are stating that A is 
40 
any bead, and Ax any other bead, but essentially different. Hence, 
at the same time A has to be considered equivalent to A-^ and it has to 
be different. 
Piaget concludes by stating: "These two conditions are necessary 
and sufficient to give rise to number. Number is at the same time a 
class and an asymmetrical relation, the units of which it is composed 
being simultaneously added because they are equivalent, and seriated 
because they are different from one another. In qualitative logic, 
the operational fusion of these two characteristics is impossible, 
since the addition of classes is commutative because the addenda are 
40Ibid., p. 183. 
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equivalent, while seriation is not commutative because the terms are 
not equivalent. Number, on the contrary, is the outcome of generaliza¬ 
tion of equivalence and generalization of seriation. For instance, the 
first unit in two is equivalent to the second, and if their orders of 
enumeration is changed, the second becomes the first and vice versa. 
This can be expressed using symbols which may help clarify what is 
intended. First, either A + or + A = 2A. Second, 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 
and 3+1=4. In each of these examples, the unit 1 is considered 
both different and the same, hence number requires the equating of 
differences. 
These basic properties of number has led to the differentiation 
of the property of number through its cardinal and ordinal value. The 
fact that a class or set of objects may contain six, seven or eight 
elements is referred to as its cardinal value. Cardinal value is then 
dependent only upon the number of objects in a set and not upon the 
color or shape of the objects. Cardinality is, however, only one part 
of what is a number. The other part is its ordinal value which is 
essentially that a set of seven objects differs from the set of six 
objects by one unit of value and a set of eight objects differs by two 
units. The ability to order this difference into the sequence six, 
seven and eight is the ordinal aspect of number. Hence, number implies 
both the ability to manage the value of the set of six elements with 
all other sets of six elements (similarity) and the ability to order 
^1Ibid., p. 184. 
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sets with six, seven and eight elements on the basis of an asymmetri¬ 
cal relation. 
Therefore, number is the quantitative attribute of the set and the 
series. Each set of objects contains a number of elements but differs 
from other sets by a specific number of units. 
Counting and Number 
A word on the role of counting is necessary in this account of 
the development of number, as counting has received a great deal of 
attention throughout history. Piaget boldly asserts "that there is no 
connection between the acquired ability to count and the actual opera¬ 
tion of which the child is capable ... if the child has not yet 
reached a certain level of understanding which characterizes the begin¬ 
ning of the third stage, counting aloud has no effect on the mechanism 
of numerical thought."42 Indeed, this is the only reasonable conclu¬ 
sion which could be reached if one is working within a stage development 
theory of logic and number; i.e., knowing how to count can provide no 
simple formula or key to the solution of problems associated with an 
edifice of thought. 
In establishing what counting is not, Piaget seems to have left 
little room for clarifying what its value is, for he states there is 
no connection between counting and the actual operations. This appears 
to provide little solace to the countless numbers of parents who have 
42Ibid. , pp. 61, 63. 
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carefully taught their children how to count, and to countless teachers 
whose main pedagogical thrust involves rote counting and discrimination 
of number exercises. In fact, Piaget provides a framework in which the 
value of counting skills can be integrated into the developmental 
sequence of number through one-to-one correspondence which leads in the 
last stage to lasting equivalence. In these stages and in the context 
of, for example, a provoked correspondence, counting can be used as 
pennies and candy are exchanged one for one. This clearly places 
counting within the greater content of the developmental pattern, as 
rote counting has been shown to have little correlation with number con¬ 
cepts (Martin, 1953; Wohlwill, 1960). 
In summary then, it should be clear that the teaching of rote 
counting can in no way substitute for what must be the development of a 
system of operational number and logic, as has been emphasized through¬ 
out this chapter. Greater emphasis needs to be placed upon the develop¬ 
mental aspects of number and less on the ability to count. Within this 
balanced context, memorization and rote counting may very well have its 
place, as it has been found that the memorization of multiplication 
tables which was eliminated with the coming of the "new math" must now 
be reinstated for there is no substitute for having those numbers 
close "at hand." 
Summary 
In order to summarize the theoretical overview of the development 
of number, the chart following this discussion has been designed. The 
1A 9 
horizontal axis is intended to show that each major topic presented 
develops through a series of stages. The major characteristics of 
each stage have been selected and presented in outline or word form. 
The vertical axis is intended to show the generic nature of specific 
concepts as they apply to the relation of equilibration to number. The 
most general category, that of equilibration, is positioned at the top. 
Under this category is the category of logico-mathematical thought. 
The specific forms and development of inference presented next derive 
directly as a specific aspect of logico-mathematical thought. The 
chart continues vertically in this manner until the discussion of the 
basic aspects of number, conservation and reversibility are presented. 
In short, the intent was to organize the relationships among the 
categories just discussed and present them in a brief and visual form. 
A Review of Number-Related Research 
A review of the research related to the number development is 
incorporated into the remainder of this chapter and into sections of 
the next chapter. As specific aspects of this review applied more 
directly to the purposes of the next chapter, it is cited there. This 
chapter includes the sections "The Developmental Sequence of Number," 
"The Conservation of Number," "Relational Terminology and Conserva¬ 
tion," "Structure of Language," "Age and the Attainment of Conserva¬ 
tion: The Mehler-Bever Controversy," and "Length, Density and Number, 
Aspects of the research related to conservation are also reported in 
the next chapter. 
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Recognition of a chair's 
use demonstrated by sitting 
down on it or using it as a 
stool; however, there is no 
simultaneous recognition of 
the properties or uses of 
the object. 
(2) (Practical Reflect ion) 
Practical—Figurative Coordination 
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1) Perceptual Groupings 
2) Invariance in Perception (the 
constancies) 
3) Perception of Stimulus Relationships 
(Do not meet the requirements of 
operational logic—reversibility, 
additivity, transitivity, and 
inversion) 
******** 
}Logic of Functions — 
Preoperational ability to understand not 
merely simple cause and effect relations 
such as fire-heat but understand func¬ 
tional correlations of dependency, such 
as the relative size of a container 
determines the quantity of fluid it can 
hold. 
Functional 
Partial Isomorphism Between Perceptual 
Inference and Conceptual Inference 
(Piaget and Morf, 1958) 
Sensory data gradually replaced by knowledge 
not immediately available in stimulus 
field but in knowledge structures; e.g., 
the class or number. 
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(1) Absence of Conservation 
(2) Perception prevails over logical 
operations 
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(A) Child can count and label objects in 
more than one way 
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evaluation of quantity based on 
numerical criteria and that based on 
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Forms of Seriation and Correspondence 
f T'V a • • L 1 « O „ ► I A 1 Double Seriation 
Simple Seriation With Correspondence- 
Direct! Correspondence 
Intuitive-Qualitative Correspondence 
(1) Beginning the construction of perma¬ 
nent sets 
(2) Transitional Stage—Perception still 
prevails but in more specific dis¬ 
criminations 
(3) Analysis is by trial and error 
(A) One-to-one correspondence—Perceptual 
equivalence (conflict) — qualitative 
identity 
(5) Stage of "Quotity"— Cournot’s termi¬ 
nology "child is capable of giving 
correct answer when asked how many 
objects there are in one collection 
after he has counted one of the col¬ 
lections: 'there are six there, and 
six there, the same number of counters 
when you count them, but it s not the 
same, there are more counters there'" 
affirms invariance of correspondence 
but insists they are unequal. 
(6) Renversibilite'—Child's belief that 
the objects can be returned to origi¬ 
nal corresponding positions, and that 
when the spatial correspondence is 
physically resumed, the numerical 
equivalence will also be resumed. 
Renversibilite' proceeds successively 
in one direction. (Atehey, et al., 
p. 95.) 
Numerical Equivalence 
| Conservation and quantifying conserva¬ 
tion 
) Combination of relation and symbolic 
representations of similarity and dif¬ 
ferences 
) Dominance of logic over perception 
) Numerical equality and conservation 
lasting or conceptual equivalence — 
quantitative identity 
| (5) Numerical quantity 
Conservation of discontinuous 
quantity, continuous quantity 
) Reversibility—Proceeds in two 
opposite directions simultaneously- 
making the conservation of numbers a 
logical necessity to a child who can 
think simultaneously of both destroy¬ 
ing and re-establishing the one-to- 
one correspondence. 
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The Developmental Sequence of Number 
A considerable proportion of number-related research after 1960 
has been devoted to substantiating Piaget’s general developmental 
sequence. Mentioned earlier in this work is the summary by Anita Riess 
who reported on number-related research prior to 1947. During this 
period, the logical foundation for number was referred to as number 
readiness. The child's lack of a "logical foundation" prior to enter¬ 
ing school was attributed to not being able to comprehend number at 
abstract levels. Piaget's theoretical structure related to stages of 
development has slowly changed the basic interpretation of the require¬ 
ments of the "logical foundation" from that reported by Riess. Among 
the research and interpretive works in the early 1960's were Dodwell 
(1960, 1961), Wohlwill (1960), Wohlwill and Lowe (1962), Hood (1962), 
Elkind (1961, 1964), and Lovell (1961). 
Dodwell (1960, 1961) used a similar experimental procedure to 
Piaget's and analyzed his results to indicate the emergence of three 
stages of development similar to Piaget's. In addition, he agreed with 
Piaget's view that an ability to count did not mean that the child was 
able to use number concepts and that the child had attained number 
conservation. 
Wohlwill (1960) developed a procedure to examine the development 
of number through scalogram analysis. His basic assumption »as "that 
the development of the concept of number has its origin in an essen- 
function of abstraction, proceeding thense by a tially discriminative 
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process of the gradual elaboration of mediating structures to an 
eventual state in which the concept exists as purely representative 
43 
symbolic entity." His was an attempt to interpret Piaget through 
the empiricist conception of development. Three stages of symbolic 
mediation were concluded to exist in the formation of number. They 
were: "An initial, pre-conceptual one, which number is responded to 
purely in perceptual terms, without any symbolic mediation; an 
intermediary one, in which the mediating structures representing 
individual stimuli on this dimension are developed, so that the per¬ 
ceptual support necessary for generalization between two equivalent 
stimuli on this dimension is steadily reduced; a final one, in which 
superordinate structures representing the number concept in the 
abstract, and relating the individual numbers to each other are elabo¬ 
rated, thereby leading to an understanding of such functional princi¬ 
ples as the conservation of number and the coordination between ordinal 
and cardinal number. 
Although Wohlwill found three stages of development, his interpre¬ 
tation of those stages was not attributed to the growth of the opera¬ 
tive structure but rather to the mechanism of mediated generalization: 
"Responses to numerical correspondence, above the simplist level, are 
clearly based on mechanisms of mediated generalization; i.e., on the 
^Joachim F. Wohlwill, "A Study of the Development of the Number 
Concept by Scalogram Analysis," Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1960, 97, 
p. 345. 
44 Ibid., p. 367 . 
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intervention of internalized symbols representing numbers."^5 The 
three stages, therefore, described by Wohlwill are not stages in a 
Piagetian sense for they are "mediated" by the developing internalized 
rule structure of the operation and not the internalized symbol. 
Wohlwill did, however, find a scalable sequence to a series of tasks, 
the simplist of which required simple recognition of the dimension of 
number chosen from among other attributes, to number conservation and 
last to the use of number in addition and subtraction. Also, Wohlwill 
substantiated Piaget's view toward counting in that it had little cor¬ 
relation to any of the tests. 
Wohlwill and Lowe (1962) designed a training study which, although 
it did not relate to the development of the overall concept of number, 
did pertain to the conditions of the development of number conservation. 
Kindergarten children with a mean age of five years and ten months were 
pre-tested and led through a pre-training exercise of matching numeral 
to a set of six, seven, or eight objects. The children were then led 
through a series of training exercises designed to correspond to three 
hypotheses which related to causes of development, the reinforcement 
hypothesis ("as the child obtains increasing experience in counting 
numerical collections of different types and different arrangements, 
he gradually learns that alterations in the perceptual dimensions of 
a set do not change its number"), the differentiation hypothesis ("the 
child has to learn to differentiate the dimension of number from this 
45 Ibid., p. 372. 
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irrelevant one”), and the inference hypothesis ("Piaget maintains that 
experiential factors can only become effective, in this realm of 
development, to the extent that it builds on the child's previously 
developed structures of thought"). The training along lines specified 
by each hypothesis involved the manipulation of the numeral-set match¬ 
ing relationship. None of the training procedures proved effective in 
inducing number conservation as they had defined it. Their definition 
of number conservation differed significantly from Piaget's formulation 
which did not involve matching the set to the visual number symbol in 
the form of the numeral. 
Elkind (1964), in a replication study of Piaget, tested to 
determine the order of the development of discrimination, seriation and 
numeration tasks. The discrimination tasks were of a type that the 
child was asked to select the "largest" and the "smallest" objects from 
a set of size graded objects. In the seriation tests, the child was 
asked to construct a stairway of nine elements after it had been demon¬ 
strated. If the child failed with nine, the number was reduced to four 
elements. Then the child was asked to insert into the stairway another 
set of elements. The numeration task utilized the stairway which a 
doll "climbed." The child was asked, "How many stairs does the dolly 
have to climb to get to this stair?" Then the stairway elements were 
mixed, i.e., the physical stairway was destroyed, and the child was 
asked to remember how many stairs the doll had to climb to reach a 
certain level. A total of ninety children were tested, thirty of whom 
had a mean age of four years and six months, thirty of whom had a mean 
155 
age of five years and seven months, and the remaining thirty had a mean 
age of six years and nine months. 
Elkind’s results were in general agreement with Piaget's in that 
similar ages and stages were found for the various tasks. 
Piaget found that the discrimination problems were passed 
at the four-year level, but the more complex of the seria- 
tion and numeration problems were not passed until the ages 
of six or seven. Through careful analysis of the typical 
performance at each age level, Piaget was able to discern 
three stages in children's ability to seriate and numerate 
size differences. 
At the first stage in the development of seriation (usually 
at age four) , children generally are unable to seriate sticks 
above a small number (three or four). At the second stage 
(usually at age five) , children are able to make a correct 
seriation after considerable trial and error, but are unable 
to insert the second set of sticks within the completed 
stairway. Children at the third stage (usually at the age 
of six or seven) are able to form a stairway and to insert 
correctly new sticks within it. Piaget observed parallel 
stages in the development of numeration. Children at the 
first stage (usually at age four) are unable to count cor¬ 
rectly and cannot determine the number of stairs the doll 
had climbed. At the second stage (usually at age five), 
children are able to tell how many stairs the doll had 
climbed when the stairway was intact, but not after it 
was destroyed. Finally, at the third stage (usually after 
the age of six or seven), children are able to say how 
many stairs the doll had climbed, whether the stairway was 
together or was in pieces. 
Elkind did observe that there was significant differences between 
the three age groups as Piaget’s stage theory predicts. The least dif¬ 
ficult tests were the discrimination tasks, whereas the most difficult 
seriation problem involved the insertion of a second set of elements 
*6David Elkind, "Discrimination, Seriation, and Numeration of Size 
and Dimensional Differences in Young Children: Piaget Rep leatlon 
Study VI," Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1964, 104, p. 27/. 
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into an already constructed order and the most difficult numeration 
problem was the determination of the number of stairs climbed by the 
doll after the stairway had been destroyed. Elkind concludes from this 
that the relative difficulty of the three tests in general and specific 
tests are consistent with Piaget’s determination. 
Elkind also found when he examined the effect of the materials 
used (blocks, slats and sticks) that "although the extent of the dif- 
j ferences was not great, there was a trend toward more successful dis¬ 
crimination, seriation and numeration of size differences with an 
increase in the dimensionality of the materials in which those dif- 
ferences appear." Increasing dimensionality in this case refers to 
the perceptibility of size differences. Elkind ends his study first 
with an analysis of specific children’s responses with respect to the 
stages of reasoning. This is followed by an attempt to recapitualize 
the issues raised by Piaget in his long and difficult to follow book, 
The Child's Conception of Number. 
Almy, Chittenden and Miller (1966), in their book Young Children s 
Thinking, presented a long and detailed account of Piaget's description 
of the child’s construction of aspects of logical thought. This is 
followed by two studies, the first was a cross-sectional study and the 
second was a logitudinal study. The two studies were in basic agree¬ 
ment. The order of difficulty of the conservation tasks studied were 
b in basic agreement with Piaget's. In addition, they showed that there 
47 Ibid., p. 283. 
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was a tendency in the transitional stage of reasoning for about half 
of the children studied to regress from "what had appeared to be an 
A Q 
understanding of conservation at an earlier period." They also sug¬ 
gested that, "while the correlations between progress in conservation 
and other measures of mental aptitude and school achievement were only 
moderately high, they were substantial enough and consistent enough to 
warrant further investigation of the understanding of conservation, and 
other manifestations of operational thought as they may relate to the 
49 
curriculum for the child in kindergarten, first and second grade." 
Hood (1962) was interested in the relationship of conservation, 
cardination and counting to mathematics achievement. He concluded that 
conservation of number was a significant factor in number readiness, 
however, his study has received a great deal of criticism because his 
assessment was based solely on teacher judgments of the arithmetic 
competence of the children studied. 
D’Mello and Willemsen (1969) administered a scalogram analysis of 
the development of four tasks which represented levels of abstraction 
in the use of number terms. Thirty-eight children were studied who 
ranged in age from three to eight years of age. Their analysis showed 
that "the child first learns to recite number words in sequence; next, 
to match visual arrays of similar objects (dots) according to visually 
^8Millie Almy, Edward Chittenden and Paula Miller, Young Children/s 
Thinking: Studies of Some Aspects of Piaget's Theory, 
Piaget (New' York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1966), p. 108. 
49 Ibid., pp. 108-110. 
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perceived equality of quantity; then to match number words to absolute 
quantity; and finally to match the visual symbol (numeral) with 
absolute quantity. 
Siegel (1971) studied the developmental sequence of a series of 
number-related tasks. They were Magnitude Discrimination of continuous 
and discrete materials, Equivalence, Conservation, Ordination, Seriation 
and Addition. Magnitude discriminations required the child to use the 
words "more" and "less" for discrete quantities and "larger" and 
"smaller" for continuous substances which were solid areas. "To under¬ 
stand these concepts, a child must recognize only simple size differ¬ 
ences; the magnitude of the difference is irrelevant." The task of 
equivalence was hypothesized to involve correspondence as the child 
was required to choose from among four alternative sets the one with 
the same number of dots as the sample. Conservation was defined as 
"the ability to recognize the identity of a set despite changes in 
relationship between elements of the set." The children had to recog¬ 
nize the equivalence of two sets of numbers with different spatial 
arrangements. It should be noted that no transformation was involved 
as the sets were pre-arranged in static arrays. "Ordination was defined 
in the present study by the child's ability to respond to a particular 
ordinal position," i.e., the child was instructed to select what had 
been previously defined as the second picture from an array of pictures 
50Sydney D'Mello and Elleanor Willemsen, "The Development of the 
Number Concept: A Scalogram Analysis," Child Development, 1969, 40, 
p. 687. 
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in which its position varied. Seriation was defined by "the child's 
ability to choose the middle-sized number in a three-number series." 
Addition was defined as "the ability of the child to select a stimulus 
which had two more objects than the sample."51 
Seventy-seven children, ranging in age from three years to four 
years and eleven months, were used. She found that there were no sig¬ 
nificant differences between performance on the two magnitude tests, 
continuous and discrete. She also found there to be no significant 
differences between the magnitude and equivalence tasks at any age. 
This was an unexpected result, as it was expected that the equivalence 
task would be more difficult than simple magnitude discriminations. 
In a similar experiment, however, Siegel (1974) did find that the 
equivalence task used in this experiment was more difficult than magni¬ 
tude discrimination tasks. The ordination task was significantly more 
difficult than the magnitude discrimination and equivalence tasks and 
was easier than the seriation and addition tasks in all age groups, 
except the three years to three years and five months group. The 
seriation and addition tasks were found to be of equal difficulty for 
all age groups. 
The scalogram analysis test was then employed to determine if the 
data showed a meaningful developmental sequence. "The expected order 
of difficulty of the tasks was as follows: magnitude continuous, 
-^Linda Siegel, "The Sequence of Development of Certain Concepts 
in Pre-School Children,” Developmental Psychology, 1971, 5, 2, 
pp. 357-358. 
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magnitude discrete, equivalence, conservation, ordination, seriation 
and addition. If this hypothesis was true, the coefficient of repro¬ 
ducibility determined by scalogram analysis would be high. The 
coefficient of reproducibility corresponds to the proportion of 
responses which fit this sequence; each time a task is passed in the 
sequence after an earlier one was failed represents an error. Thus, 
the coefficient of reproducibility = 1 - (errors/NK) where N is the 
number of subjects and K is the number of tasks. The value of the 
coefficient for each age group was as follows: 3-0 to 3-5, .89; 3-6 
to 3-11, .93; 4-0 to 4-5, .89; 4-6 to 4-11, .89. The value for all 
CO 
seventy-two subjects was .89. 
She reports that although the coefficients were high, only 57.1 
percent of the children exhibited perfect scores in terms of the pre¬ 
dicted sequence. This percentage would, of course, have been higher 
in light of her 1974 findings. She was able then to determine that 
magnitude discriminations and equivalence do proceed the understanding 
of conservation. Further, ordination develops after an understanding 
of equivalence, magnitude and conservation but precedes the develop¬ 
ment of the ability to understand seriation and addition. Siegel's 
(1974) findings are reported in the section titled "Length, Density 
and Number." 
52 Ibid., p. 360. 
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The Conservation of Number 
Number conservation is a pivotal structure upon which rests not 
only the structure of number but according to Inhelder and Sinclair in 
discussing the interaction between different fields of knowledge 
(numerical, logical, spatial, physical) in learning, "first, it seems 
clear that the possession of an elementary invariant (conservation of 
number) is a prerequisite of success—even if partial success—in 
learning experiments in any field. Until now we have been unable to 
provoke more than figitive moments of operational structuring in 
children who are totally preoperational in the pre-tests." Number 
conservation is the first of the conservation to appear. Research con¬ 
ducted at Geneva "(Piaget and Inhelder, 1941; Piaget, Inhelder, 
and Szeminska, 1948; Piaget and Szeminska, 1941) has already shown 
that children acquire conservation concepts studied in the learning 
experiments in the following order: discontinuous quantities, continu¬ 
ous quantities (liquids, solid matter [modeling clay], and then 
length)."5^ Chronological order of attainment is not meant to convey 
that these conservations are directly derived from one another. 
Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet's latest work, in fact, is devoted to a 
53Barbel Inhelder and Hermina Sinclair, "Learning Cognitive 
Structures," Trends and Issues in Developmental Psychology, 
Paul Mussen, Jonas Langer and Martin Covington (Eds.), (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 19. 
■^Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development of 
Cognition, p. 246. 
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study of some of the non-chronological relationships among the con- 
servations. 
Specifically with respect to number, however, Piaget and col¬ 
leagues see that the native concept of number, in the sense that opera¬ 
tions can be performed on them, "is slowly built upon from the first 
elementary number conservations (see Piaget and Szeminska, 1941; and 
Piaget, Inhelder and Szeminska, 1948).Therefore in a real sense 
elementary number conservation is a pivotal notion upon which rests 
the understanding of mathematics. 
Elementary number conservation is defined by Piaget as "the 
invariance of a characteristic despite transformation of the object 
or of a collection of objects possessing this characteristic. The 
conservation of number is a particular case of this general definition. 
Concerning number, a collection of objects 'conserves' its number when 
the shape or disposition of the collection is modified, or when it is 
partitioned into subsets. 
A typical procedure used to test whether or not a child has num¬ 
ber conservation (Piaget and Szeminska, 1941) utilizes sets of 
counters (manipulation objects). For example, the experimenter would 
lay out a row of seven blue counters and ask the child to put out as 
many of your red counters . . . exactly the same number as I've put 
blue ones . . . just as many, no more, no less." The child's response 
55Ibid., p. 131. 
^6Jean Piaget, "Quantification, Conservation and Nativism," 
Science, 162, 3857, 1968, p. 978. 
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is then recorded and then in order to be sure that the child appre¬ 
ciates the numerical equivalence, the experimenter may put the red 
and blue counters in one-to-one correspondence. Invariance o£ number 
Is assessed next where the experimenter lengthens or shortens one of 
the rows and then asks "Are there as many ... the same number . . . 
of blue ones as red ones or aren't there? Or are there more? How 
do you know?"^" 
In the procedure developed by Piaget and Szeminska, an attempt 
is made next to talk the conserver out of his correct judgment by 
pointing out how long one row has become and thus aren’t there more 
counters, or in the case of the non-conserver, the experimenter points 
out the original numerical equivalence. Lastly, the child is asked a 
quantity question: 'Count the blue ones (the experimenter hides the 
red ones). How many red ones are there; can you guess without count¬ 
ing them? How do you know?" 
A second arrangement is used to check the results of the first 
arrangement where, for example, the counters are placed in a circle 
and the same questions are asked. 
Using this series of tests, it is possible to determine the child's 
stage of development. During the non-conservation stage, neither the 
conservation question nor the quotity question are answered correctly. 
During the intermediate stage, some of the conservation questions may 
be answered correctly. However, the child is not able to justify his 
57 Ibid., pp. 275-276. 
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responses. In addition, the quotity question is answered correctly: 
"There are seven red ones ... so I should think that there are seven 
CO 
blue ones as well." 
In the last stage, the stage of conservation, the child is able 
to justify his answers using essentially what is an identity argument, 
a reversibility argument, or a compensation argument. Examples of each 
of the arguments are as follows: "There are just as many blue ones as 
red ones because it was right before and we haven't taken anything 
away, they've just been squashed up (identity argument). We could put 
the others in a heap as well, or put one by the other so there aren't 
more blue ones or red ones (reversibility argument) . Here the red ones 
are in a long row, but there's space in-between the counters, so that 
59 
makes it the same (compensation argument)." 
Although the specific arguments apply to number, it is interest¬ 
ing to note that Piaget sees these operating schemes as applying to 
all forms of conservation. "All conservation concepts have certain 
characteristics in common: they are based on the same operatory schemes 
characterized by transformational properties, and their acquisition is 
attested by the appearance of astonishingly similar arguments (identity, 
compensation by reciprocity, and cancellation through reversibility)." 
The fact that all of the various forms of conservation are not 
attained at the same time, but acquired over a period of years, is 
•^Ibid. , p. 277 . 
59Ibid. , p’. 246. 
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reemphasized by Piaget and Garcia (1971) through an explanation 
recognizing that there are actions in the material world and there is 
a system of coordinations or a logical part. "At the level of the 
formation of the concrete operations, every action has two aspects: 
it has a particular, material result, which constitutes its causal 
part, and it requires general coordinations which constitute its logi¬ 
cal part." Each of the forms of conservation involves an aspect 
unique to its own physical reality whereas the logical aspect remains 
essentially the same. 
This orientation to number conservation has identified several 
issues upon which the rather large array of research issues have con¬ 
centrated. One such issue involves a definition of conservation of 
number and what constitutes adequate evidence that a child has attained 
it. In the early and mid-sixties, a debate began between Braine 
(1964), Braine and Shanks (1965a, 1965b), Bruner (1964), and Bruner, 
et al. (1966) , who demonstrated that children could conserve number at 
least a year or two prior to Piaget’s findings. This controversy 
received new impetus when Mehler and Bever (1967), and Mehler, Bever 
and Epstein (1968) indicated that children as early as two years and 
six months could conserve. This is a full three years prior to what 
many others have found. These results will be presented more fully 
later. It is important at this point to establish that the criteria 
which were presented earlier involving a specific transformational 
60 Ibid., p. 257. 
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procedure, a quotlty question and justification arguments have not been 
used by the investigators mentioned. Hence, quite different results 
were obtained. Major theoretical differences are apparent when the 
need for justification arguments (identity, reversibility, and compen¬ 
sation) by the child are considered. Gruen (1966), in an analysis of 
methodological and definitional considerations, concluded that differ¬ 
ences in procedure and a basic disagreement as to the nature of the 
psychological processes that underlie conservation account for the dif¬ 
ference in age of the attainment of conservation observed by Bruner 
and Braine, et al., versus those found by Piaget and Smedslund and 
others. 
A second major area of research relates to the first aspect (the 
physical reality or actions in the material world) of the dual aspects 
of a logical operation. Basically, number always relates to physical 
objects and their arrangement. Piaget has identified a fourth and 
earlier stage in the development of number (Piaget, 1968), that of the 
topological relation, where quantitative judgments are based on cri¬ 
teria such as the length and density of a configuration. With this 
stage as a basis, and prior to elementary number conservation where 
number is not present as a concept, which one does the child attend to 
in the physical display of objects? 
Another aspect which has received considerable attention relates 
to the aspect of language and the child's understanding of the rela¬ 
tional concepts of "less," "more," and the "same," terms which are 
integrally linked to methods of ascertaining the level of conservation 
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reasoning and is reported next. 
Relational Terminology and Conservation 
Crucial to procedures used to determine the level of a child’s 
reasoning with respect to number conservation (in fact, all conserva¬ 
tions) is the child’s understanding of the words "more,” "less," and 
the "same." With some exceptions [Wohlwill and Lowe (1962); Osgood, 
Suci, Tannenbaum (1957); Braine (1959; 1962), to mention a few], most 
experimental techniques have involved the use of the relational forms 
or terms. Investigations were undertaken by Braine and Shanks (1965a, 
1965b); Smedslund (1966); Wallace (1966); Griffiths, Shantz and Sigel 
(1967); Sigel and Goldstein (1969); Donaldson and Balfour (1968); 
Piaget (1968); Rothenberg (1969); and Harasym, Boersma and Maguire 
(1971), for the purpose of determining the child's understanding of the 
relational terms. 
Donaldson and Balfour (1968) , in a study of elegant design, 
investigated children's understanding of the terms "more" and "less." 
The children were between the ages of 3;6 years and 4; 1 years. Dis¬ 
crete units were used in the form of cardboard apples to be hung or 
removed from two cardboard trees with six holes in each. Both static 
and changing situations were used and initially both equal and unequal 
situations were used. Sometimes the subject effected the change and 
at other times he or she watched. There was a series of eight dif¬ 
ferent questions: (1) A judgment of static inequality; (2, 3, 8) A 
judgment of static equality (although in 3 and 8 if the child denied 
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that one tree had more apples, he was further asked: "Is there the 
same number of apples on each tree?"; (A, 6) A situation of initial 
equality which was changed by addition or subtraction (with Question A, 
the child was passive and was asked questions; and with Ouestion 6, the 
child was asked to "make it so that there are more (less) apples on 
this tree than this one."); (5) A situation of initial inequality was 
presented and supplemented by adding or subtracting apples so that the 
difference was lessened but never made equal and then the child was 
asked to make a comparative judgment; (7) A situation of initial 
inequality was presented and the child was asked to reverse it by mak¬ 
ing the one which originally had less have more.^ 
A second study was conducted six months later with the same chil¬ 
dren in order to check the response patterns over time and to see if 
there was an influence of the use of "more" and "less" questions on the 
same day. In this study, only one tree was used which had a number of 
apples on it and the child was asked to make it so that it had less 
apples on the tree. 
"The most consistent and striking finding is that, in the great 
majority of cases, responses gave no indication that the children were 
differentiating 'less* from 'more.' Questions containing the word 
'less' were answered in the same way as questions containing more ; 
i.e. , in a way that would have been correct for 'more. In addition, 
^Margret Donaldson and George Balfour, "Less Is More: A Study 
of Language Comprehension in Children," British Journal of Psychology, 
59, A, 1968, p. A63. 
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the children showed a marked tendency to make the same response 
irrespective of which the two words were used in the instruction. In 
addition, "more" was the dominant interpretation given to the undif- 
62 
ferentiated pair. 
In the discussion of results, the authors concluded that using 
"less" appropriately apparently comes later in development. In addi¬ 
tion, when discussing the context in which children encounter these 
terms, they conclude: "It seems likely, however, that ’more’ is first 
comprehended—and produced—by children in contexts where one entity 
changes. A quite young child can commonly say 'more' when he wants 
food in addition to what he has previously been given and it seems 
credible that this is ontogenetically the term's more primitive context. 
Notice that the word 'less,' if heard by the child in this context, 
might well carry some such meaning as 'more, but not so much more.' 
One adult might say to another: 'That's too much. Give him less.'"63 
Others have provided a similar interpretation of "more" (Braine and 
Shanks, 1965a, 1965b; Hood, 1962). 
The results of the study by Harasym, Boersma, and Maguire (1971) 
confirm in general the young child's lack of understanding of the terms 
"more" and "less," although there were some important differences 
between this study and the Donaldson-Balfour study. The main purpose 
of this study was to "investigate the relationship between qualitative 
6^Ibid. , p. A6A. 
63 
Ibid., p. 668. 
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and quantitative relational terms and conservation ability by means of 
the semantic differential."64 In addition to the terms "more" and 
"less," the terms "same" and "different" were added. The children 
ranged in age from six years and two months to ten years and five 
months. The children were divided into three groups on the basis of a 
pre-test of conservation (non-conservers, intermediate conservers, and 
logical conservers). The terms relevant to conservation, "more," 
"less" (quantitative concepts), and "same," "different," were then com¬ 
pared to twelve scales of opposites, "low-high," "long-short," "wide- 
narrow," "big-small," "thin-fat," "up-down" (concrete scales); "bad- 
good," "dirty-clean," "strong-weak," "happy-sad," "slow-fast," and 
"noisy-quiet" (abstract scales). In addition, the words "mother" and 
"school" were compared to the scales as terms which came from the 
child’s everyday experience and acted as controls. 
The results showed that, "For LCs (logical conservers), the pro¬ 
files for ’more’ and ’less' seem to be opposite to each other. If one 
pole of the scale is relevant for ’more,’ the other pole appears to 
be relevant for ’less.’ For example, 'low' is chosen for 'less' and 
'high' is chosen for 'more.' On the other hand, NCs (non-conservers) 
do not appear to distinguish 'more' from 'less.' In fact, they tend 
to select the same pole for both concepts. Thus both 'more' and less 
64Carolyn R. Harasym, Frederic J. Boersma, and Thomas 0. Maguire, 
"Semantic Differential Analysis of Relational Terms Used in Conserva¬ 
tion," Child Development, 1971, 42, p. 768. 
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are judged to be ’short,' ’narrow,’ ’small,’ ’thin,’ and ’down.”'65 
The logical conservers saw the terms "more” and "less" as oppo¬ 
sites, while the non-conservers tended to confuse the terms. The logi¬ 
cal conservers could also give logical explanations while the non- 
conservers could not. The intermediate conservers were reported to 
see the two terms as different but not opposite. In addition, they 
could not give adequate explanations. The authors, therefore, con¬ 
cluded that the status of conservation reasoning and the use of rela¬ 
tional terms are related. 
One difference exists between this study and the Donaldson- 
Balfour (1968) study, and that is that instead of "less" being equated 
and undifferentiated from "more," the opposite is true; "more" is 
associated with "less." The authors explain that this may be due to 
a different procedure or to the fact that in their test the children 
were tested as a group using paper and pencil or that there is a wide 
age difference. Griffiths, Shantz and Sigel (1967) showed that "more" 
is used more often and with greater accuracy than is "less." 
Griffiths, et al. (1967) also showed in children four years and 
one month to five years and two months that the greatest difficulty 
was experienced using the term the "same." They also found that there 
was a relationship between the frequency of terms used and the type of 
material for which the term was spontaneously elicited (length, number 
and weight). The children had the least difficulty in using all of the 
65 Ibid., p. 773. 
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terms with respect to length, number next most difficult, and weight, 
the most difficult. 
One aspect of Rothenberg's (1969) study related to the child's 
understanding of these concepts. Results are in general agreement, 
that is, four-year-olds have much greater difficulty with the terms 
than do five-year-olds. Her study differentiated "lower class" and 
"middle class" four and five-year-olds. A very small percentage of 
the four-year-olds and less than half of the five-year-old children 
designated as "lower class" used the terms "less" and "more" correctly 
in conservation problems. While percentages were higher for "middle 
class" children in general, there was a direct age correlation to the 
uses of the relational terms. 
Piaget (1968) , in light of the gathering evidence that young 
children do not understand terms such as "more," objected to the Mehler- 
Bever (1967) study partly on the basis that they used the word "more" 
to show that three-year-olds could conserve. It should be pointed out 
also that many, if not all, of the number and conservation studies 
prior to 1965 did not take into account this possible confounding 
factor. 
Before leaving this topic, it is important to summarize Piaget's 
perspective on the relationship of language to the developing struc¬ 
tures of knowledge. Hermina Sinclair-DeZwart (1969) points out that 
for Piaget, "(1) The source of intellectual operations are not to be 
found in language, but in the pre-verbal, sensori-motor period where 
a system of schemes is elaborated that prefigures certain aspects of 
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the structures of classes and relations, and elementary forms of con¬ 
servation and operative reversibility ... (2) The formation of 
representational thought is contemporaneous with the acquisition of 
language; both belong to a more general process, that of the constitu¬ 
tion of the symbolic function in general. This symbolic function his 
several aspects; different kinds of behaviors, all appearing at about 
the same time in development, indicate its beginnings. The first 
verbal utterances are intimately linked to, and contemporaneous with, 
symbolic play, deferred imitation, and mental images as interiorized 
imitations." The link between language and development thus for 
Piaget is not a causal one where language and the meaning of words 
cause the development of operative schemes. 
In a recent study of the effect of verbal learning on the growth 
of the conservation of continuous quantities, Inhelder, Sinclair and 
Bovet (1974) support this view. In support of the difference between 
language understanding and operational structures, they ask in an open 
ing paragraph, "How can it be that a child would come to understand 
and use correctly the terms 'more' and ’less,' 'just as much,' and 
'the same amount,' which are common to all forms of conservation, and 
still not interpret weight and volume conservation the same?" The 
issue then of attaining conservation reasoning is not purely a verbal 
or semantic one, although as stated, the purpose of the study was to 
66Hermina Sinclair-DeZwart, "Developmental Psycholinguistics," 
Studies in Cognitive Development: Essays in Honor of Jean Piaget, 
Elkind and Flavell (Eds.), (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) 
p. 316. 
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determine the influence of verbal training on cognitive structure (the 
child's reasoning process). In order to insure that only the effects 
of learning would be related to training in the correct use of the 
words, "all cognitive training had to be avoided, no conservation 
problems presented, no transformations were effected and there was no 
true dialogue with the experimenter, nor any attempt to arouse con¬ 
flicts in the child's mind.''^7 
Initially, the comprehension and use of the terms used by the 
children at both the conservation and non-conservation levels was 
studied. Eight-eight children ranging in age from four years and six 
months to eight-years-old took part in the experiment. Although all of 
the children understood the terms elicited, there were systematic dif¬ 
ferences between the expressions conserving and non-conserving chil¬ 
dren chose to describe situations. The use of discriptive terms ("a 
lot," or "not a lot") and comparative terms ("more" and "less") is an 
example. Conserving children used the comparative terms while most 
non—conserving children used descriptive terms. The use of differen¬ 
tiated ("long"/"short," "thick"/"thin") or undifferentiated terms 
("big'V'little," "thick"/"little") is a second difference. Again, con¬ 
serving children tend to use the differentiated pair whereas non¬ 
conserving children tended to use the undifferentiated terms. The use 
of two- or four-part structures where, for example, "In situations 
where the child was asked to describe two differences at the same time 
67Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development of 
Cognition, p. 100. 
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(marbles Mc" and "d", number and size; pencils "c" and "d", length and 
thickness), and conserving children chose the following form for the 
pencils: ’This pencil is long and thin; the other is short but fat’; 
whereas the non-conservers said: ’This pencil is long; that one is 
short; this one is thin; that one is fat,' if they were capable of 
describing both differences and of using differentiated terms."68 
After determining the spontaneous use of words and phrases with 
respect to the situations presented, these same expressions used by 
conserving children were used to determine if they understood what 
they had said. The materials used to initially determine spontaneous 
reasons (modeling clay, marbles and pencils) were used again. A series 
of ten questions using the words "more" and "less" in the same ques¬ 
tion, "the same," or "as much," "more" and "fewer," "smaller-larger," 
"fewer but larger" and "more but smaller," longer pencil (when compared 
with a short, thin pencil), thicker pencil (when compared to a long, 
thin pencil) , a shorter and thinner pencil (when compared to a long, 
thick pencil) , and a longer but thinner pencil (when compared with a 
69 
short, thick pencil). 
These same ten questions were then used in a three-part training 
study which first asked the child to describe the ten situations; 
second, to carry out instructions relative to them; and third, several 
parts of the second procedure were repeated. The children were given 
68Ibid. , p. 105. 
6^See Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, pp. 103-104, for the specific 
questions. 
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one pre-test and two post-tests (the second of which was administered 
two weeks after the first). The tests were liquid conservation tests 
which had no direct relation to any of the materials used in the train¬ 
ing procedures. 
At the beginning, eighty-eight subjects were classified as 
seventeen conservers, sixteen intermediate conservers, and fifty-five 
non-conservers. Almost all of the children made no operatory progress. 
"Some children made neither operatory nor verbal progress and used the 
higher level expressions only sporadically at the experimenter's 
insistence. For each new question, they returned to typical non¬ 
conservation expressions. All the other subjects, however, definitely 
benefited from the verbal exercises, regardless of whether they made 
operatory progress."70 Three subjects progressed from non-conservation 
to conservation; however, one of them regressed to an intermediate 
level at the second post-test. One child who was a non-conserver at 
the first post-test progressed to a conservation level at the second 
post-test. Seven children progressed from a non-conservation level to 
an intermediate level. Nine children, although they remained at a non¬ 
conservation level, modified their arguments in the post-tests. 
We think that this effect of our training procedure is 
instructive, particularly for the following reasons: 
(1) The subjects who progressed to the interme¬ 
diate stage of conservation were clearly 
aware of the co-variation of the dimensions. 
This led to a temporary coordination expressed 
70Ibid. , p. Ill• 
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in the form of the compensation argument 
resulting in a conservation answer. Only one 
of them justified his correct answer by ’if 
you put it back, it will be the same,' an 
argument often given alone or initially in 
other experiments. All the others supported 
their conservation answers only by compensa¬ 
tion arguments. 
(2) The children who achieved conservation started 
off by giving the compensation argument, but 
then, without any prompting from the experi¬ 
menter, added those of identity or reversi¬ 
bility. 
(3) It was quite easy to teach non-conserving chil¬ 
dren the differentiated terms, but, as we saw 
during our preliminary investigation, the use 
of such terms is the least reliable indication 
of conservation. 
After making these observations, they were able to make three 
major conclusions. 
(1) The hypothesis that a child needs only to under¬ 
stand and use correctly certain expressions to 
attain conservation should be discarded. However, 
there seems to be a clear parallel between the 
structuring of the cognitive operations and the 
acquisition of the terms necessary for their 
expression. As long as we remain at the level of 
the lexicon (differentiated terms), verbal learn¬ 
ing is easy; however, as soon as we come to a more 
structured level, then verbal training is faced 
with the same obstacles as the acquisition of 
the concept itself; namely, lack of coordination 
and of decentration. 
(2) Acquisition at the level of the lexicon enables 
a child to direct his attention toward the 
relevant aspects of the situation (argument of 
co-variation). 
(3) Verbal training helps some children who have 
already acquired conservation but are unable to 
71 Ibid., p. 114. 
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Justify their answers to give clear explanations 
during the post-test. This effect of verbal 
training is well known. The very nature of 
language permits rapid coding and an efficient 
storing and retrieval of data, as has been 
realized by many researchers and educators.72 
It should be remembered, however, that the experimental design 
here attempted to isolate the effects of training to verbal word learn¬ 
ing; i.e., all cognitive, conservation, transformations, dialogue 
between the experimenter and child, and an attempt to arouse conflicts 
in the child's mind were eliminated. A few training studies have used 
verbal learning procedures without these limitations (Beilin, 1965, 
1969; Braine and Shanks, 1965; and Wohlwill, 1960a, 1960b). Greater 
training effects were seen in these studies in the absence of the 
above limitations. These and other studies will be discussed later. 
Within the general context of learning, however, verbal learning does 
have a place. 
Structure of Language 
One result of the Inhelder, Sinclair, Bovet (1974) study not yet 
discussed was that it was easier for children to learn to discriminate 
between comparative terms such as "more" and "less" than it was to use 
several comparative terms as in a two-part structured question; e.g., 
more but smaller marbles. Rothenberg (1969), in a summary introduc¬ 
tion, reported that many studies have used, for example, three-part 
conservation questions "Does this row (or side) have more, or does 
72Ibid., p. 115. 
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this row have more, or do they both have the same number (amount, 
etc.)?" or two-part questions "Do these two rows have the same number 
or does one have more?" She hypothesized that for the young child, 
long and complex questions are difficult not only to remember, but 
to answer with a single response. 
Hood (1962) noticed that when children were asked a three-part 
question, they tended to repeat the last thing they were asked; i.e., 
the child tended to choose the last alternative in a series, especially 
if the question was long and confusing. Hood's observation inspired 
Siegel and Goldstein (1969) to conduct a study on the conservation of 
number which tested the child's use of the most recent (recent hypothe¬ 
sis) part of the question presented versus the use of a relational 
response strategy. Sixty-six children ranging in age from two years 
and seven months to six years and one month were tested. The proce¬ 
dure involved a two-part test, the first part of which tested the 
children's understanding of relational terminology. In support of 
previous findings, only the older children understood the relational 
concepts. The second part of the test involved conservation of number 
situations and questions which systematically varied the use of the 
terminology. The younger children chose the most recent stimulus and 
this tendency decreased with age. With increasing age, children 
tended to use the relational terminology. In addition to the terms 
"more" and "less," the word "same" was included. The majority of 
children did not understand the word the "same" until the age of four 
months. In the oldest group of children, five years years and seven 
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and seven months to six years and one month, only one-half were reason¬ 
ing at a conservation level and even then the data showed that in over 
fifty percent of the cases the children still responded to the most 
recent part of the question asked. 
These results indicate that in the absence of the concept, chil¬ 
dren tend to depend upon other factors to respond to the experimenters' 
questions. In a related finding, Achenbach (1969) reported that when 
the position of sets is controlled in conservation tests with very 
young children, the responses of the children do not differ signifi¬ 
cantly from what would be a random responding to the question. 
Age and the Attainment of Conservation — 
The Mehler-Bever Controversy 
One recent aspect of studies related to the Piagetian notion of 
conservation has been an effort by some to show that very young chil¬ 
dren in the late two's and early three's are conservers. Many of the 
determinations made with respect to the child's understanding of the 
terms used in conservation assessment apply directly to this discussion 
In addition, according to Gruen (1966) many of the issues relate 
directly to the theoretical orientation of the author with respect to 
the nature of the psychological processes which underlie conservation. 
In the first half of the 1960's decade, a controversy began involv 
ing Smedslund (1963, 1965a, 1965b) and Braine (1959, 1964); Braine and 
Shanks (1965) and Bruner (1966); Frank and Bruner (1964). Both Braine 
and Bruner showed that children four and five-years-old could conserve 
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where Smedslund, when using the prescribed Piagetian tasks to determine 
conservation, found results basically in support of Piaget (i.e., 
children do not attain conservation until six, seven or eight years 
of age). The differences in age results were secondary to the deeper 
issues of the psychological nature of conservation and the tests used 
to determine it. Both Frank and Bruner, and Smedslund, in their 
determinations, used liquid conservation tests with a transformation 
which was accomplished by pouring one of two standard beakers into a 
wider-shorter and thinner-taller beaker. If the child gave a conserv¬ 
ing response, the child was asked to explain why, whereas Frank did 
not ask the question. Gruen (1966) , utilizing this difference alone, 
reinterpreted both sets of data and concluded: "The Frank-Bruner 
procedure for assessing the presence or absence of conservation clearly 
results in more (and probably younger) children being labelled con- 
servers than does the Smedslund procedure. . • . If Frank had used the 
Smedslund criteria for assessing the presence or absence of conserva¬ 
tion, her age norms would have been older than the ones she obtained; 
and vice versa, if Smedslund had used the Frank-Bruner criteria, his 
73 
age norms would have tended to be younger.' 
Mehler and Bever (1967) and Mehler, Bever, Epstein (1968) pre¬ 
cipitated the next chapter in the age controversy. Definitional and 
methodological differences are evident here also. However, of even 
greater importance is the fact that the original study by Mehler and 
73Gerald Gruen, "Note on Conservation: Methodological and 
Definitional Considerations," Child Development, 1966, 37, pp. 981-982 
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Bever (1967) has only been partially corroborated by Calhoun (1971). 
The overwhelming majority of replication studies have been unable to 
duplicate Mehler and Bever's results: Rothenberg and Courtney (1968); 
Piaget (1968) ; Beilin (1968) ; Goldschmid and Buxton-Payne (1968); 
Achenbach (1969); and Willoughby and Trachey (1972). 
Bacially, Mehler and Bever (1967) showed that children two years 
and four months to two years and eight months gave one hundred percent 
verbal and eight-one percent non-verbal conservation responses. Con¬ 
servation responses grew steadily worse until nearly four years of 
age where they started to improve again. They hypothesized that this 
period of a temporary inability to solve conservation problems 
"reflects a period of overdependence on perceptual strategies . . . 
eventually, the child develops a more sophisticated integration of the 
logical operation with his perceptual strategies which allow him to 
r „74 
count members of an array. 
Strenuous objections have been voiced with respect to Mehler and 
Bever's use of the term conservation for the procedure essentially 
required the correct use of the word "more and did not utilize what 
are standard transformational procedures to determine conservation. 
Mehler-Bever (1968) modified their terminology of "overconservation" 
in response to Piaget's objections (1968). Their study also indicated 
that very young children do correctly understand and use the term "more 
and the "same." This stands in marked contrast to the studies reported 
^J. Mehler and T. Bever, "Cognitive Capacity of Very Young 
Children," Science, 1967, 158, 3797, p. 142. 
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earlier. To date, Mehler and Bever’s results remain largely uncor¬ 
roborated and more importantly no adequate explanation for them has 
been advanced. Rothenberg and Courtney (1968) do point out in connec¬ 
tion with the demonstrated lack of understanding of the realm meaning 
of the word "more” that Mehler and Bever's technique always associated 
the word "more" with the group that was manipulated and, therefore, 
led to the possibility of a spurious cue for the child in that in 
answer to the question of "more" the child pointed to the group that 
had been manipulated and therefore seemingly gave a correct answer. 
Length, Density and Number 
In a set of objects, there are several dimensions which can be 
attended to. For example, ... in this single set there are four 
objects, they occupy a certain length and they are a prescribed dis¬ 
tance apart. In a more complicated set, as used in number conserva¬ 
tion exercises, two sets are compared; e.g., . . . Now each set has its 
own number of elements which can be the same or different, in this 
case 5, 6. The two rows can also be compared as to their relative 
length, which can be the same or different. Density (or crowding) is 
also an attribute; i.e., it can be the same or different. 
Prior to number conservation, when a child is asked which set has 
more or less or are they the same number, it has been found (as was 
hypothesized by Piaget) that children do not use number to answer the 
question. Prior to number conservation, there exists not only a gross 
quantification capacity (or numerosity sense) in the child but also a 
1 84 
topological sense which influences the child's Judgment of a question 
dealing with number; i.e., the longest row just because it is longest 
■nay have "more" for the child than a shorter row. The same may hold 
for density. 
A number of studies have been devoted wholly or in part to the 
subject of perceptual cues and how children use them in conservation 
situations: Zimiles (1966); Wallach, Wall and Anderson (1967); Gelman 
(1969, 1972); Peters (1967); Rothenberg (1969); Rothenberg and Courtney 
(1969); Calhoun (1971); Pufall and Shaw (1972); Pufall, Shaw and 
Syndal-Lashy (1973); Smither, Smiley and Rees (1974); Sigel (1974); 
Lawson, Baron, Siegel (1974); Baron, Lawson, Siegel (1975), 
Zimiles (1966) , in a study with one hundred and forty-six children 
ranging in age from five years and three months to seven years and 
three months, found that children at this age had no difficulty in 
differentiation magnitudes such as width vs. depth, length vs. thick¬ 
ness, etc., even if they were non-conservers. He was able to confirm 
the hypothesis that the conservation of aggregates small enough to 
be intuitively or immediately grasped occurs prior to conservation of 
larger aggregates. The small children used sets of three elements, 
whereas the large condition used sets of seven elements each. Further, 
he found that the first experience a child had in his conservation 
trials with either the large or small condition had an important 
influence on behavior. If the large condition was used first, chil¬ 
dren had much greater difficulty in subsequent problems than those 
children whose first experience was with the small condition. This 
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suggests that there may be greater transfer of number (numeroslty) from 
the small condition used to Illustrate a concept such as conservation. 
This conservation of the importance of a recognized intuitive numeroslty 
ability has been shown to be of importance in the next studies to be 
discussed. 
Pufall and Shaw (1972) tested one hundred and sixty-three 
three to six-year-old children on seven conservation-like number prob¬ 
lems. Seven configurations were used, each having two rows of dots. 
The seven configurations were variations of four rules: "Rule 1: 
Lengths and densities equal, therefore number equal; Rule 2: Lengths 
and densities directly related, therefore rows unequal numerically 
(the set with the greater—lesser—length is also the set with the 
greater—lesser—density, then the sets are numerically unequal) ; 
Rule 3: Lengths equal and densities unequal, therefore rows unequal 
numerically; Rule 4: Lengths and densities inversely related, there¬ 
fore numerical relation could be equal or unequal. Assumptions were 
made with regard to stage and the possible reaction a child might have 
to these situations. A Stage 1 child bases his judgments on the global 
similarity or differences between two rows. The second stage child 
intuitive thought—is characterized by at least a partial coordination 
of length, density and number. In the third stage of lasting equiva¬ 
lence, the child understands that spatial and number correspondence 
are not identical, and yet they are systematically related."75 
75Peter Pufall and Robert Shaw, "Precocious Thoughts on Number: 
The Long and the Short of It," Developmental Psychology. 1972 » Vo1' 7’ 
No. 1, pp. 62-64. 
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They found first that only forty-two percent of the three-year- 
old group made correct judgments on whether or not two sets of seven 
dots, same length and density and set in one-one correspondence, were 
equal, while all the older groups correctly made this judgment. No 
child consistently judged number with respect to density (equal 
density, equal number or more dense, greater number or less dense, 
smaller number). However, 22 of 96 four and five-year-old children 
did judge in terms of length; i.e., equal length means equal number or 
greater length means greater number. None of the six-year-olds did 
so, however. 
In configurations [• ■] they 
found that ninety percent of the middle-age groups (four and five) 
judged that the longer rows had more. In this age group in general, 
approximately one-fifth of the children exclusively based their judg¬ 
ments on length. This led to the general conclusions that younger chil¬ 
dren tended to base number judgments on differences in either length 
or density; children at the next stage tended to judge number in terms 
of relative length. This conclusion was generally supported by Zimiles 
(1966). An analysis of differences between the youngest three-year-old 
group and the oldest, the six-year-old group, resulted in the conclu¬ 
sion that the older child appears to multiply (coordinate) length and 
density relations in making number judgments. 
Their data was not analyzed from a perspective of how many chil¬ 
dren used a numerical scheme to answer the questions. It is also impor¬ 
tant in terms of later studies to recognize that they used what would 
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be described as a large condition which would preclude reliance upon 
an intuitive numerosity judgment. 
Gelman (1972) and Lawson, Baron and Siegel (1974) demonstrated 
that number is indeed a salient cue provided that the array is suffi¬ 
ciently small so that the child can estimate its numerosity. The dif¬ 
ference between Pufall and Shaw s (1972) data was discussed by Lawson, 
et al. (1974) when they noted that Pufall and Shaw used collections 
of five to seven or seven to nine elements where theirs were configura¬ 
tions of three to five elements. 
Gelman (1972) found, however, that when the differences for num¬ 
ber, length and density were all large, children four and five-years- 
old made accurate judgments for numbers than five but did attend to 
length with larger numbers when the rows were more dense. Therefore, 
if the array was sufficiently small, number is an important cue. 
Smither, Smiley and Rees (1974) conducted a study of the use of 
perceptual cues of length, density and number as used in number judg¬ 
ments. They varied the magnitude of number (large and small collec¬ 
tions) , and varied the number length and density differences. They 
reported that when the numbers used were large and the number dif¬ 
ferences between the collections to be compared were small, that chil¬ 
dren at a three to six years of age spread tended to judge on the basis 
of length, although the older children did better than the younger chil¬ 
dren when the number difference was great. 
They summarized their results as follows: "The use of length 
and density cues depends not only on age and the salience of those 
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dimensions but also on the magnitude of number and number differences. 
When the length differences and the numbers were both small and the 
density and number differences were both large, all age groups made 
accurate number judgments. When the numbers were large and the number 
differences small, all age groups judged on the basis of length."76 
Siegel (1974) ; Lawson, Baron, Siegel (1974); and Baron, Lawson 
and Siegel (1975) do not support the view of the previous findings 
regarding the salience of the length cue in the judgment of number. 
Siegel (1974) offers an alternative hypothesis to the interpretation 
that young children tend to use length to judge number. "Rather than 
using length to judge number, the children may be manifesting an 
ability to separate the dimensions of length and number. The critical 
test of these two alternatives is a situation in which length provides 
a conflicting cue to numerical size; for example, a task in which the 
child is required to judge the relative numerosity of two sets in which 
the shorter row always contains the greater number of dots. If the 
child is operating on the basis of length, this should be a relatively 
easy task, since number is perfectly correlated (negatively) with 
length. If, on the other hand, the child has difficulty in coordinating 
the dimensions of length and number, this should be an extremely diffi¬ 
cult task because the dimensions are in conflict. Lawson, Baron and 
Siegel (1974) have shown that children tend to confine the dimensions 
7^Suzanne Smither, Sandra Smiley and Red Rees, "The Use of 
Perceptual Cues for Number Judgment by Young Children, Child 
Development, 1974, 45, p. 698. 
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of number and length when asked about both simultaneously in situations 
where their dimensions conflict. Therefore, in situations where 
numerosity and spatial extent are negatively correlated, magnitude and 
equivalence concepts were expected to be difficult."77 
Her hypotheses were shown to be true where children had the 
greatest difficulty in tasks where the shortest length always indi¬ 
cated the smaller number. Number and length were interpreted to be in 
conflict for the reason that children had the greatest difficulty mak¬ 
ing a judgment where it would have been an easy decision to make if 
length alone were used. 
Lawson, Baron and Siegel (1974) , and Baron, Lawson and Siegel 
(1974) extended this basic idea of conflict between number and length 
; 
by suggesting that some children expressed a consistent preference or 
bias for either the use of number or length as a strategy for solution 
of judgment questions. If the child attempts to use number and it is 
conflicted strongly by length, the conflict remains unresolved. The 
opposite is true also if the child's bias is for length judgments. 
In general, there is a failure to differentiate length and number, 
although the choice of the strategy to use is in addition to the bias 
of a child determined by the number of elements in the set (large sets 
favor length, small sets favor numerosity). In this context, Lawson, 
et al., suggest a possible rule used by the child that summarizes 
77Linda Siegel, "Development of Number Concepts: Ordering and 
Correspondence Operations and the Role of Length Cues," Developmental 
Psychology, 1974, 10, 6, p. 908. 
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behavior seen during the development of number conservation. 
The rule prior to the development of mature concepts of 
length and number may be: When the numbers are beyond 
estimation range, use length for quantity; when the 
numbers are within estimation range, use number for 
quantity. 
Within this context, Lawson, et al., suggest that the child may 
have a superordinate concept of "bigness" into which both number and 
length are assimilated prior to the establishment of the discrete 
unit in number conservation. Their superordinate concept is not 
unlike Piaget's description of this stage of reasoning by titling it 
the stage of gross quantification. 
The logic and consistencies of the children's responses 
would seem to indicate that the majority of the children 
do have some understanding of 'more,' 'same,' and 
'longer.' However, a concept of length which does not 
include, as the primary comparative dimension, spatial 
extension, would not appear to be a mature concept; the 
same is true for a number concept which does not include 
rules for appropriate and inappropriate applications. 
Baron (1974) has suggested that a theory of acquisition 
of concepts component by component might provide a reason¬ 
able interpretation of these findings. This interpreta¬ 
tion views the child as being in possession of a super¬ 
ordinate concept of 'bigness' to which both length and 
number are assimilated. Children in the present study 
do appear to lack the necessary components for distin¬ 
guishing length and/or number from bigness.^ 
This interpretive summary necessitates comments. The "super¬ 
ordinate" concept of "bigness" from which number and length have not 
been differentiated seems to be in basic harmony with Piagetian notions 
^^Glen Lawson, Jonathan Baron and Linda Siegel, "The Role of 
Number and Length Cues in Children's Quantitative Judgments," Child 
Development, 1974, 45, p. 734. 
79 Ibid., p. 735. 
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of this stage of reasoning. The criteria that the concept of number 
at this stage does not include rules for appropriate and inappropriate 
application is not in harmony with Piaget nor is it in agreement with 
much of the previous work regarding the application of number. The 
application of number which is being referred to is counting. Although 
Piaget points out that the ability to count has no connection with the 
beginning of a level of understanding as is found in Stage Three, where 
the unit exists and is conserved, nevertheless, many researchers have 
pointed out that children do try to apply number to the situations 
which seem to require it. This is especially true during the second 
stage which is characterized by quotity reasoning. Here the child can 
count each set and say that they are equal. Then because number is 
not an invariant yet and because the perceptual transformation is more 
salient, judgments of quantity are made on another basis. In the static 
configuration which was used in Lawson, et al., research, there very 
well may be a perceptual concept of bigness to which judgment is assimi¬ 
lated. With respect to rules for the application of number, it is 
difficult to conceive of the inappropriate application of number in 
situations requiring number judgment. Number, as was shown by 
Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet (1974), can be inappropriately applied 
80 
when considering the conservation of length. 
The factors responsible for a mature concept of number for the 
invariance or conservation of number have been discussed in the chapter 
80See Chapter Six, Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and 
the Development of Cognition, pp. 131-166. 
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on number and in the section on the conservation of number earlier in 
this chapter. Piaget recognizes that both actions in the material 
world (which involves perceptual cues) and a system of coordination 
or a logical part based on identity, reversibility and coordination 
ere the factors which contribute to number conservation. 
The research related to the material and language aspects of 
the concept of the conservation of number has been summarized in the 
preceding sections. There is basic argument among most of the 
research cited in this section that number conservation does not begin 
to be attained by most children until the child is nearly six years 
old, although there are exceptions as has been noted (Braine and 
Bruner; Mehler and Bever). These exceptions have been explained by 
Gruen (1966) and Rothenberg (1969) and are due to methodological and 
theoretical differences. It is generally agreed that with regard to 
relational terms such as "more" and "less" that most young children 
do not attain an understanding of them until or at about the same as 
the various forms of conservation begin to be attained. With regard 
to complex multi-part questions, it has been determined that young 
children tend to respond to the last part of the question asked. With 
regard to the available perceptual cues of length, density in number 
situations, it has been determined that young children often do confuse 
length for number. Density confusion for number appears to occur less 
often. 
There is general consensus that length is more often chosen as a 
criteria for judgment of number when the collection is larger than can 
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be grasped by the child's intuitive numerosity sense. It has also 
been found that when number problems have been presented that are 
within the bounds of an intuitive number sense that the learning of 
conservation related tasks is facilitated, whereas, presentation of 
a large collection often results in a confounding effect. 
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CHAPTER IV 
LEARNING COMPETENCE AND THE NATURE OF PIAGETIAN STRUCTURES: 
THE LEARNING TO LEARN OF PRE-NUMBER CONCEPTS 
Introduction 
Through the first three chapters, a discussion of the ANISA Theory 
of Development, Piaget and Number has been presented. This chapter is 
devoted to their integration; i.e., the two theories through an analy¬ 
sis of topics related to number development will be integrated for the 
purpose of developing implications for the ANISA Theory of Development. 
Although a survey and analysis of all theories of development and 
learning have not been attempted, it is generally agreed that Piagetian 
theory lies somewhere in between two extreme positions taken by various 
schools. On one end of the spectrum of theories is the empiricist tra¬ 
dition which attributes the central causal role in development to 
external sensory factors. At the other end of the spectrum is the 
rationalist philosophy which attributes development to purely internal 
causes; e.g., Kant's pure reason. Piaget's theory attributes growth and 
development to a combination of both external and internal factors, 
hence, Piaget is positioned between the two extremes. This orienting 
frame of reference also places the ANISA Theory of Development between 
the two extremes for it recognizes both as functioning in development. 
In fact, the ANISA Theory and Piagetian theory are positioned in close 
proximity to one another, because growth and development for both 
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ANISA and Piaget are accounted for through a complex interaction 
between internal structures, internal processes and the environment. 
The proximity of the two theories does not in any way imply, how¬ 
ever, that they account for development in an identical manner. In 
fact, the matter of the general compatibility of the two theories is 
a matter for extensive scholarly analysis. Many tempting perspectives 
are open at this time for this analysis, among them: The matter of the 
origin of knowledge—Pre-formed Structures vs. Potentiality in an ANISA 
Sense (the five domains of Potentiality) vs. Innate, Figurative and 
Operative Knowledge; the equilibration model auto-regulatory homeo- 
rhesis to homeostasis vs. learning competence and conscious control, 
vs. creativity, vs. concrescence; Piagetian stages vs. ANISA's general 
pattern and rhythm to development; the role of purpose which is central 
to ANISA vs. Piaget who, as a genetic epistemologist, makes no mention 
of purpose. 
This chapter is limited to an analysis of those aspects of pre- 
numerical thinking from a perspective of Piagetian theory and research 
which apply to the general issue of learning competence as an aspect of 
ANISA's Theory of Development. The fundamental issue in this analysis 
is the specific nature of learning and development as seen by each 
theory. 
A brief summary of the theoretical issues important to the elabo¬ 
ration of the ANISA Theory of Development is presented first. Most 
broadly, the issues are related to the possible similarities and dis¬ 
similarities between ANISA and Piaget with respect to learning. In a 
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narrower sense, the issues of stage and structure as they relate to 
development are discussed in a similar manner. Following these topics 
is a review of current research on Number as it relates to these three 
themes. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the themes and 
research as they relate to the ANISA Theory of Development. 
Learning and Development 
ANISA 
Learning is the key to the release of psychological potentialities. 
Learning can be organized to gain conscious control over those processes 
central to psychological development. Those processes are differentia¬ 
tion, integration and generalization. Conscious control over those 
processes is described as learning competence; or knowing how to learn. 
Learning then is fundamentally an expression of man's creative potential 
which becomes self-actualized as conscious control over the fundamental 
processes is gained. 
Differentiation involves the ability to break down experience, 
whether internal or external, into separate elements. Integration is 
fundamentally the ability to reassemble those separated elements into 
new patterns of relationship, thereby providing new information, feel¬ 
ings, skills, perceptions and new patterns of thought intentions, 
and generalization involves the extension in thought or action of 
the integration to similar but not identical situations. This entire 
process occurs as the child interacts with the various environments as 
defined by ANISA: the physical, the human, the unknown and the 
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environment of the Self. Learning then is an active process which 
occurs within the framework of the environments. Development is 
broadly defined as the process of translating potentiality, both bio¬ 
logical and psychological, into actuality.1 
Piaget 
Both Piaget's and ANISA's theory are process models with respect 
to development; i.e., development is a result of the interaction of 
internal structures, internal processes and the environment. Emphasis 
in ANISA is placed upon the manner of the interaction through mastery 
or conscious control over the processes of learning. This interaction 
results in new stages of development. In a sense, learning for ANISA 
determines development. 
A different emphasis is placed upon this mix of ingredients for 
Piaget. For Piaget, the state of development determines the nature of 
the interaction and the forms of learning which can occur. "The 
development of knowledge is a spontaneous process, tied to the whole 
2 
process of embryo genesis." Life is active and coordinating by nature. 
This active process of coordination and adaptation is the process of 
equilibration. 
Equilibration finds expression through the internal structures. 
1These topics have been fully discussed in separate sections of 
Chapter One: "Learning," pp. 15-16; "Differentiation, Integration and 
Generalization," pp. 16-17; and "Environments," pp. 24-26. 
^Jean Piaget, "Development and Learning," Journal of Research in 
Science Teaching, 2:176-186, 1964, p. 176. 
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Development begins with an interaction between the environment and the 
innate structures of reflex-motor patterns in the sensori-motor stage. 
Development finds its ultimate expression in the interaction and 
coordination of the internal structures of knowledge. The governing 
process of the interaction is the auto-regulated state of equilibrium; 
i.e., each structure maintains itself as an integrated whole possess¬ 
ing its own mechanism of reacting to disruptive pressures from both 
the physical, environmental and internal structures which in some way 
do not correspond with what the child has just experienced. Hence, he 
concludes that by way of the equilibratory mechanism the development 
of knowledge is an active process of construction which is regulated 
by the internal contributions of the child. 
"Learning presents the opposite case. In general, learning is 
provoked by situations—provoked by a psychological experimenter, or 
by a teacher, with respect to some didactic point; or by an external 
situation. It is provoked, in general, as opposed to spontaneous. 
In addition, it is a limited process—limited to a single problem, or 
' 3 
to a single structure." The theme which is being developed here 
essentially allows Piaget to distinguish between what the child gains 
from outside contributions from the "opinion that development is a sum 
of discrete learning experience"^ and those processes which regulate 
the growth of operative schemes. Within this framework, Piaget uses 
•^Ibid. , p. 177 . 
^Ibid., p. 177. 
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the term learning in a restricted sense, for he does not take the 
operations, such as classification, seriation, conservation, etc., to 
be the product of learning. 
A new scheme is the product of learning in the strict 
sense, insofar as it results from the differentiation of 
a previous scheme and insofar as this differentiation 
involves an accommodation that depends on experience. But 
for this learning to take place, there must exist previous 
schemes that can be differentiated during assimilation of 
new objects. Moreover, the structure of these schemes and 
the assimilation, considered strictly as the prerequisite 
of the structure, are preconditions and not the products 
of learning. In a word, learning relates to the content 
of the schematism while the generalizable character of its 
form does not result from learning but is a necessary con¬ 
dition for the functioning of the schemes. . . . What is 
learned in the strict sense is the totality of differentia¬ 
tions due to accommodation as the source of new schemes 
vis-a-vis the increasing diversity of contents. But what 
is not learned in the strict sense is the assimilative 
activity with its consequence of an equilibration between 
assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation is the source 
of the gradual coherence of schemes and of their organiza¬ 
tion in equilibrated forms in which one can already discern 
a sketch of logical classes with inclusion, intersections, 
and groupings within a totality. The interactions between 
assimilation and accommodation imply therefore two factors, 
learning in the strict sense and equilibration. These two 
factors underlying the functional process in its totality 
can be called learning in the broad sense and are prac¬ 
tically identical with development.^ 
Piaget continues by proposing four possible forms of relationship 
between learning in the strict sense and equilibration. "(1) Inde¬ 
pendence is maintained between the two processes; (2) Learning is a 
precondition (necessary but not sufficient) of equilibration, in the 
■^Jean Piaget, "Apprentissage et connaissance" in Etudes 
d'eplstemologie genetique VII, pp. 62-63 (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1959), translated and cited by Hans G. 
Furth, Piaget and Knowledge, p. 236. 
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sense that the strategies leading to equilibration involve a learning 
(this would constitute a learning of equilibration); (3) Equilibration 
is a precondition (necessary but not sufficient) of learning in the 
sense that every learning presupposes the intervention of activities 
not learned that bring about its equilibration; (4) Equilibration and 
learning are mutually required conditions that in their interaction 
result in a complete reciprocity. 
Piaget then chooses from among the four propositions by summariz¬ 
ing previous results into two propositions: 
(a) All learning presupposes the utilization of coordina¬ 
tions not learned (or not entirely learned); these 
coordinations constitute a logic or prelogic on the 
part of the subject; 
(b) Learning of logical structures supposes the utiliza¬ 
tion of other pre-existing logical or prelogical 
structures not learned (or not entirely learned). 
These coordinations that were not learned in the 
strict sense are the specific domain of equilibra- 
/ tion; their development consists in a progressive 
organization oriented in the direction of an operative 
reversibility; i.e., compensations that are increas¬ 
ingly more complete. Precisely insofar as they are 
mechanisms of compensation, coordinations are not 
learned in the strict sense but derive from the 
activity of the subject in response to external 
changes.^ 
Piaget concludes on the basis of these two propositions that the 
third and fourth relationship between learning and equilibration are 
supported because learning presupposes a logic or prelogic (the exis- 
of previous structures) which are the result of a stabilization 
6Ibid., p. 237 (translated from Vol. X, pp. 183-184). 
^Ibid., p. 237. 
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or equilibration response after a learning encounter has occurred. 
Clearly, the stabilization or accommodation which occurs during 
development is an internal process due primarily to the interaction 
caused by an assimilation into already existent structures. Stabiliza¬ 
tion occurs as a result of the resolution of conflict to which the 
l 
child brings his previous knowledge structures. 
Stage 
ANISA 
The ANISA Theory of Development at this time includes a general 
acceptance of the patterning and rhythm of growth and views develop¬ 
ment as a series of hierarchical, qualitatively different series of 
stages which do not necessarily appear in the same order. A specific 
hierarchical pattern of development has been proposed and accepted 
which would ultimately describe a series of stages not necessarily 
invariant for the multitude of dimensions which develop in all five 
domains of human potential. However, Piaget’s description of the 
stages of growth in the cognitive domain, therefore, in no way con¬ 
tradicts basic conceptions of the ANISA Theory of Development and have, 
therefore, been accepted in their broad outline. The specific aspect 
of stage and the equilibration model, however, does warrant further 
analysis, as there is no general provision for equilibration in the 
ANISA model unless the ANISA concept of generalization, which consti¬ 
tutes evidence for consolidation of a structure, may be interpreted 
as a kind of equilibration. If this be the case, then equilibration 
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would be seen as the integrative aspect learning itself; i.e., it is 
one of the capacities the child consciously develops in learning how to 
learn. 
If this were the case for Piaget, there would be no reason for him 
to make a distinction between learning and equilibration. As contra¬ 
dictory as it may seem, this may, in fact, be exactly what is meant by 
ANISA’s use of learning how to learn. 
Piaget 
Piaget has recognized and described an invariantly ordered and 
hierarchically arranged series of stages. Each stage is qualitatively 
different from the preceding stage yet is dependent upon it, in that 
prior stages are integrated and thereby changed into successive 
stages of development. Stages are, therefore, transitional in nature, 
i.e., each is characterized by a period of genesis, transition, and 
consolidation, and each becomes the basis of the next stage once con¬ 
solidation or attainment has occurred. Stage also implies the notion 
of organization; i.e., each stage represents a level of the structuring 
of knowledge. These structures, as the stages advance, become inter¬ 
connected in ever-increasing patterns of complexity. Lastly, at the 
heart of the process of formation within each stage is the notion of 
equilibration. As the development of stages proceeds, the equilibra- 
tory mechanism is extended to wider fields of application, becomes more 
mobile in terms of flexibility of the types of assimilations and 
accommodations which can be managed, and it becomes more stable in the 
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manner in which transformations are handled. 
Stages are established on the development of unitary structure 
of knowing the operation; i.e., development proceeds in the direction 
of the establishment of stable structures of knowing, the most funda¬ 
mental of which is the operation. Prior to operational thought, 
reflexive or innate action patterns are coordinated with one another 
establishing sensori-motor thought (Stage 1). During this stage, the 
child gradually differentiates himself from the outside world and 
establishes the permanent object. The internalization of the object 
and the action in the form of symbolic representation commences the 
second major stage, that of preoperative thought. Gradually, pre- 
operational thought evolves and becomes stabilized in the form of the 
operation which is the concrete operational stage. During the next 
stage, operations are combined with one another in an interactive 
whole which establishes the last stage of formal operational thought. 
Structures 
ANISA 
The concept of the competencies in each of the five areas of 
human potential is as formalized as the notion of structures in the 
ANISA model has become, in that the competencies describe the struc¬ 
tural organization of that which is actualized in the process of becom¬ 
ing. In the cognitive domain, these competencies include number, 
classification and seriation, in addition to many others. There are 
also a broad range of other competencies which relate to each of the 
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other domains. Last, higher order competencies are delineated. They 
entail a complex hierarchical integration or structuring of basic 
competencies in the five categories of potentialities. The resulting 
structures—patterned uses of energy—make up the structure of the 
Self. These patterned uses of energy are the values and attitudes 
which constitute the identity of the person. 
Piaget 
Three key ideas characterize the structure, the idea of wholeness, 
8 
the idea of transformation, and the idea of self-regulation. These 
three ideas essentially characterize the structure as a totality of 
thought which is governed by laws of transformation and is active or 
self-regulated according to the idea of equilibration. 
The basic structure of knowledge is the operation. Its roots are 
in innate, physical and logico-mathematical knowledge. It is gradual1\ 
structured through the sensori-motor and preoperational stages and 
attains its full dimensions in the concrete operational stage. The 
operation has four basic characteristics: (1) It is an internalized 
action; (2) It is a reversible action; (3) It always supposes some 
conservation; and (4) It is always related to a whole system of opera¬ 
tions. 
Piaget attributes a regulatory role in the operation; in fact, he 
uses the term regulation and operation synonymously. As the operation 
8See Page 66 in Chapter Two. 
or regulation becomes more precise, reversibility establishes for 
Piaget the primary characteristic of a mature logico-mathematlcal 
level of thought. 
Thus, it can be seen that during the gradual extension of 
the knowledge environment,' that is, the sum total of 
external objects on which intelligence is brought to bear 
and during the gradual disassociation of forms and their 
contents, that^is, the elaboration of abstract and con¬ 
ceptual forms as opposed to perceptual or sensori-motor 
forms and, a fortiori, as opposed to the material forms 
of the organism, the regulations whose task it is to 
control cognitive exchanges with this environment, that is, 
to organize experience in terms of deductive frames, will 
reach a level of precision never found in elementary regu¬ 
lations. Instead of being restricted to corrections after 
the event that bear only on the results of processes or 
behaviors, or to an approximate guidance of anticipations 
that are never more than probabilistic, they carry out a 
function of precorrection in the proper sense of the 
word.9 
Trial and error, compromise, retroactive correction and anticipa¬ 
tion, all of which function in the developing intelligence, eventually 
lead to a fully and operationally defined reversibility which, as 
Piaget points out, is precorrective in nature because the child can 
reason back to the starting point of an action or to the end point of 
an action without actually carrying it out physically. 
Piaget cites an example emphasizing the relation between the 
gradual growth of the regulatory function and conservation; in fact, 
he concludes the reversibility is the very process from which con¬ 
servation is produced. 
^Jean Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, p. 211. 
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Before going any farther, we should point out that there is 
nothing sudden about this transition and that the earliest 
representational, though preoperational, regulations make a 
transition between sensori-motor regulations and operations. 
For example, a child of five or six years will maintain that 
a meatball rolled into a sausage contains more meat because 
it is longer, but if one continues rolling that sausage out, 
the child will then think it contains less because it has 
become ’thin.' In this case, the error is reversed by means 
of a regulation based on the very exaggeration of the error. 
The reversal will, in turn, lead to the idea of inter¬ 
dependence between the lengthening and the thinning down 
and so finally to an operational compensation 'longer x 
thinner = same quantity.' Thus it can be seen how a 
reversible operation, followed by conservation, may be 
derived in an absolutely continuous fashion from the inter¬ 
play of regulations. ... It may be said that such a regu¬ 
lation presupposes conservation. But that is not true at 
all, for it is precisely the reversibility which brings 
about the conservation, as can easily be demonstrated in 
the psychological field; reversibility is the very process 
from which conservation is produced, and this process varies 
in degrees of approximation as long as it remains in the 
state of a regulation in the usual sense of the word.10 
Piaget continues this discussion of the relationship between con¬ 
servation and reversibility by stating that even when the child is 
able to use an identity argument to establish conservation of substance 
by stating "its the same sausage" is, in fact, using a reversibility 
argument of "sausage - sausage = no sausage," which is, in fact, a 
reversibility argument. 
It is clear then that the structure of knowledge for Piaget is 
that which controls cognitive exchanges with the environment. It is 
a system of transformation whose rules allow an eventual disassociation 
of form and content; i.e., the substance from which knowledge is built. 
10Ibid. , pp. 208-209. 
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objects and actions, leads eventually to logico-mathematical construc¬ 
tions which are no longer tied to concrete content. 
A Review of Number-Related Research 
In the recently published work of Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, 
Learning and the Development of Cognition, is an important wealth of 
experimental results, learning experiments and analyses which directly 
relate to many of the issues raised in the previous section. Although 
their learning experiments did not directly deal with the development 
of number conservation, many other conservations were experimentally 
dealt with (continuous quantity, physical quantity, and the conserva¬ 
tion of length). The psychological similarity of the conservations 
has been previously discussed; i.e., they all eventually involve the 
use of identity, reversibility and compensation arguments in the 
presence of a transformation of some sort. The learning experiments 
in this work were designed to reveal the interactive effect that one 
type of conservation or type of training had upon the attainment of 
the conservation under study. As a result, they were able to clarify 
many dynamic effects of cognitive growth which relate directly to 
issues of stage and the equilibration model. These results, in turn, 
will be utilized to address many of the issues raised earlier in the 
pursuit of the elaboration of the ANISA Theory of Development. 
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The Role of Inference in the Development of Conservation 
The first experiment to be reported is one in which the process- 
making inferences from observations were analyzed with respect to the 
development of the conservation of continuous quantity. In the main 
experiment of this chapter, the children were concerned with the flow 
of liquids through two parallel rows of containers. Each row had three 
containers arranged so that the flow could be regulated starting at 
the top and ending up in the bottom. On the top were funnels of equal 
size A and A'. Each funnel had a valve as did the next two below. The 
funnels at the second level were not of equal size and were designated 
B and E or N. Finally, at the bottom level were either two equal 
beakers, C and C*, or two unequal, long-necked flasks, F and F'. 
Thirty-four children, ranging in age from five years and one month 
to seven years old, were used. As in other conservations, three stages 
have been found in its development. Fifteen of the thirty-four children 
were selected because they were at a Stage 1 Level of Non-Conservation. 
The remaining children were all at an Intermediate Level. The Interme¬ 
diate Level was further sub-divided into three levels, Non-Conservation 
Intermediate II, Intermediate-Intermediate III, and Intermediate 
Conservation IV. None of the children was at a Conservation Level. 
Prior to the experiment, they summarize some of the previous 
findings which, in turn, assisted in the design of this study. They 
were: 
(1) It was evident from these preliminary investigations 
that the effects of teaching techniques are governed 
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by the child's initial level of cognitive develop¬ 
ment, as measured by a pre-test. 
(2) No differences were noted between the results of the 
three techniques . . . verbal training, conflict due 
to a discrepancy between prediction and outcome, and 
the pouring of liquid back into the original glass— 
was particularly effective when used alone. 
(3) Even the cumulative effect of the three techniques 
used together was less predictive of the result of 
the post-test than the child's initial level of rea¬ 
soning. Apparently, the child's capacity to inte¬ 
grate the information drawn from the exercise is the 
factor that mainly determines progress. It seems, 
therefore, that the benefit a child is likely to gain 
from the three techniques depends more on his level 
of cognitive competence than the specific type of 
teaching technique used. 
(4) Finally, there remains the question of comparing 
the progress of the subjects of this experiment with 
that of children who are given no such training. This 
question later became one of our major concerns and 
was constantly borne in mind when we tried to improve 
our technique and the design of our pre-tests and 
post-tests in order to evaluate the progress accom¬ 
plished by the subjects in the course of the experi¬ 
ment s. !■*- 
These guiding conclusions were derived from the original experi¬ 
ments which developed from a collaboration of the Harvard Center for 
Cognitive Studies lead by Bruner and the Genevian group. The conclu¬ 
sions were those reached by the Geneva group, as Bruner's results were 
reported in his Studies in Cognitive Growth, a work which was cited in 
the previous chapter and contained the Frank-Bruner (1966) experiment. 
From the above four conclusions, Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet 
were able to form a main hypothesis which guided the experiments in 
UInhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development of 
Cognition, pp. 40-41. 
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the work being reported. 
We adopted the hypothesis that any increase in knowledge is 
the result of contact between a person’s already established 
schemes and reality, and we postulated that the systems into 
which schemes are organized change with development.12 
Returning now to a specific discussion of the training experiment, 
in the conservation of continuous substance, it was stated that the 
training sessions were designed such that the child actually performed 
all of the manipulations of opening and closing the valves. The child 
was asked to "make predictions as to what would happen and then to 
compare these predictions with what actually did happen when they per¬ 
formed the actions." We also tried to help the child by trying to 
shift his attention away from the static result, i.e., the level of 
the liquid, as this is an inherent characteristic of non-conservation 
reasoning. Therefore, we directed his attention toward the continuity 
of the filling and emptying of a series of jars in a virtually closed 
system. In this way, the child was provided with the opportunity of 
witnessing the causal aspects of a continuous physical process (the 
initial and final states are the same) as well as the kinetic aspects 
(the rate of rise of the level of liquid depends on the diameter of 
the jar).1"^ 
Four protocols of individual children at each stage are presented 
below which provide excellent examples of the transition in the stages 
of reasoning. There is one protocol for each of the four levels 
■^Ibid. , p. 41. 
13Ibid., p. 43. 
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mentioned earlier: I, N-C; II, NC-Int.; Ill, Int.-Int.; IV, Int.-C. 
The abbreviated names of the children are BAB, GER, JAC and POU. 
None of the fifteen Non-Conservation children ever made a conserva¬ 
tion judgment. As can be seen, the child clearly focuses on the action 
being carried out; e.g., the pouring in this experiment. In addition, 
they are unable to relate the fact that the final appearance of the 
material is determined by the actions carried out during the transforma¬ 
tion. In short, "these children did not know how to use the observa¬ 
tions."^ 
BAB (5;6) is at the preconservation stage: his reasoning 
is based on the changes of the dimension or on the actual 
act of pouring the liquid or changing the shape of the 
modeling clay. 
In the first phase of the experiment, he thinks that the 
quantity of liquid increases when it is poured into N 
and then diminishes when it is poured back into F. He 
is amazed to find that F contains the same amount of 
liquid at the end of the experiment as at the beginning. 
In the second phase, he begins to notice the co-variation 
of the dimensions, but without realizing that his suc¬ 
cessive judgments contradict one another: 'If you look at 
it from the side, there's more here (N); if you look at 
it from the top, there's more here (B).' 
During the third phase, BAB seems a little unsure of him¬ 
self. At first he stops the flow of liquid into B and N 
at the same level, but when he is asked, 'Is it the same 
or different when you drink it and when you look at it? 
he says nothing and his expression betrays his confusion. 
He finally opts for a compromise solution, and lets a few 
more drops of liquid flow into N (so that the level of N 
is higher than the level of B, but there is still some 
liquid left in A'). But, and this is striking, he expects 
that the levels of C and C' will be equal and that C and 
C' will contain the same quantity of liquid. It is only 
14 Ibid., p. 53. 
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later that he notices the liquid left in A', and when 
questioned again on the quantities in B and N, he admits 
that there was less in N. This retroactive correction 
seems isolated, in the sense that it has no effect on his 
other judgments; when the procedure is repeated (using W 
instead of N), he once again makes the levels in B and W 
equal, and does not notice the liquid left behind in A 
until later. 
In the fourth phase, BAB thinks that the quantities are 
equal as long as the middle jars are hidden by the screen. 
When the screen is removed, he seems very intrigued, and 
spontaneously says, 'There's nothing left at the top'; 
but when he sees that the levels are not equal, he goes on 
saying that the quantities are not equal.15 
At the second level, NC-Int., the child begins to make retroactive 
corrections of previous judgments because the discrepancy between 
observation and prediction begins to become obvious; however, the child 
is unable at this stage to organize his observations into a coherent 
system of schemes. This is most strikingly illustrated by GER's pro¬ 
tocol . 
GER (6;2) starts off at Level II and reaches Level IV after 
the training sessions. 
During the pre-test, the only difference between GER and 
the Level I children is that she gives a correct conserva¬ 
tion answer for the situation where liquid is poured into 
several small glasses. The argument she gives is that of 
primitive identity: 'because in there (original glass) and 
in there (glass from which the liquid was poured into the 
smaller ones) there was also the same.' However, she does 
not use this reasoning in any of the other situations 
(liquid conservation task and modeling clay conservation 
task). 
During the training sessions, she begins by reasoning in the 
same way as the Level I children, except that during Phase 2 
she correctly predicts the inequality of the liquid in 
and C': 'more here (C) and less here (C') because there s 
l5Ibid. , p. 53. 
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still some left at the top.' This is the beginning of an 
inferential process. However, her progress is minimal, 
because when she lets all the liquid run into N she is’ 
bothered by the fact that the levels in B and N are unequal. 
She does not try to explain how equal quantities in A and 
A can come to different levels when they are in B and N. 
Only in the following phase does real conflict occur: GER 
continually changes her mind: 'There's more lemonade in N 
because it's thinner, and there (B) it's fatter,' she says; 
then immediately afterward: 'No, it's the same' — 'How 
do you know?' — 'Because I can see it.' — 'How can you 
see it? I just know.' She does not yet attempt an 
explanation based on compensation of the dimensions. 
At the beginning of the fourth phase of the experiment, 
she seems to understand that unequal quantities of liquid 
in A and A' can come to the same levels when they are 
poured into B and N. However, she abandons the idea of 
conservation of inequality by predicting that the levels 
in C and C' will be equal. But she later explains the 
inequality between C and C' by referring to the middle 
jars: '(not the same) because one's thinner (N) and the 
other's fatter (B) , that still makes more lemonade 
(despite the equal levels).'16 
JAC, on the other hand, typical of children at the level Int.- 
Int., started off by at least considering the possibility of conserva¬ 
tion—even if, influenced by the striking changes in shape of the 
modeling clay, they give preconservation answers—can later modify 
their judgments because of their own inferences. The observable fea¬ 
tures of the situation, although they are not the direct source of 
knowledge, force the child into comparing his successive judgments. 
In this way he can become aware of the contradiction between them. 
During the pre-test, JAC continually switches between con¬ 
servation judgments and preconservation judgments (Int.- 
Int.) . He takes a lively interest in the problem and is 
able to think both in terms of an empirical return and In 
terms of the co-variation of the dimensions. 
16 Ibid., p. 55. 
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In the first phase, he correctly predicts that the levels 
and quantities in C and C' will be equal. When the liquid 
flows from A' to N and then to C', he says: ’Gosh, it's 
coming up very high (in N) , but I've poured with the same 
flask (F), I poured it all.' 
In the second phase, he expresses a conflict: 'How can I 
do it? If I stop at the same place (equal levels in B and 
N), I won't have enough to drink at the end (C') ; look, 
I left a bit up there (A'). To have the same at the end, 
I've got to put it all in, but then it comes up to a dif¬ 
ferent place.' He lets all the liquid flow into B and N 
and spontaneously says: 'That looks like too much, 
doesn't it?' When the liquid flows into W and N, he is 
very perplexed: 'It's even funnier, if I don't leave 
this little bit at the top I don't get the same (pointing 
to the levels) in that one, it's so wide (W), and in that 
thin one . . . Well, it must still be the same amount of 
lemonade, it's all there ... I know, it just looks as 
if there's more ... in the thin glass the lemonade is 
all squashed up, it has to go up; in the wide one, it's 
spread out.' 
During the third phase, once the screen is removed, he is 
delighted to find that his predictions are confirmed: 
'Ah, I know, it's like last time (previous session), 
there's always the same amount of lemonade to drink, it 
just looks as if there's more, the lemonade is in dif¬ 
ferent places in the glasses.' 
During the fourth phase, he is at first perplexed by the 
equal levels in B and N: 'How come? I poured into there 
(A') with the little bottle (F'), and now it's equal 
. . . Ah! I know, it's still less, we'll see at the end; 
wait a minute, wait ... I know, there's always less 
in this line (column), we haven't added any in the middle 
so it must be right.' 
In the post-tests, JAC clearly understands the conservation 
of the liquid and the modeling clay; he gives arguments 
based not only on compensation and identity, but also on 
reversibility: 'It's when I make it into a ball again, 
when I think about that, I'm quite sure.'17 
POU's protocol is an example of a child who was pre-tested 
at a level of competence just prior to conservation Int.-C, IV. 
to be 
He 
17Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
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is able to compensate and coordinate the dimensions involved. 
POU (5;6) in the pre-test gives conservation answers based 
on the reversibility for the modeling clay conservation 
task: 'If we make a ball again, it's the same.' But he 
is still unsure of himself in the liquid conservation 
task, and after some hesitation returns to his original 
preconservation judgment: 'More in the thin glass because 
it's narrower than this (original glass).' 
During the training sessions, his reasoning becomes more 
explicit and at one point he refers to the compensation of 
the dimensions. In the second phase, he thinks: 'There 
(N) it's longer, and there (W) it's wider, so it should 
come lower.' He also uses a transitivity argument: 'If 
you want to have the same here (C) and the same as there 
was in the beginning, there must be the same here (middle 
pair of jars) . . . when it runs down into the bottom 
glasses, it's as if we put it back into the top ones.' 
In the fourth phase, he triumphantly exclaims: 'There I 
poured from the big bottle (F) and there from the little 
one (F'). Everything ran out, so in the end you have to 
have a little lemonade here and a lot there.' When ques¬ 
tioned about the equality of levels in the middle pair 
of jars, he says: 'You can make a mistake when you look 
at it like that, but there can't be the same to drink.' 
In the post-tests, he gives conservation answers for all 
the situations.1° 
Development in these examples is clearly related to the fact that 
contradictions between observable features and predicted outcomes lead 
the child to retroactive corrections of his or her judgments. These 
corrections remain inadequate until a system of compensations in the 
form of the coordination of relations is established. For Piaget, 
these coordinations are clearly linked to operational thought for the 
child who attains conservation reasoning using identity reversibility 
by cancellation and compensation arguments to justify his answers. 
18 Ibid., p. 57. 
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Inhelder, et al., state that a grasp of conservation "indicates the 
presence of an underlying system of mental operations that is charac¬ 
terized essentially by two forms of reversibility, inversion or can¬ 
cellation on the one hand, and compensation of reciprocal relationships 
on the other. 
The transition in reasoning which characterizes the development 
of conservation reasoning is evident when the reasoning of BAB, GER, 
JAC and POU are compared. 
BAB attention is directed to the changes in one dimension at a 
time, or upon one of the actions performed. Because he is able to 
focus on one dimension alone, such as the height of the liquid, his 
predictions in the form of successive judgments are often incorrect 
and contradictory. This produces an effect on BAB of him being unsure 
of himself, which in turn leads to compromise and retroactive correc¬ 
tions in isolated cases. 
"The reaction of the Level I children seems to confirm the 
hypothesis that as long as the child does not incorporate the observ¬ 
able features of the situation into a system of inference allowing him 
to link the various observations made in the successive phases of the 
experiment, he cannot make any progress. The observable features them 
selves cannot alone lead to change in the thought processes." The 
system of inference refers, according to Piaget, to the already men¬ 
tioned structures of thought identity, partition (mentioned in the 
■^Ibid., p. 31. 
20Ibid., p. 54. 
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previous chapters) and reversibility by inversion and compensation. 
GER, who is slightly advanced over BAB, begins to use some of these 
operations. GER's initial argument by which she explains conservation 
of liquids poured from one large glass to smaller glasses involves 
identity, "because in there (original glass) and in there (glass from 
which the liquid was poured into the smaller ones) there was also the 
same." Her reasoning, however, does not extend conservation to all 
problem situations involving continuous quantities. During training, 
however, she begins to make correct judgments indicating the beginning 
of the inferential process, but her reasoning is not stable as she 
cannot justify her answers and she later abandons conservation reason¬ 
ing in the face of what seems to be an end equality. GER then wavers 
between conservation and non-conservation reasoning, whereas BAB was 
not advanced enough to ever give a conservation answer. 
JAC begins the training experiment as one who wavers between con¬ 
servation and non-conservation reasoning. He can use an empirical 
reversibility (he has to actually return the substance to its original 
state, thus proving its equality) in contrast to operational reversi¬ 
bility which takes place solely as a mental act. Through the training 
exercises, JAC advances in his understanding and attains both the con¬ 
servation of liquid and modeling clay and his explanatory arguments are 
based upon operational compensation, identity and reversibility. 
Throughout the eight studies conducted by Inhelder, et al. , the most 
dramatic progress came from this group of intermediate reasoners with 
respect to the specific operation being studied. Besides those 
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children who fully consolidated their reasoning with respect to con¬ 
servation, class inclusion or number conservation, many of the children 
21 
"made real progress." The most outstanding conclusions thus reached 
was that "the nature and extent of the subject's progress was always, 
in fact, strikingly so, dependent upon their initial level; in other 
words, progress depends on the assimilatory instrument a subject 
already has at his disposal." JAC, as an example, shows "how chil¬ 
dren who have started off by at least considering the possibility of 
conservation—even if influenced by the striking changes in the shape 
of the modeling clay they give preconservation answers—can later 
modify their judgments of the situation, although they are not the 
direct source of knowledge, force the child into comparing his suc¬ 
cessive judgments. In this way, he can become aware of the contradic¬ 
tion between them."23 JAC completed the transition in reasoning from 
the intermediate stage to the third stage of conservation which indi¬ 
cated his "assimilatory instrument" was developed to the point where 
the observable and misleading influence of the features of the situa 
tion, when in seeming conflict with his own judgments, were used to 
modify his own internal structures, his level of competence. In JAC's 
study group, children beginning the training at Level I did progress, 
although "apparently the only benefit gained from the training sessions 
21Ibid. , p. 243. 
22Ibid., p. 244. 
23Ibid. , p. 57. 
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is that the child can now evaluate the two dimensions, but without 
coordinating them: 'More lemonade seen from the top (large diameter), 
less seen from the side (smaller diameter).'"2^ 
POU clearly is at an advanced enough stage so that he is able to 
quickly consolidate his reasoning and attain the conservation of con¬ 
tinuous quantity. "In this case, the observable features of the 
situation allow the child to make predictions and some explicit 
inferences based on a chain of causal implications of the "if . . . 
then 'type, which in the child's language is expressed' if you want 
2 S 
to have . . . there must be." 
Clearly, Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet interpret the advances in 
reasoning demonstrated by this learning experiment to be due to the 
status of the inferential mechanisms which are in a larger sense 
determined by the child's level of competence. They conclude that for 
the child reasoning at a non-conservation level: 
The lack of assimilation is not due to shortcomings in the 
subject's powers of observation, but to the fact that 
observable features are not integrated into inferential 
mechanisms. 
The way in which the intermediate-level subjects integrate 
the observable features into inferential mechanisms and the 
increasingly rapid progress made during Sub-Stage II provide 
further support for our general hypothesis that sensitivity 
to environmental cues and progress during training sessions 
depend on the child's initial level of development, rather 
than being independent of it, as in the case of a stimulus- 
response type of learning theory. 
2^Ibid., p. 54. 
2^Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
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Clearly, the transition between the level where a child does 
not use the new observable features and that where he can 
integrate them within a system of inferences is not abrupt. 
In fact, the transition is made very gradually by means of 
an increase in the retroactive corrections and accurate 
predictions, which become interdependent. Such predictions 
are possible only when they are related to prior inferences. 
In this particular case, it is interesting to note that 
inferences are closely dependent on the corrections which 
the child is able to make, retroactively, to his earlier 
solutions.26 
The description of the role of inference is, of course, not new or 
unique to the work of Inhelder, et al., which is cited here. Earlier 
in this work, it was pointed out that for Piaget the first glimmerings 
of intentional cause and effect reasoning are seen in the latter of 
the six sub-stages of the sensori-motor period. It is during the fifth 
sub-stage of this period that experimental trial and error behavior 
begins to appear. This is, of course, prior to the age of two. In the 
sixth period of this stage, "invention of new means through mental com¬ 
bination" is seen. These behaviors are of the first level of logic 
introduced earlier, the "logic of action"; i.e., they are limited to 
physical actions that the child actually carries out on his environ¬ 
ment . 
This period is followed by the beginning of the symbolic period 
of representation. With the advent of representation, pre-inferential 
or pre-logical connections are made through the logic of functions; 
i.e., the child is able to explore cause and effect relations in a 
functional manner. As the preoperational period is limited to 
26 Ibid., p. 59. 
221 
perceptual relationships, the functions are also limited. These func¬ 
tions are part of what Piaget described as the spatial continuum; i.e., 
perceptual attributes such as length, density, etc. "The difference 
between what is logical (or pre-logical) and what is sub-logical is 
simply that the former deals with the relations between discontinuous 
elements while the latter relates to elements forming part of a spatial 
27 
continuum." 
Wohlwill (1962), in discussing some of Piaget's earlier references 
to perception and pre-inference on the one hand and conceptual and 
inference structures on the other, states that of the earlier stage 
"the child's responses appear to be governed by particular aspects of 
the stimulus field. "28 Wohlwill reports that Piaget and Morf (1958) 
see a similarity of form between perceptual structures and conceptual 
structures as the title of their article demonstrates, "The Partial 
Isomorphisms Between Logical Structures and Perceptual Structures." 
"Like Werner (1957), Piaget and Morf draw parallels between perceptual 
groupings and conceptual classes; between invariance in perception 
(the constancies) and in conception (the conservations); between the 
perception of stimulus relationships and the conceptual representation 
of relationships of a symbolic level. For these authors, however, 
these analogies, or isomorphisms, are only partial; they emphasize, 
27Inhelder and Piaget, The Early Growth of Logic in the Child, 
p. 282. 
28Joachim Wohlwill, "From Perception to Inference: A Dimension 
of Cognitive Development," Child Development Monographs, 1962, 2, 83, 
p. 93. 
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rather, the ways in which perceptual mechanisms differ from the cor¬ 
responding inferential ones. They point out that perceptual phenomenon 
generally do not meet the requirements of the fundamental operation of 
logic (reversibility, additivity, transitivity, inversion) except in a 
? Q limited and approximate sense.' 
Evident in the similarity of structure between perception and 
conception is the fact that they are not the same and they do not lead 
to the same end when a child employs them in his judgments. This can 
be related to the statement of Inhelder, et al., that "the lack of 
assimilation (in the non-conserving child) is not due to shortcomings 
in the subject's powers of observation, but to the fact that observable 
features are not integrated into inferential mechanisms." Studies cited 
earlier, which have explored length, density and number relations, sup¬ 
port this thesis; namely, that the young child depends upon perceptual 
structures which lead him to incorrect solutions with respect to what 
is a logical problem of the conservation of number. Prior to the 
advent of the logical coordination of perceptual differentiations, 
number conservation is not possible. Other experimental evidence will 
now be presented which more or less directly involves aspects of the 
inference argument. 
Identity and Equivalence Conservation 
Elkind (1967), in an essay on the nature of Piaget's explanation 
of conservation problems, wrote that most researchers had overlooked 
^^Ibid., p. 93. 
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a distinction which was previously made regarding identity and equiva¬ 
lence conservations. 
Conservation problems involve presenting the child with an 
equivalent variable (V) and a standard (S) stimulus. The child is 
then asked to judge if they are equivalent. Then the variable stimu¬ 
lus is transformed V -> V', "which alters the perceptual but not the 
quantitative equivalence between variable and standard."30 The child 
is then asked to make a quantitative judgment of equivalence. 
Elkind, in the light of Piaget's previous explanations, states 
that there is recognized here two essential types of conservation: 
Conservation of Identity: The datum of the conservation 
problem, the judgment regarding the equality of inequality 
of S and V', can be viewed as indicative of two different 
forms of conservation. First of all, the judgment could be 
viewed as dealing with the conservation of a given weight, 
length, number, etc., across a reversible transformation 
and with respect to itself alone. For example, suppose that 
in the weight conservation problem described earlier, one 
employed only a single ball of clay which was rolled into a 
sausage, and the child was asked whether the clay was now 
the same weight as before (i.e., Does V = V'?). This would 
be a direct assessment of what will hereafter be called 
the 'conservation of identity.' 
Conservation of Equivalence: The conservation judgments, 
however, can be viewed as assessing the child's knowledge 
of the invariance of a quantitative relation (of equality, 
inequality, etc.) across a transformation of one of the 
elements of the relation. It can be readily seen that the 
standard conservation problem outlined above provides a 
direct test of this form of conservation which will here¬ 
after be called the 'conservation of equivalence.' 
3°David Elkind, "Piaget's Conservation Problems," Child 
Development, 1967, 38, p. 16. 
31 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
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Elkind then explains that the conservation of identity is the 
necessary condition for the conservation of equivalence, that is, 
before the child can make a comparison across objects, he first has to 
have the notion that when V changes to V’ it's amount, or weight, etc. 
remains conserved. In order to do this, the child must be able to 
"equate the differences" or be able to "compensate" the changes which 
have taken place in the dimensions (increasing length Is compensated 
for by decreasing width). This is in part accomplished through retro¬ 
active changes in judgment which eventually lead to the idea of 
invariance or conservation. "It is thus clear that Piaget's discussion 
of conservation is primarily aimed at explaining the conservation of 
identity and not the conservation of equivalence. That is to say, the 
equation of differences refers to the compensation of changes within 
one and the same object and not to the relation between the standard 
32 
and the variable directly assessed by the conservation problem." 
The initial inferences are related to identity conservation when 
the child discovers "that when the dimensions of a given quantity are 
altered, the dimensional differences compensate one another and under¬ 
lies the child's insight that transformations are reversible and that 
33 
they leave the object (property or quantity) invariant." Now that 
the child has established the notion of invariance by means of deduc¬ 
tive reasoning, he can establish the conservation of equivalence 
32Ibid. , p. 19. 
33Ibid. , p. 19. 
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(S - V'). "This (V) was equal to that (S) before, and the change 
(V V') doesn't change anything, so this (V) must still equal this 
„34 
(S)." The proposed order of development of the conservations was 
first identity then equivalence conservation. 
A number of studies were subsequently conducted in response to 
Elkind's article. 
Hooper (1969) tested six, seven and eight-year-old children on 
the two types of conservations, and formed that 66.7 percent of the 
children in the identity conservation group conserved where 43.1 per¬ 
cent of the equivalence group conserved. He concluded from the analy¬ 
sis of his data that identity conservation definitely precedes equiva¬ 
lence conservation. The results of Papalia and Hooper (1971) were 
similar with respect to quantity conservations; however, they showed 
no significant difference in number conservation. 
Schwartz and Scholnick (1970) found that identity judgments were 
more easily made than were equivalence judgments with a conservation 
of discontinuous quantity. The children ranged in age from four years 
and five months to six years and four months. Although they obtained 
the predicted order of the conservations, they interpret their results 
as not due primarily to a logical difference as Elkind (1967) suggests, 
but rather it was due more to the stimulus setting. 
It has become increasingly apparent that conservation per¬ 
formance is affected by two major variables. Many analy¬ 
ses of conservation stress the logic which enables S to 
34Ibid. , p. 20. 
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make some judgment about the invariance of a particular 
quality of an object (Elkind, 1967; Wallach, 1969) and the 
stimulus conditions under which the judgments are made; 
namely, in the face of particular irrelevant transformation 
(Gelman, 1969; Uzgirls, 1964). The present scaling study 
lends support to contentions that the elements in the 
stimulus situation pose a major stumbling block in the 
mastery of conservation of discontinuous quantity and to 
the contention that the relative difficulty of each of the 
sequence of logical judgments which make up conservation 
also depends on the stimulus setting in which the judgment 
is made. 
Teets (1968), Northam and Gruen (1970), Murray (1970), Moynahan 
and Glick (1972) have all shown generally that identity conservation 
did not precede equivalence conservation. Elkind and Schoenfeld (1972) 
point out that this distinction between the conservations was meant to 
apply to preoperational children only and thus this would possibly 
explain the difference in the data of Teets (1968) , Northam and Gruen 
(1970), and Murray (1970), as primarily older children were used in 
their study. This explanation, however, would not apply to Moynahan 
and Glick (1972) , as they tested children ranging in age from five 
years and four months to seven years and six months on problems of 
number, length, continuous quantity and weight. Only for length was 
there a significant tendency to possess identity conservation without 
equivalence conservation. 
Elkind and Schoenfeld (1972) presented a series of four hypotheses 
which might explain some of the difference. 
35Marilyn Miller Schwartz and Ellen Kofsky Scholnick, "Scalogram 
Analysis of Logical and Perceptual Components of Conservation of 
Discontinuous Quantity," Child Development, 1970, 41, p. 702. 
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(1) Six-year-old children score significantly higher on 
identity and equivalence conservation tests than do 
four-year-old children. 
(2) Identity judgments are easier for four and six-year- 
old subjects (taken as a group) than are equivalence 
judgments. 
(3) Success in making identity and equivalence judgments 
varies with the type of conservation test in ques¬ 
tion (horizontal decal age). 
(4) Four-year-old subjects score significantly higher on 
identity-conservation tests than on equivalence- 
conservation tests but that this is not true for 
six-year-old subjects.36 
Four different conservation tasks were used to test these hypo¬ 
theses: The conservation of number, of continuous (liquid) quantity, 
of mass, and of length. Twenty-two pre-school children with a mean 
age of four years and five months and twenty-two first-grade children 
with a mean age of six years and 2.8 months were tested. Six orders 
of the words "more," "less," and "same" were used in phrasing the con¬ 
servation questions. All four hypotheses were supported in their 
results. The difference between identity in equivalence conservation 
was most pronounced for the young children. The number conservation 
test was found to be significantly easier than the other three. They 
hypothesize the difference between identity and equivalence conserva¬ 
tion is accounted for because, "identity conservation is not truly 
quantitative and involves only figurative perceptual processes (i.e., 
global quantitative judgments comparable to those used when a child 
36David Elkind and Eva Schoenfeld, "Identity and Equivalence 
Conservation at Two Age Levels," Developmental Psychology, 1972, 6, 
3, pp. 530-531. 
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judges a cluster of ten pennies as more than a cluster of six—because 
of the perceptual impression of numerosity). Equivalence conservation, 
in contrast, requires the deductive processes made possible by con- 
37 
Crete operations." Although they did not state this, their distinc¬ 
tion could very well explain the Mehler-Bever finding of a "conserva¬ 
tion" or "over-conservation" in very young children as the children 
may be able at a young age to judge "more" on the basis of perceptual 
numerosity. 
In summary, an important distinction has been made between the 
levels of conservation. Identity conservation involves a global 
quantification and a perceptually based inference mechanism, whereas 
equivalence conservation appears later in development and involves a 
deductive concrete operational form of inference. 
Compensation 
"Compensation refers to the recognition that material undergoing 
a perceptual transformation in one dimension is accompanied by a 
specific change in another dimension." The recognition of the per¬ 
ceptual transformation relates directly to anticipatory and hence 
retroactive judgments which have previously been presented as central 
to the development of conservation. The compensatory relationship 
between dimensions is seen as a prerequisite for conservation and 
3^Ibid. , p. 532. 
38F. Curcio, E. Kattef, D. Levine and 0. Robbins, "Compensation 
and Susceptibility to Conservation Training," Developmental Psychology, 
1972, 7, 3, p. 259. 
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hence was hypothesized by Piaget to appear before conservation reason¬ 
ing. Piaget and Inhelder (1971) reported that, "In a sample of four 
to eight-year-olds, 30 percent could not conserve nor could they 
anticipate the direction of change in height; 42.5 percent passed both 
tests; 22.5 percent could anticipate but could not conserve; whereas 
only a small portion, 5 percent, could conserve but could not antici¬ 
pate."^ 
Curcio, Kattef, Levine and Robbins (1972) hypothesized in 
response to these that possessing the ability to coordinate dimensions 
should increase a child's susceptibility to conservation training. 
Sixty-seven children, ranging in age from five years and four months 
to six years and two months, were first pre-tested on their understand¬ 
ing of the words "more" and "same" and the ability to compensate height 
and width dimensions and discontinuous quantity conservation. Three 
levels were thus established. Non-conservers who understood the words 
"more" and "same" were assigned to either an experimental or control 
group. In these groups, one further distinction was made between com¬ 
pensators and non-compensators. Four groups were in effect created in 
which both compensators and non-compensators either received or did not 
receive training. They found that "children who recognize a compensa¬ 
tory relationship between height-width dimensions are more susceptible 
to conservation than children who do not recognize this relationship. 
■^Ibid., p. 260. 
^Ibid ., p. 263. 
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Neither the compensators nor the non-compensation control groups made 
conservation progress. They also found that children who could 
verbalize the principles underlying their height predictions were more 
susceptible to conservation training. 
Larsen and Flavell (1970) attempted to reinterpret the results 
of Bruner (1966) , Cohen (1967) , Halford (1968), Silverman and Marsh 
(1969) , who concluded the ability to anticipate level changes in liquid 
conservation which occurred at an earlier age in all their studies to 
mean that "if abstract terms are avoided, conservation appears at an 
earlier age than is found using the usual conservation tasks," i.e., 
conservation can be understood in terms of "action before it can be 
grasped at a verbal descriptive level.The abstract terms referred 
to here is the ability to anticipate the compensation of dimensions. 
Citing a reference by Piaget and Inhelder (1963), who provided 
the first objection used by Larsen and Flavell, they point out that 
"the anticipation-of-levels task is a test of the ability to compen¬ 
sate height and width relations rather than a test of conservation," 
as conservation requires that the child realize "that the quantity 
n42 
of a substance does not change with changes in dimensions." 
Unfortunately, their results shed little light on whether com¬ 
pensation is a prerequisite for conservation of length except to say 
^Gary Larsen and John Flavell, "Verbal Factors in Compensation 
Performance and the Relation Between Conservation and Conservation," 
Child Development, 1970, 41, p. 966. 
42 
Ibid., p. 966. 
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that their results gave little support to the hypothesis of Piaget 
and Inhelder (1963). They attribute this result to a lack of clarity 
on Piaget and Inhelder's part as they were able to reinterpret their 
data in a manner which is in conformity with the original conceptuali¬ 
zation by Piaget and Inhelder. 
Halford and Fullerton (1970) used a discrimination task related 
to compensation to induce number conservation in children. First 
they stated: "It is only when the compensating relation between length 
and spacing is recognized that number, length, and spacing becomes 
mutually consistent ones." 
In order to conserve number, the children must discover 
the operations which determine number. In the context of 
the classicial conservation test, this means they must dis¬ 
cover that number is determined by correspondence, poten¬ 
tial or actual, to the standard, and not by length or spac¬ 
ing unless these two compensate each other. (They refer 
here to Piaget's dolls and bed conservation test.) The S 
must discover that if number is constant, an increase or 
decrease in length is compensated by the opposite change in 
spacing. Thus, length and spacing are not ignored as cues. 
If both length and spacing are taken into account together, 
and seen as compensating one another, then they are quite 
consistent with number. Then, and only then, can number be 
seen as the determinant of the size of the collection. 
Their theorization, in short, is that unless and until number is 
an invariant, "length, spacing, and counting provide antagonistic 
cues,"^ and that the compensatory relation is established when the 
child brings number, length and spacing into relationship. This is, of 
43G. S. Halford and T. J. Fullerton, "A Discrimination Task Which 
Induces Conservation of Number," Child Development, 1970, 41, p. 206. 
44 Ibid., p. 206. 
232 
course, a different relationship than Piaget has proposed for he 
establishes that the compensatory relation between perceptual dimen¬ 
sions, such as length and spacing (density), occurs prior to number 
becoming an invariant. 
They were able to induce conservation in two-thirds of their non¬ 
conserving subjects by using a form of provoked one-to-one correspon¬ 
dence training between dolls and beds. The children were required to 
discriminate between sets which vary in extent, spacing and number 
in order to select a set which matches the beds in number."45 They 
argued that "the property of ’reversibility' or ’(potential) cor¬ 
respondence' to a standard set has a role resembling that of a dis- 
A 6 
criminative stimulus." "Reversibility" was involved when it was 
shown that the transformed (lengthened) row of beds no longer in one- 
to-one correspondence with the dolls, for example, could be shown to 
be equal in number simply by placing the dolls on the beds, or a 
return to numerical equivalence by provoked correspondence. 
Their results shed little light on the role of the compensatory 
relationship in number conservation for they depended heavily upon 
correspondence which was presented with other potentially conflicting 
ones with length and density. As their pre-test was one of number 
conservation, they did not separate out the children as other studies 
have who could anticipate the effects of transformation (compensation) 
45Ibid. , p. 210. 
46Ibid., p. 211. 
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but still not conserve number. They argue, of course, that until 
number is invariant there can be no compensation. Also, the mean age 
of their subjects was six years and three months, which is the age at 
which children naturally attain number conservation. Provoked cor¬ 
respondence then could have been the determining factor and not a com¬ 
pensatory relationship. 
In summary, the research results on the role of compensatory and 
anticipatory judgments does not seem to be conclusive, with the 
exception that compensatory judgments do occur prior to the conserva¬ 
tions under study and from the Curcio, et al. (1972) study, children 
acquire conservation reasoning more easily and sooner if they can 
compensate. The role that Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet (1974) attri¬ 
bute to compensatory judgments in the form of anticipations and retro¬ 
active corrections has, in general, received little experimental 
attention. Theirs, however, is a compelling argument, especially when 
the protocols of the children cited are examined. In addition, the 
remainder of' their work, a portion of which remains to be reported on 
here, gives further support to the role of the child's ability to 
anticipate the effect of transformations. 
Conflict and Compromise 
One of the major findings of Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet s study 
was that certain conceptual schemes can be manipulated and applied in 
training studies such that they are brought into direct conflict with 
other schemes. The child, in an attempt to solve the problem at hand, 
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draws upon principles inherent in each scheme and due to their incom¬ 
patibility (until they are coordinated or integrated in a higher order 
relationship) induce conflict in the child's thinking and compromise 
solutions and judgments which clearly do not solve the problem. The 
realization of the conflict on the part of the child provides part of 
the impetus needed to go on and resolve the schemes. 
The responses observed in the conservation of length train¬ 
ing study clarify the general processes underlying the 
transition to a higher level of reasoning. Both in espe¬ 
cially contrived situations and in normal everyday life con¬ 
flicts can arise between different conceptual schemes, some 
of which are more developed than others. A first effort to 
combine and reconcile the conflicting schemes results in 
inadequate compromises, which indicate the beginning of a 
coordination between certain previously unconnected schemes. 
Subsequently, the various schemes are integrated into a new 
and more advanced cognitive structure. . . . Once particu¬ 
lar conceptual schemes are known to be applied in certain 
situations, it is possible to devise problems that activate 
these schemes and to induce conflicts by comparing solutions 
based on different principles.^ 
The specific schemes referred to above were elementary number conserva¬ 
tion and the conservation of length. 
Several interesting points are made. Prior to number conserva¬ 
tion, which is the first of the conservations to appear as we have 
seen, the lack first of the differentiation and then the lack of the 
coordination of the differentiation of number, length and density (a 
dependence upon topological relations) do not disappear at the time of 
elementary number conservation being attained, as these same factors 
tend to operate in the various conservations studied—conservation of 
A7Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development of 
Cognition, p. 166. 
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continuous quantity, conservation of physical matter and form of con¬ 
tinuous quantity, and the conservation of length. Children, even 
after number conservation, tend still to be confused by the "going 
beyond" judgment, as in length conservation. 
To emphasize the point, number, particularly the stage of the 
arithmetization of number, is built slowly from the elementary number 
conservation. 
Also, in a fascinating series of experiments, they explore the 
relationship and effect that number and its use have upon various 
conservations. In essence, structures which are at least partly 
logically connected are brought into relationships with one another. 
This often leads to conflict and an important dimension of a child’s 
thinking in the intermediate stages when conflict is most prevalent 
to compromise solutions. 
The Elaboration of the ANISA Theory of Development 
A complex interaction of internal structures, internal processes, 
and the environment characterize the developmental theories of both 
ANISA and Piaget. The broad tenents of the two theories, although in 
no way identical, are basically compatible. ANISA has specified the 
nature of man and has more broadly investigated and synthesized the 
multitude of dimensions which are crucial to the development of the 
human being. Piaget, on the other hand, has to a much greater degree 
investigated and theorized about the nature of the development of 
knowledge as it applies to perception and cognition. It is on the 
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basis of this specificity that the elaboration of aspects of the ANISA 
Theory of Development are undertaken. 
Learning Competence and Equilibration 
Learning competence is seen as a parallel conceptualization to 
equilibration, although there are important philosophical differences. 
The essential feature of learning competence is that it involves gain¬ 
ing conscious control over the processes of learning. Equilibration 
is seen as an "intrinsic and constitutive property of organic and 
mental life."^8 In the same sense, consciousness and conscious con¬ 
trol are seen by ANISA as intrinsic and constitutive properties of the 
human being. Equilibration is, however, described as an auto- 
regulatory mechanism, whereas conscious control represents an act of 
intention, of will. Auto-regulation is not interpreted by Piaget, 
however, as meaning that it happens automatically; rather, the type of 
equilibration which can occur is fundamentally dependent upon the level 
of competence or the stage of development which reflects the functional 
status of the internal structures. As a consequence, equilibration is 
not a static form but changes as development occurs. Equilibration 
functions as a regulatory mechanism whose function it is to preserve 
the integrity of the mental structures, yet at the same time extend 
them to the next level of development. 
^8Jean Piaget, Six Psychological Studies, trans. Anita Tenser, 
ed. David Elkind (New York: Vintage Book Edition, Random House, 1967), 
p. 102. 
237 
The organism has special organs of equilibrium. The same 
is true of mental life, whose organs of equilibrium are 
special regulatory mechanisms. This is so at all levels 
of development, from the elementary regulations of motiva¬ 
tion (needs and interests) up to will for affectivity, and 
from perceptual and sensori-motor regulations up to opera¬ 
tions for cognition. We shall see that the role of opera¬ 
tions is to anticipate the intrusions which modify all of 
the representative systems and to compensate for them. This 
is accomplished by the complete reversibility which charac¬ 
terizes operational mechanisms, as opposed to the semi¬ 
reversibility of the regulatory mechanisms of pre- 
operational thought.^ 
The twin functions of preservation and extension were introduced 
in Chapter Two as describing two levels of equilibration. They were 
homeorhesis and homeostasis. The former is an elementary form of 
equilibration which characterizes the early stages of developmental 
formation of the structures, whereas, the second, homeostasis, functions 
in the mature system. Further, each structure develops its own rules 
of transformation through which equilibration functions. This was par¬ 
ticularly evident in the research on the various forms of conservation 
among which there is a basic structural similarity, yet they develop 
at different times and can even be manipulated to create internal cogni¬ 
tive conflict between them. Through anticipation, compromise and com¬ 
pensation, the conflicts are resolved and a new and higher level of 
synthesis is present. 
Learning competence for ANISA functions in a similar manner. 
Learning to learn is dependent upon the state of competence of the 
internal structures, i.e., conscious control over the fundamental 
49 Ibid. , p. 102. 
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processes of learning is gradually structured. The conscious control 
over the processes of learning would involve similar mechanisms of 
anticipation, compromise, compensation reasoning. These mechanisms 
describe the type of integrations and generalizations the child is able 
to make at this stage of development. 
The role of reversibility was discussed in the introductory sec¬ 
tions of this chapter. During preoperative thought, there is a gradual 
dissociation of form and content until in operative thought a logical 
deductive frame of reference prevails. This logical frame of reference 
relates to the child's own internal actions. The gradual refinement 
of reversibility reasoning first in the form of approximate judgments 
or integrations and last in the form of logical reversibility would 
also be true for ANISA as a description of the fundamental changes in 
the conscious ability to control differentiations, integrations and 
generalizations. 
The equilibration model is important to education for it is the 
basis upon which Piaget distinguishes between two levels of activity 
which contribute to development. Piaget limits learning to specific 
situations, to provoked interactions which are, for example, under the 
control of the teacher. The process of equilibration underlies the 
second and major contribution to development; i.e., Piaget argues that 
there is an aspect to development which is not subject to manipulation, 
rather it is the child's own internal mental functioning or activity 
which is responsible for the major transitions in reasoning which 
occurs through the stages. In a sense, Piaget argues for recognition 
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of the child's ovm activity in the process of development. Efforts to 
overcome conflict, through trial and error, through retroactive cor¬ 
rections, through compromise, and through compensation, functions to 
coordinate the structures of knowledge and bring on a new stage of 
thinking. These kinds of activity cannot be accounted for if develop¬ 
ment is conceived to be due to either maturational factors solely or 
due to the summation of a set of discrete learning expriences defined 
in the narrow sense. Neither requires a level of internal functioning. 
Equilibratory mechanisms then are seen to develop gradually and 
are limited by each stage of development. Much of the research on num¬ 
ber has substantiated this aspect of stage, each of which is charac¬ 
terized by a definable type of reasoning. This was particularly evi¬ 
dent in the research by Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet (1974) where they 
showed over and over again that the effect of various training proce¬ 
dures depended primarily upon the state of competence or the state of 
development of the assimilatory scheme. At earlier levels, for 
example, they were not even able to induce conflict in the child when 
presented with clearly (to the adult) contradictory responses; while 
for children at a more advanced level, the differential aspects of the 
situation were grasped and conflict was created, although the resolu¬ 
tion of the conflict in many children had to await further development, 
i.e., had to await equilibration activity by the child. 
The fact that many subjects progressed as a result of the 
training procedures and that in most cases this progress 
resulted in stable acquisitions is in itself sufficient to 
show that progress cannot stem from maturation alone; if 
it is possible, through adequate exercises, to shorten the 
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intervals which 'normally1 (according to the standards 
established through statistical studies) separate the suc¬ 
cessive cognitive stages, then development cannot be 
explained in terms of a genetically pre-established pro¬ 
gram with no modification resulting from the environment. 
Quite to the contrary, insofar as it is possible to compare 
learning achieved as a result of training procedures with 
that occurring over a greater time span in everyday life, 
the results demonstrate the importance of the interactions 
between a subject's tendency to assimilate reality and the 
reality with which he is brought into contact, and the 
importance of general stimulation of his mental processes 
when opportunities for action and reflection are numerous.^ 
Stimulation of the child's mental processes, of his own conception 
of reality, is clearly accomplished through training procedures which 
utilized uncoordinated members of what eventually will be a major 
structure of knowledge. Bringing these into relationship in an educa¬ 
tional setting would constitute for ANISA a description of the educa¬ 
tional process through which an optimum rate of development is achieved. 
The technique used by Inhelder, et al., is summarized in the following 
statement, the general principles of which will later be used to sug¬ 
gest ways to support number development. 
Conflict is introduced into procedures by confronting the 
subjects with the discrepancy between their predictions and 
the experimental outcome, or, as in logical or logico- 
mathematical problems, between sub-systems of the child's 
own reasoning. A typical example is that of the child who, 
in the number and length experiment, thinks he can make his 
road the same length as the model simply by using the same 
number of matchsticks, ignoring the fact that his matches are 
not of the same length. In the particularly clear situation 
where parallel roads are laid out one directly above the 
other, he realizes that his solution is wrong, and why, but 
this does not help him solve the problem in the other 
50Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development of 
Cognition, p. 266. 
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situations, unless a certain competence in the coordination 
of schemes (comparing different ideas and their respective 
results) is already present. 
They go on to state that this type of experience for the child 
(the experience of discrepancies between one's predictions and ideas) 
is clearly an important dimension in the acquisition of knowledge. 
Again, it is important to recognize, however, that this technique was 
successful at a particular level of development. This type of pre¬ 
diction and the inferential mechanisms evoked are typical of the child 
who is passing from a preoperational form of reasoning to an opera¬ 
tional form. The state of competency, the state of the pre-logical 
to logical or pre-inferential to inferential forms of reasoning, 
determines the potential use of regulations or mechanisms which are 
present. 
Before proceeding further with the analysis of learning principles 
important to ANISA, the integration of learning competence with the 
general notion of equilibration can be undertaken. 
Implications 
It, indeed, seems reasonable at this point to state that the 
gradual control which the child is able to exercise over his environ¬ 
ment and his own internal actions of thought as described by the 
mechanism of equilibration must, in part, be what is inherent in learn¬ 
ing how to learn. The gradual transition from recognitive abstraction 
51 Ibid., p. 267. 
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to reflective abstraction; from object permanence to the logic of 
action (early form of causal reasoning—trial and error), to the logic 
of functions, to the mature forms of logic; from retroactive correc¬ 
tions, to predictions (anticipation and implication), to compensatory 
reasoning; must all be examples of the growing process of control over 
one’s thinking processes. In this sense they constitute the learning 
how to learn of logico-mathematical thought in general and number in 
specific. As Piaget intended them, these functions are not learned in 
the strict sense, for one cannot teach a child, for example, to make 
a compensation between the topological dimensions of length, density 
and height. They are not taught or learned in the strict sense because 
they occur as properties of a particular stage of development of a 
specific level of competence, and because they are the result of the 
child's own mental activity. 
The ANISA Theory of Development is, as stated previously, not 
based upon a Piagetian definition in the narrow sense but rather cor¬ 
responds to the broad definition of development. Therefore, these 
same learning processes and conscious control over them would suggest 
that they can be taught in an ANISA sense; i.e., after accurately 
diagnosing the level of competence of the child, a specific learning 
experience would be introduced by the teacher in order to induce a 
new level of differentiation, integration and generalization. 
Earlier, Piaget was quoted as having rejected the idea that a 
child can learn to equilibrate. To reiterate, "a new scheme is the 
product of learning in the strict sense, insofar as it results from the 
243 
differentiation of a previous scheme and insofar as this differentia¬ 
tion involves an accommodation that depends on experience. But for 
this learning to take place, there must exist previous schemes that 
can be differentiated during the assimilation of new objects. More¬ 
over, the structure of these schemes and the assimilation, considered 
strictly as the prerequisite of the structure, are pre-conditions and 
not the products of learning. In a word, learning relates to the 
content of the schematism while the generalizable character of its 
form does not result from learning but is a necessary condition for 
the functioning of the schemes. 
It would appear paradoxical to be describing the characteristics 
of learning to learn on the one hand and at the same time stating that 
it cannot be learned. This is true only in the sense that Piaget 
limits learning to apply to some didactic point or to be manipulated 
by the teacher. In the larger sense, the development of regulatory 
mechanisms which apply universally across an entire set of structures 
or stage are developed as a result of the child's efforts. It is also 
reasonable in the sense that for ANISA learning is not limited to the 
empiricist conception of learning, which holds that development is the 
sum of discrete learning episodes, as learning is defined in a broad 
(equilibration—learning to learn) sense. Therefore, for ANISA the 
effect of manipulation and intervention on the part of the teacher is 
not limited to a didactic or content oriented experience, but is rather. 
52Furth, Piaget and Knowledge, p. 236. i 
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defined in a manner which involves the regulatory mechanisms of a par¬ 
ticular structure or stage of reasoning. This is so because the 
Developmental Theory of ANISA recognizes, as does Piaget, that the 
actualization of potentiality is due to a complex interaction of 
internal structures, internal processes and the environment. 
Now that the basic compatibility of the equilibration mechanisms 
with that of the learning to learn mechanisms has been established, a 
specific analysis of the learning to learn of number can be undertaken. 
What Is the Learning to Learn of Number? 
The problem of "What is the learning to learn of number?" is simi¬ 
lar to the basic problem posed by Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet (1974), 
that being "the major concern of the present work is to discover the 
processes of integration that result in novel types of behavior; these 
will be studied by means of a method based on learning." The same 
question was asked in another way, "What are the regulatory mechanisms 
which govern the transition from one stage of development to the next?" 
The fundamental starting point for these studies included several 
assumptions: (1) "The basic hypothesis of developmental constructivism 
(Piaget, 1960) postulates that no human knowledge, with the obvious 
exception of very elementary hereditary forms, is preformed in the 
structures of the subject or the object";54 (2) There is a continuity 
53Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, "Learning and the Development of 
Cognition," p. 8. 
54Ibid., p. 8. 
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between functions at a lower level and those of a more advanced level; 
(3) Piaget proposes a single explanatory principle to account for the 
transformations that lead to novel types of behavior that characterize 
each successively more complex stage of development. This principle is 
based on regulatory or auto-regulatory mechanisms which account for the 
structure of the different cognitive stages of various levels of 
complexity and their mode of construction"; (4) "All regulations 
that take place during biological growth and psychological development 
are constructive processes and not just a means of preserving an already 
attained equilibrium; and all constructive processes imply compensating 
activities that counteract disturbances in equilibrium";56 (5) "Con¬ 
cepts do not develop in closed systems but are in constant interaction 
with each other—even though for methodological reasons they are 
studied separately—and it is this interaction that accounts for the 
child's progress during learning experiences." They do not see the 
problem of interaction as one of transfer but is better thought of in 
terms of "extension of fields of operativity."57 
Posing the same question for ANISA, i.e., "What are the regulatory 
mechanisms which govern the transition from one level to another?" 
or "What are the processes of integration that result in novel types 
of behavior?" would produce the following set of assumptions on which 
55Ibid., pp. 8- 
56Ibid. , P- 10 
57Ibid. , P- 15 
to base an answer. 
(1) Learning is the key to the release of human poten- 
tiality. Potentiality does not imply preformed 
structures, nor preformed knowledge. Potentiality 
does imply, however, that there is a latent capacity 
of each individual to express certain unique charac¬ 
teristics in addition to common characteristics. 
ANISA then would depart with a hypothesis of develop¬ 
ment constructivism to the extent that an interaction 
also occurs with respect to a latent but undeveloped 
capacity. 
(2) The development of conscious control over the 
processes of learning constitutes learning compe¬ 
tence or learning how to learn. Conscious control 
changes as development proceeds but is nonetheless 
an inherent characteristic or prime causal factor 
behind all human activity. It is not auto-regulated 
or system governed in the sense that the degree of 
conscious control relates to a person's general 
state of well-being, to his state of "effectance," 
and because of that relationship, development can 
be accelerated or retarded as the state of well¬ 
being is changed or effected. 
(3) The processes of learning competence are differen¬ 
tiation, integration and generalization. Conscious 
control is exercised over the capacity to abstract 
(differentiate) or select from what is either 
stored in one’s memory about the process of learn¬ 
ing experienced earlier that is relevant to the 
present learning task and apply it appropriately 
to the task. To do this appropriately will involve 
some kind of association (integration) of the dif¬ 
ferentiated or abstracted aspects of previous 
learning processes with the requirements of the 
present task. This would essentially constitute a 
learning of the regulatory mechanisms or a learning 
of equilibratory mechanisms. As noted previously, 
this type of learning is not like Piaget's learning 
in the narrow sense but is more like his learning 
in the broad sense which is equivalent to develop¬ 
ment . 
(4) A continuity between functions at a lower level and 
those at a more advanced level, as for Piaget, are 
necessarily implied by learning competence. 
(5) Also, as for Piaget, concepts develop in a constant 
interaction with each other. In the sense that 
every object of the environment is assimilated into 
an already existent scheme, and therefore knowledge 
is an action, then for ANISA interaction with the 




Learning competence defined as conscious control over basic pro¬ 
cesses of development is fundamentally an expression of self- 
actualization—an expression of creativity guided by purposive activity. 
Creativity is then the fundamental dynamic which expresses itself as 
purposive activity. Subjective confirmation that learning competence 
is being gained (effectance) serves to reinforce and direct conscious 
activity. This view does not exclude equilibration as a means of 
explaining the construction of development but transcends and incorpo¬ 
rates it. The central problem then of distinguishing learning compe¬ 
tence or the learning to learn of number from equilibratory mechanisms 
is to account for development as an activity expressive of purposive 
and conscious activity. 
What Is the Role of Differentiation, Integration 
and Generalization? 
In pursuit of the general goal of determining "What is the learn¬ 
ing to learn of number?" the role of differentiation, integration and 
generalization must be accounted for, as they are the central processes 
hypothesized in the ANISA Theory of Development through which conscious 
control or learning competence is gained. It has already been suggested 
that the mechanisms of equilibration describe generally the means by 
which the child is able to exercise control over his interaction with 
^Daniel C. Jordan, "Learning Competence and the Release of Human 
Potential," p. 56. 
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the environment and his own internal actions of thought. They 
generally involve the transition from recognitive abstraction to 
reflective abstraction, the transition from the logic of action to the 
logic of functions to the mature forms of logic; retroactive correc- 
bions to predictions (anticipation and implication), to compensatory 
reasoning. To relate these forms of transition to the processes of 
differentiation, integration and generalization now remains to be 
explained. First, the definition of learning competence is stated 
again as it describes the framework for the manner in which differen¬ 
tiation, integration and generalization function. 
Learning competence then refers to a capacity to abstract 
(differentiate) or select from what is stored in one’s 
memory about the process of learning experienced earlier 
that is relevant to a present learning task and apply it 
appropriately to the task. To do this 'appropriately' will 
involve some kind of association (integration) of the dif¬ 
ferentiated or abstracted aspects of previous learning 
processes with the requirements of a present task.59 
Generalization would involve the application of the integration 
processes of learning to wider fields of application. It is interest¬ 
ing to note that in subsequent ANISA publications after this initial 
definition was advanced, the definition of learning competence has 
been changed. Careful reading of the first definition reveals that it 
clearly refers to the differentiation and integration of the process 
of learning, whereas the later definition refers to the differentiation, 
integration and generalization of experience. 
5Daniel C. Jordan, "Learning Competence and the Release of Human 
Potential," Unpublished Manuscript, Xerox, December 1971, p. 56. 
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We thus detine learning eonpcM eneo as t hr :iM l i t v i .> .Ml 
ferentiate experience, whether internal or external, into 
separate elements, to integrate them in a new way, thereby 
providing new information, new feelings, new skills and new 
perceptions which may or may not become expressed immedi¬ 
ately in some form of overt behavior, and to generalize the 
integration. 0 
Later definitions clarify that learning competence rests on the 
conscious ability to differentiate, integrate and generalize the learn¬ 
ing processes or experience. For ANISA, then, the meaning of a learning 
process and that which constitutes internal or external experience are 
equivalent concepts, i.e., that which is intended by an internal 
experience or an internal structure for ANISA conditions the type of 
learning process which the child employs. As was the problem with a 
narrow and broad definition of learning and development for Piaget, 
so also a similar problem arises when the Piagetian definitions of 
experience and memory are considered. Piaget defines both of these 
concepts in a broad and narrow sense, and as was the case for learning, 
ANISA recognizes and uses them in the broad sense. Therefore, it is 
not a matter of a conceptual difference between the two theories but 
is a matter of the definition of terms. 
Experience, no matter tiow presented or managed, is for Piaget an 
insufficient mechanism for the construction of an operative structure 
such as the conservation of physical substance. Piaget, in his essay 
of Development and Learning, states: 
60Jordan and Streets, "The ANISA Model: A New Basis for 
Education Planning," p. 297. 
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Experience of objects, of physical reality, is obviously 
a basic factor in the development of cognitive structures. 
But once again this factor does not explain everything. I 
can give two reasons for this. The first reason is that 
some of the concepts which appears at the beginning of the 
stage of concrete operations are such that I cannot see how 
they could be drawn from experience. ... My second objec¬ 
tive to the sufficiency of experience as an explanatory 
factor is that this notion of experience is a very equivocal 
one. There are, in fact, two kinds of experience which are 
psychologically very different and this difference is very 
important from a pedagogical point of view. It is because 
of the pedagogical importance that I emphasize this distinc¬ 
tion. First of all, there is what I shall call physical 
experience, and secondly, what I shall call logico- 
mathematical experience. 1 
The first objection Piaget discusses, an example involving the 
conservation of substance, is the case of changing the shape of a ball 
of plasticene. This is the same example which has been discussed 
previously, where the ball shape is changed to a sausage shape and the 
child is asked, "Is it the same amount?" To ascertain other aspects of 
the conservation of substances, he added two more questions: "Does 
it have the same weight?" and "Does it have the same volume?" Piaget 
points out that weight conservation can simply be shown to the child 
by weighing it before and after the transformation. The conservation 
of weight, it would seem, can then be gained as a direct result of 
experience. He uses a similar explanation of volume conservation by 
stating that the volume which the plasticene displaces submerged in 
water before and after the transformation can be shown to be the same; 
hence, volume conservation could result directly from experience. He 
then states, "Through perception you can get at the weight of the ball 
blpiaget, "Development and Learning," p. 188. 
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or the volume of the ball but perception cannot give an idea of the 
amount of substance. No experiment, no experience, can show the child 
that there is the same amount of substance. 
The reason that the conservation of substance cannot be simply 
shown is that it must become a logical necessity which involves 
coordination of the three rules, identity, compensation and reversi¬ 
bility. The child must realize that it is the same substance, that 
nothing has been added or subtracted (identity), and that the changes 
in one dimension are compensated for by the change in another dimen¬ 
sion. Finally, the child must know that the transformation can be 
reversed; i.e., the substance can be returned to its original state. 
This reasoning is clearly linked to the notion of operative knowing 
where the child’s own internal schema act upon the "experience" trans¬ 
forming it with respect to the rules of the schema. 
Piaget’s second objection to the sufficiency of experience explana¬ 
tion relates to the distinction between physical experience and logico- 
mathematical experience. In fact, it is the same argument clarified 
above. "Physical experience consists of acting upon subjects and 
drawing some knowledge about the objects by abstraction from the 
objects. For example, to discover that this pipe is heavier than this 
watch, the child will weigh them both and find the difference in the 
objects themselves. This experience in the usual sense of the term— 
in the sense used by empiricists but not ANISA people." "But there 
^Ibid. } p. 188. 
63Ibid. , p. 188. 
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is a second type of experience which I shall call logico-mathematical 
experience where the knowledge is not drawn from the objects, but is 
drawn by the actions effected upon the objects. This is not the same 
thing. When one acts upon objects, the objects are indeed there, but 
there is also the set of objects which modify the objects. He 
illustrates this second kind of experience which modifies the object 
by using an example involving the conservation of number. He reports 
that a mathematician friend of his, when a boy of four or five, dis¬ 
covered that the number of objects in a set remained the same no 
matter how he arranged or counted them. First, the boy arranged ten 
pebbles in a row and counted them left to right (one, two, three . . . 
ten). Then he counted them right to left (ten . . . three, two, one). 
They were the same. Then he arranged them in a circle and counted 
first clockwise, then counter-clockwise and the total remained the 
same. "Now what did he discover? He did not discover a property of 
pebbles; he discovered a property of the action of ordering. The 
pebbles had no order. It was his action which introduced a linear 
order or a cyclical order, or any kind of an order. He discovered 
that the sum was independent of the order. ... He discovered a 
property of actions and not a property of pebbles." He goes on to 
point out that what, in fact, was discovered was a mathematical deduc¬ 
tion. "The subsequent deduction will consist of interiorizing these 
6^Ibid., p. 188. 
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actions and then of combining them without needing any pebbles."65 
This is a classic example and distinction for Piaget when dif¬ 
ferentiating what can be gained from learning in the narrow sense and 
what involves operative knowing in the equilibration or broad sense. 
It is an important example also, in fact, it is a clear example, of 
the nature of the operation. The pedagogical significance of this is 
that physical experience or action on objects does not lead to a logico- 
mathematical deduction. This type of deduction must await the develop¬ 
ment or construction of more advanced and internalized structures 
which possess their own rules of transformation. In an ANISA sense, 
it offers a clear distinction of the inception of a truly internalized 
conscious control over processes which regulated the child’s interaction 
with the environment. The type of conscious control over the processes 
which regulate interaction are clearly cast within the framework of the 
stages of development, the characteristics of which have been exhaus¬ 
tively illustrated previously. 
Piaget concludes his discussion in this article by delineating 
the role of learning when considered from a pedagogical and didactic 
perspective. He states: "My first conclusion is that learning of 
structures seems to obey the same laws of the natural development of 
these structures. In other words, learning is subordinated to develop¬ 
ment and not vice-versa."66 He goes on to establish within the 
65Ibid., pp. 188-189. 
66Ibid. , p. 194. 
I 
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framework three criteria for those educators interested in teaching 
operational structures: (1) "Is the learning lasting?"; (2) "How much 
generalization is possible?"; (3) "In the case of each learning experi¬ 
ence, what was the operational level of the subject before the experi¬ 
ence and what more complex structures has the learning succeeded in 
achieving?"^7 
My second conclusion is that the fundamental relation 
involved in all development and all learning is not the 
relation of association. In the stimulus-response schema, 
the relation between the response and the stimulus is under¬ 
stood to be one of association. In contrast to this, I 
think that the fundamental relation is one of assimilation. 
Assimilation is not integration of any sort of reality into 
a structure, and it is this assimilation which seems to me 
fundamental in learning, and which seems to me the funda¬ 
mental relation from the point of view of pedagogical or 
didactic applications. All of my remarks today represent 
the child and the learning subject as active. An operation 
is an activity. Learning is possible only when there is 
active assimilation. It is this activity on the part of 
the subject which seems to me underplayed in the stimulus- 
response schema. The presentation which I propose puts 
the emphasis on the idea of self-regulation, on assimila¬ 
tion. All the emphasis is placed on the activity of the 
subject himself, and I think that without this activity 
there is no possible didactic or pedagogy which signifi¬ 
cantly transforms the subject. 
Before relating this discussion to a definition of learning compe¬ 
tence, one last distinction remains to be made. The first definition 
of learning competence used the word memory, and it was implied in the 
second. In an effort to further clarify assimilation, and association 
in a stimulus-response sense, Piaget states that the issue of 
67Ibid. , p. 194. 
6®Ibid., pp. 194-195. 
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conservation schemata and the manner of their function is not a matter 
of calling or evoking from the memory a figurative aspect but is more 
strictly speaking a problem of assimilation into the schemata. 
The problem of the conservation of the schemata is not, 
properly speaking, a problem of memory, unless the mean¬ 
ing of the term is extended in an unwarranted way, for the 
schema of an action, being the transferable or generaliz- 
able quality in the action, is self-conserving; the memory 
of a schema is thus nothing more or less than the schema 
itself, and so there is no need to talk of 'memory1 in con¬ 
nection with it except insofar as to show the schema to be 
an instrument of memory. On the other hand, memory in the 
strict sense of the term, which is to say recognition or 
evocation ... is simply the figurative aspect of this 
conservation of schemata-figurative in the sense of some¬ 
thing perceived (recognized) or imagined (evocation by a 
memory-image).69 
Memory in the strict sense then for Piaget refers to calling forth 
the perceptual or figurative sense of something. The association or 
integration of this aspect of experience from memory is closely associ¬ 
ated with stimulus-response strategies. The role of the conservation 
schemata or operation is clearly for Piaget not functional in a 
stimulus-response framework. 
The distinctions between broad and narrow definitions of experience 
and memory were developed by Piaget in an effort to distinguish con¬ 
structivist notions of development from empiricist conceptions. The 
ANISA Theory of Development is conceived in a manner parallel with that 
of Piaget's constructivist notions of development, therefore, the 
second definition of learning competence, as it is presented stated, 
69 Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, p. 187. 
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cannot be misread as a stimulus-response statement; i.e., it cannot be 
read in the narrow sense of the definition of experience and memory. 
This is so for the simple reason that both experience and memory are 
defined for ANISA in the broad sense of the terms. In this framework, 
ANISA for Piaget would stretch or extend the meaning of the term 
memory in an "unwarranted way." Memory for ANISA refers to the level 
of competence, to the specific structures which the child has con¬ 
structed through his external and internal experience. For ANISA, 
therefore, experience can be a logico-mathematica1 activity, as it can 
also relate to simple figurative, perceptual, or qualitative differen¬ 
tiations. The definition of experience then for ANISA involves the 
role of cognitive structures or assimilatory schemata, as it does for 
Piaget. The major cause of developmental progress for both ANISA and 
Piaget is attributed to the actions of the child's own internal struc¬ 
tures. Learning competence then would refer to the child's growing 
ability to employ or "appropriately" utilize the structures in new 
situations. The conscious use of these structures is gradually 
attained and becomes fully conscious in the formal operational stage 
where thinking is propositional or hypothetico-deductive. Within the 
framework of all of these considerations, a definition of learning 
competence is advanced. 
Learning competence refers to the child's growing capacity 
to select or differentiate the appropriate assimilatory 
schema and to integrate that structure with other struc¬ 
tures thereby transforming the present state of develop¬ 
ment into a new and higher ordered structure and thereby 
generalizing the integration. 
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Within the context of this definition, the child's ability to resolve 
conflicts between structures through compromise (retroactive corrections 
and predictions) and compensation judgments would characterize elements 
which come under the conscious control of the child at the age under 
study in the period of the development of logico-mathematical thought. 
Also within the context of this definition, the assimilatory schema 
would govern what the child differentiates and integrates from, for 
example, the perceptual field. An example of the application of this 
definition follows. 
Differentiation, Integration and Generalization of the 
Conservation of Number 
First, it is important to state that the differentiations, inte¬ 
grations and generalizations are conditioned by the state of compe¬ 
tence, by the stage of the development of the assimilatory schema. 
Second, conscious control is contingent upon the stage of development 
of logic and inference mechanisms. 
In the stage of gross quantification (Stage I of the conserva¬ 
tion of number) , the assimilatory schema is characterized by the 
general conditions of a sense of numerosity, by the general topological 
aspect of the objects dealt with as being "smaller" or "larger" or 
"more" or "less." The child's figurative differentiations are topo¬ 
logically oriented and are restricted to the perceptual field as 
opposed to a logical field. Differences are perceived as relative 
to one another and are not specific. Hence, when asked about the 
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equality of two rows of discrete elements, one row of which is longer 
than the other, as for example . , the child applies a 
schema of relative size, hence he claims the longer row has more. At 
this stage, length, density and number have not been incorporated into 
a logical structure, hence, there is nothing wrong from the child’s 
judgmental perspective with the assertion that the longer row has 
more. The child simply applies his sense of gross quantification to 
all problems or situations which require it, and to him his conclusions 
make sense even if they are wrong. 
The child then enters the intuitive stage of qualitative cor¬ 
respondence where he realizes that it is no longer a simple matter of 
the application of a general gross and undifferentiated sense of 
quantity, but as in the case of quotity reasoning, the child sees that 
he can count the elements in each set and they equal each other. 
Because number still does not exist as a conserved unit, however, the 
child in the face of an overwhelming topological difference will fall 
back to the judgments used in the previous stage; i.e., that of the 
quality of gross quantity or bigness being determined by perception 
of length. However, the conflict produced by this use of perceptual 
criteria in light of what should be an equal number established on the 
basis of counting is clearly unsettling for the child. Because number 
is not yet conceived to be a logical necessity, the child has no means 
available to resolve the conflict. During this stage, however, the 
child begins to dissociate (differentiate) length, density and number 
from each other and from the prior dominance of gross quantity and 
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begins to apply compensation judgments; i.e., an increase in length 
is compensated for by a decrease in density. Conscious control, there¬ 
fore, is suggested by the manner in which the child adopts schemes 
which act to resolve the conflict. 
In the last stage, number invariances becomes a logical necessity 
and identity, compensation and reversibility arguments are employed to 
justify answers. 
The conservation of number then provides a good example of the 
appropriate application of the developing assimilatory schema, of the 
rules of the developing structures to wider fields of application 
(integration). The following diagram illustrates the general nature 
of the coordinations from one stage to the next. 
Stage I Perceptually-Based Gross Discrimination 
tolt 
Stage II Intuitive-Transition Stage of 
Qualitative Correspondence 
to 
Stage III Operational Number Conservation 
During the intuitive or transitional stage, the child vacillates 
between the perceptual (figurative, topological) schema and a logical 
schema. During this stage, qualitative discriminations (length, 
density) have begun to be dissociated (differentiated); however, they 
are as yet not fully coordinated. 
Within this frame of reference then, the child's judgment, hence, 
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use of the assimilatory schema, is conditioned by the general state of 
competence. Further, it would seem that the child's conscious and 
logical control over these schema becomes evident after the transition 
into the third stage which, in general, corresponds to the end of the 
preoperational stage and the beginning of the concrete operational 
stage. 
It is interesting to note, however, that the results of Inhelder, 
et al. (1974) showed clearly that even though a child had attained the 
stage of elementary number conservation and could justify his reasoning 
by using identity, compensation and reversibility, arguments that he 
could not use these arguments with respect to a length conservation 
problem. Eventually, of course, these same three arguments will be 
employed with respect to length conservation but as they stand, the 
conservation of length depends upon the development of the concept of 
measurement in combination with the unit; hence, the child is unable to 
appropriately use the same rules of logic (identity, compensation and 
reversibility) when applied to as yet a separate structure and not yet 
developed. 
A general definition of the learning to learn of number can now 
be advanced. 
The learning to learn of number is the conscious ability 
to make all of the necessary differentiations, integra¬ 
tions and generalizations that create the basic structure 
which enables the child to comprehend and deal with num¬ 
ber and its basic meaning. 
The assimilatory structure previously identified which governs 
the first stage of the development of number is that of gross 
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quantification. It's rules are not specific but are approximate, and 
it is closely tied to the perceptual field or topological relations. 
Therefore, the differentiation which the child makes at this stage is 
as general and non-specific as is required by the assimilatory schema. 
Further, the differentiations are related to the figurative aspects of 
the problem, for example, length and perceptual one-one correspondence 
of small sets of objects. The integration that the child is able to 
make meets the requirements of the characteristic of this stage (gross 
quantification). The relative size of a set of objects may be deter¬ 
mined for the child by the length of the row alone as it can be the 
predominating perceptual characteristic of an approximate sense of 
bigness or gross quantity. Number, because it is not as yet necessarily 
an invariant, is not able to be used by the child to establish equiva¬ 
lence between two sets of objects. Even though the child is able at 
first in a one-to-one correspondence situation to count the elements 
• • • • 
in each set .... and say each has four elements, once the perceptual 
correspondence is destroyed the matter of which set has "more" or 
"less" now becomes a problem of cardinal evaluation which is beyond 
the child’s reasoning at this point. Therefore, the integration of 
the perceived dimensions is established within the child’s frame of 
reference to mean which looks bigger; i.e., the cognitive structure of 
the child at this stage deals with notions of "more" and "less" as 
"looks bigger" and "looks smaller." In this case, the longer set looks 
bigger, therefore, it has more. "For the adult, cardinal evaluation 
always presupposes that units have been added or merged in order to 
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form the whole obtained by the correspondence with the set to be 
evaluated. For the child of this stage, on the contrary, the evalua¬ 
tion is based merely on the global quantities of the sets in question, 
these quantities being quantified by comparison as 'more' or 'less,' 
without coordination of the comparisons."^0 The integration at this 
stage is, therefore, limited because the child is only able to concen¬ 
trate on the sets one at a time and does not understand that there is 
a compensatory relationship or need to coordinate them. For these 
reasons, the aspect of generalization is limited to the specific 
application of one criterion at a time; i.e., length, if it is the 
predominating topological factor, is used to establish size in the 
case of "more" and "less." In the case where two sets differ greatly 
in the number of elements ^ ! 1 .* . . . , a relative and non-specific 
numerosity judgment is made. 
To sura up, the most general characteristic of this stage 
is the irreversibility of the reactions. The evaluations 
of children at this level are purely perceptual, with the 
result that qualities that are not comparable are related, 
and the synthesis can only be global. This means, in 
other words, that the child’s intuitive judgment is not 
combined with operations through which the elements iso¬ 
lated by his analysis can be put together again. It is 
precisely because the judgments of the child at this stage 
lack mobility, that his thought is essentially irrevers¬ 
ible.71 
Learning competence or the conscious control of learning processes 
at this stage is also characterized by the lack of mobility and the 
70Piaget, The Child’s Conception of Number, p. 69. 
71 Ibid., p. 70. 
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irreversibility of thought. During the second and third stages, how¬ 
ever, dramatic changes take place as operational logic begins to be 
structured. Thought becomes more precise, more mobile and elementary 
reversibility (renversibilite') becomes evident limited as it is to 
the perceptual field. 
During the second stage, qualitative or intuitive correspondence 
is established. Qualitative correspondence becomes operational when 
the child is presented with small collections of objects which can be 
intuitively grasped and manipulated. Differentiated topological 
features begin to be coordinated in an intensive sense, that is, they 
still cannot be fully added together as there still is no concept of 
the invariance of number except when dealing with very small numbers, 
and reversibility is as yet limited to actual physical return to the 
original state. At this stage, the differentiation of perceptual 
features remains similar to the previous stage. However, their inte¬ 
gration and coordination is partially established, although it is not 
operational yet. As a consequence, judgment remains essentially 
qualitative and intuitive. For example, the equivalence of two sets 
remains limited to a perceptual correspondence and is, therefore, not 
a lasting equivalence based on number. Cardinal evaluation in this 
stage becomes more structured as the child determines number value of 
a set or sets by counting. This determination provides the impetus 
for the dramatic development in conscious control in the form of con¬ 
flict which occurs at this stage, for the conflict is between cardinal 
evaluation (equivalence of the two sets of objects on the basis of 
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number) and perceptual evaluation of one row being longer than the 
other, therefore it "looks" as though it has more. The child then 
abandons cardinal equivalence in favor of the perceptual value of more 
because 'it looks bigger." This is quotity reasoning. The child's 
intuitive understanding that quantitative judgments of "more" or 
"less" objects should determine the relative size of the sets being 
compared is in direct conflict with prior use of the perceptual attri¬ 
butes which in the previous stage establishes gross quantity. 
Conscious control then begins to intervene precisely at the time 
that perceptual and logical solutions come into conflict. The child 
attempts to overcome the conflict by trial and error manipulation, 
compromise solutions, and retroactive corrections. These are clear 
examples of the increasing mobility and partial reversibility of 
thought. However, until number becomes an invariant, i.e., a logical 
necessity, the conflict between percepts and concepts at this stage 
remains unsolvable. 
During the third and final stage, topological features are no 
longer simple features of the situation but because they are assimi¬ 
lated into an operational scheme, i.e., they are acted upon by the 
child’s thought structures, they can be coordinated and logically 
utilized. At this stage, a child’s thought with respect to number 
exhibits a truly transformational character. Number is assumed as a 
logical necessity to be invariant and there is extensive multiplica¬ 
tion of the qualities dealt with. Differentiation then must be 
expressed in terms of an operational assimilatory schema. Integrations 
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are logically governed, and schemes such as counting are appropriately 
applied (generalized) to any new situation which requires number Judg¬ 
ment. 
In terms of conscious control, thought with respect to number is 
now fully reversible, hence judgments are accurately made and are no 
longer approximations. To this degree, thought is mobile, although 
this is only the beginning of the stage of concrete operations. Con¬ 
crete operations are limited in the sense that the physical environ¬ 
ment is still at least initially required, whereas full mobility of 
thought is established in formal operations where it becomes proposi¬ 
tional in form, and the presence of the physical environment is no 
longer necessary. 
Number Development Chart 
The following chart diagrams a general sequence of number opera¬ 
tions and relates that sequence to general stage characteristics; 
to descriptions of differentiation, integration and generalization 
in each stage; to an approximate chronological age scale; and to the 
general transition from percept bound to logical reasoning. As 
classification and seriation are the major contributing structures, 
whose eventual operational synthesis results in number, then they are 
displayed separately one on each side of number. The chart is intended 
as a general description of the sequence of the attainment of various 
operations. Age dimensions represent approximations and should not 
be interpreted explicitly as the individual child may vary greatly 
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from the norms suggested here. Some developmental connections between 
various aspects of the operations are depicted by arrows. Proximity 
also suggests that the schemes are related but do not necessarily 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR A PARENT-TEACHER TRAINING PROGRAM 
This chapter is devoted to the formulation of a training program 
on pre-numerical thinking in the young child. The training program's 
philosophy and structure must logically flow from the ANISA Theory of 
Development and The Theory of Curriculum. Further, because pre- 
numerical thinking develops in the child prior to the formal school¬ 
ing of the child (two through five or six years of age), this aspect 
of ANISA training must apply to both parents and pre-school teachers 
who are the trainers of children at this age. The majority of children 
in the world, however, will not attend a formalized pre-school program; 
therefore, the program should ideally be developed for use by parents. 
Parent-teacher training in ANISA will eventually involve all 
aspects of the five areas of human potentiality, only one of which is 
cognitive development. This program will, however, present only the 
portion of the cognitive domain as it relates to number. Integration 
of this into the comprehensive program that an ANISA trainee will 
receive, which will include not only the entire cognitive domain but 
the sensori-motor, perceptual, effective or emotional, moral and voli¬ 
tional domains, will be an aspect of the development of the entire 
model. It is my intent, therefore, to attempt implications for a 
parent and pre-school teacher training program which will be charac¬ 
terized by an effort to present the content knowledge or theoretical 
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framework of development of number in a manner which will facilitate 
putting it into practice with the child. 
It is important at the outset to distinguish between the adult's 
experience in this training program and the child's subsequent develop¬ 
ment of knowledge under the guidance of the adult. The adult is 
already reasoning at a logical level; i.e., the adult has long since 
progressed through the developmental stages which he or she will be 
studying as a parent. Therefore, it follows that in this training pro¬ 
gram the adult cannot reconstruct his knowledge of how he attained the 
concepts with respect to number and think mathematically in the same 
manner that a child does. The conflicts which develop for the child 
between, for example, spatial and logical aspects of the operations 
under discussion would not be experienced by the adult who is already 
reasoning on a logical level. 
The task of the adult is, therefore, three-fold. First, the adult 
must understand the acquisition process or developmental processes 
which occur in the developing child. Second, the adult needs to under¬ 
stand the specific operations which are central to the formation of 
number in the developing child, e.g., the forms of conservation, 
classification, correspondence, etc. Third, the adult must be able to 
extend his general understanding to practical everyday situations with 
the child. The adult must be able to provide specific experiences 
which enable the child to make the proper differentiations, integra¬ 
tions and generalizations. 
The rather extensive and complex nature of this two-fold task as 
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it relates to number development necessitates an efficient and effec¬ 
tive manner of presentation. Further, to the extent possible, the 
training program for the adult should reflect as many aspects of the 
ANISA Theory of Development as possible, for even though the learning 
task for the adult and the child are different because of differing 
levels of attainment, recognized in the Theory of Development are 
learning principles which apply to all levels of development. A pro¬ 
gram developed by Dr. S. N. Postlethwaite, a botanist at Purdue 
University, can be adapted to facilitate an understanding of the 
first two objectives in an ANISA training program for adults. His 
program has become known as the "Audio-Tutorial" approach. The 
second part would involve the parent and teacher in a controlled and 
guided implementation stage with children. During this second phase, 
the third aspect of extending one’s knowledge of theory to the practi¬ 
cal world of the child would take place. 
Part One: An Adaptation of Postlethwaite's Program 
The basic format is very flexible and is built upon many princi¬ 
ples of learning which are basic to the philosophy and practice of 
the ANISA model. Most basic of principles is the recognition that 
knowledge is structured by the individual as a result of the actions he 
or she performs on the material. The use of behavioral objectives, use 
of audio-visual supports, the presence of all materials to be manipu¬ 
lated or seen, the creation of many supportive guides for successful 
student interaction with the material, the isolation of the learner 
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from distractions and others are important aspects of this method. 
Important also is the idea of breaking the major area of study into 
discrete conceptual modules or mini-courses. Each module will cover 
an aspect of development. They, therefore, are central to all other 
supportive materials used by the trainee in this aspect of the pro¬ 
gram. Following is an outline of the adapted Postlethwaite program 
as it applies to Number in an ANISA training program. 
Postlethwaite has adapted the use of pre-recorded audio-tapes 
as the main guide for the student's interaction with the content to 
be mastered. Their use in this ANISA training is consistent with the 
philosophy of the model mainly because of the incorporated recognition 
of the individual nature of the learning experience. Each student 
(parent or teacher) is ideally provided with a tape, a play back 
machine and earphones. In this circumstance, each student is under 
the complete control of how he proceeds with the guided interaction 
with the content and supportive materials. The rate, the extent of 
exposure to, and the amount of repetition desired by the student are 
all factors able to be controlled. The rate is controlled simply by 
turning the tape-machine off. Repetition is accomplished by repeating 
a section of the tape. 
Isolation of the individual allows for minimal distractions and 
maximum concentration; i.e., the learner can be relatively isolated 
from any extraneous distractions through the use of an isolated 
contained space supplemented by the use of headphones. 
Another important recognition by Postlethwaite is the necessity 
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of the use of multiple sources of information. In addition to the 
central guiding audio-tape, the content to be mastered can be pre¬ 
sented, outlined and illustrated in written form. Also, as is the 
case with number development, examples of the supportive physical 
material (toys, objects, games, etc.) which will be used by the child 
can be included and manipulated by the adult. These materials can be 
further supplemented for the adult's training through the use of 
slides, video-tapes, Super-8 film and any other audio-visual support 
felt necessary. 
The inclusion of physical objects manipulated by the adult in the 
training of their use recognizes an important learning principle; i.e., 
simultaneous psycho-motor, perceptual and cognitive involvement maxi¬ 
mizes learning. In addition, the adult trainee will actually use a 
wide variety of possible materials to be used with the child. This 
will also serve to fix in the adult frame of reference how various 
materials can be used to support the development of various cognitive 
schemes. 
The format also allows for the modularization or division of the 
main topic of number development into smaller discrete units. For 
example, a module presenting an overview of ANISA's Theory of 
Development which would contain a discussion of the function of dif¬ 
ferentiation, integration and generalization and learning competence 
could be developed. Other modules should be developed on the three 
stages of the development of seriation, and another on classification, 
and another on conservation. 
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Each module Is designed as a discrete unit of sufficient length 
to be engaging and challenging but brief enough to be completed 
within a few hours. Each module characteristically constitutes a 
guided interaction with the topic. The developmental sequence which 
characterizes the manner in which a child's development proceeds 
should be followed in the module. 
This approach is not expected to provide a training procedure 
which can wholly be depended upon to train adults in number develop¬ 
ment. Indeed, from the extensive theoretical analysis of the preceding 
chapters, this approach has certain limitations. It does not provide 
for direct supervision and immediate feedback as would be the case in 
the second part of the training procedure to be discussed where the 
adult works with another adult trainer and a child. Another limita¬ 
tion of this approach is that it cannot provide for practice and 
generalization of the concepts covered necessary to have an adult be 
a fully competent teacher. It does, however, provide some practice 
and, most importantly, it does provide a setting whereby a complex 
topic can be studied in some detail. In this recognition lies its 
strength, for the management of the environment for the child in a way 
that will provide for appropriate differentiations, integration and 
generalizations and will provide aspects such as conflict, requires 
the teacher to be well-grounded in the theory. 
Again, number development is closely associated with the skills 
of logic and as such is only a part of the total development that must 
occur in the psycho-motor, perceptual, cognitive, affective and 
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volitional domains of human potential. Therefore, the utility of 
this adaptation of Postlethwaite's approach is seen mainly in trans¬ 
mitting the content of number theory and in transmitting the content 
of the Theory of Development as it applies to developmental processes. 
It is expected also that the manner in which the teacher can function 
as an ANISA trained interventionist can also be demonstrated in the 
training program. This approach may also be of use as an aspect of 
a training program which can be used on a more extensive basis than 
in the training centers alone; e.g., as in a situation where the 
time and money to centralize training operations may not be available. 
Trainers who lack specific expertise in early math development may also 
use this package of materials as it will be by and large self-contained. 
Lastly, it is hoped that the A-T approach as a vehicle will reflect 
learning theory as recognized by the ANISA model; i.e., the parent or 
teacher being trained will be engaged in the processes of differentia¬ 
tion, integration and generalization. This singular aspect of cogni¬ 
tive development in the larger context of the entire model must be 
recognized as but a small part of the release of human potential. 
Therefore, this particular aspect of training must, when fully 
developed, be incorporated as part of the total training that an "ANISA 
teacher" would receive. 
Part Two: Implementation for the Adult Trainee 
ANISA training of parents and teachers cannot solely rely upon 
the program just outlined for it can only serve as a framework of 
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information and experience for the adult. A second half of training 
must be an implementation stage which would make practical the use of 
knowledge and materials in the home or classroom. This aspect of the 
program could be conducted in a more traditional lab-school setting 
where the trainee functioned as a teacher under the guidance of 
experienced ANISA personnel. The basic task would consist of becoming 
familiar with the use of various diagnostic tools and procedures for 
assessing the level of the children's development to be "taught." 
Second, the adult parent or teacher would then function as an ANISA 
teacher interacting and guiding the children through various appro¬ 
priate experiences. 
As this second aspect of training is much more traditional and 
is already widely in use, it need not be developed further here. It 
is felt important, however, that the two aspects of this program are 
complementary and even indispensable aspects of a thorough program. 
The knowledge and experience gained in the first part establishes in 
an easily implemented fashion a level of competence in the trained 
adult. The second aspect consolidates that competence in that it is 
practical and relates to the everyday life. The second half also 
serves to provide the means for dealing with the whole child in all 
of his developmental aspects. 
Philosophical Considerations 
Math Readiness 
An important reason for considering a program designed to train 
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parents and teachers of young children is directly related to its 
potential for effecting the child’s growth of concepts related to 
establishing a foundation of "math readiness" prior to entry into the 
formal kindergarten and elementary school program. Number, particu¬ 
larly that of arithmetical number, is slowly built up from elementary 
number conservation and the concepts which precede this. The use of 
number in the elementary school levels requires a firm foundation 
established developmentally through years of experience. In the 
introduction to this work, mention was made of some of the research 
which substantiates this math readiness perspective. 
Conservation of number has been shown by several researchers 
to be related to work with counting and with addition and 
subtraction. Almy, Chittenden, and Miller (1966) noted that 
children who conserve at an early age do better in beginning 
arithmetic than those who are late in acquiring conserva¬ 
tion. Robinson (1968) also found significant relationships 
between a child’s ability to conserve, seriate, and classify 
and his level of achievement in Grade One. He concluded that 
conservation may be necessary but not sufficient for mathe¬ 
matics achievement. Others have found that first graders 
who are conservers tend to do better at certain mathematical 
problem-solving tasks. Steffe (1967) reported that the tests 
of conservation of numerousness used in his study provided 
an excellent prediction of success in solving addition prob¬ 
lems and learning addition facts for children entering first 
grade. Using the same test in a companion study or sub¬ 
traction, LeBlanc (1968) reported a similar conclusion. 
Dodwell (1961) and Wheatley (1968) have also indicated that 
the tests of number conservation that they used may be 
meaningful measures of arithmetic readiness.^ 
Although the available research on math readiness is not as exhaus¬ 
tive of the topic as has been the research of development, the results 
1Suydam and Weaver, "Research of Learning Mathematics," in 
Mathematics Learning in Early Childhood, Thirty-Seventh Yearbook NCMT, 
1975, p. 48. 
278 
of the research reported are indeed what one would expect to find. 
Many of the training studies cited earlier are of direct relevance 
here. 
Suydam and Weaver (1975) summarize the studies which they reviewed 
in listing what a normal five-year-old can do prior to formal training. 
(1) Many children can count and find the number of objects 
to ten, and some are able to count to at least twenty; 
(2) Some can say the number names for tens in order (that 
is, ten, twenty, thirty . . .), but far fewer can say 
the names when counting by twos and fives; 
(3) Most know the meaning of "first," and many can identify 
ordinal positions through "fifth"; 
(A) Many can recognize the numerals from one to ten, and 
some can write them; 
(5) Most can give correct answers to simple addition and 
subtraction combinations presented verbally either 
with or without manipulative materials; 
(6) Most have some knowledge about coins, time, and other 
measures; about simple fractional concepts; and about 
geometric shapes.2 
This list must, of course, be interpreted in light of the fact 
that elementary number conservation is not attained as an average 
beginning in the latter months of the fifth year and going on into the 
sixth year. Some of what they report children can do, therefore, must 
be primarily verbal and not logical. 
Normative summaries may or may not correspond to what an individual 
child may do, however. For this reason, procedures need to be developed 
for assessing the level of competence of each individual child in order 
that training experiences be appropriate to his or her level of develop¬ 
ment. 
2Ibid., p. 49. 
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Affective Aspects 
Another important consideration which effects both children and 
adults lies in the affective domain of attitudes toward number and 
mathematics. It can be safely assumed that most of Piagetian 
theory and the related research is beyond the concern of all but the 
most avid devotee. The selection and manner of presentation of topics 
related to number development must be judicious chosen and presented 
in a manner that is relatively easy to understand. The attitude of 
the adult toward the level of possible difficulty in understanding 
number is specific, and the growth of logic, in general, will undoubt- 
ably affect any potential relationship with a child. The ability of 
the adult to relate to the child, to give emotional support, to capi¬ 
talize on the interests of each child, to act as an arranger of environ¬ 
ments for the child, etc., will to a large degree be determined by an 
attitude toward the subjects. For this reason, it may be important 
at some later date to distinguish between the level of involvement 
that a parent would have and would, therefore, need to be aware of and 
the teacher of the young child who Is or must be a specialist and, 
therefore, have a greater depth of knowledge of the subject. 
The affective aspect also relates to the child in a narrow sense 
in their attitude toward mathematics and in the broader sense, their 
entire sense of well-being. The ANISA program will, in this broad 
sense, be concerned with the development of the whole child. For 
ANISA, the dynamic force behind development is effectance, that is, 
effectance is the most powerful form of intrinsic motivation which 
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occurs as a result of the subjective confirmation that competence is 
being gained, that development is happening and new powers and feelings 
are being expressed. Effectance, so conceived, can only narrowly be 
attributed to a specific aspect of cognitive development represented 
by number. 
The Whole Child 
Constance Kamii, who has long distinguished herself as a teacher 
and interpreter of Piaget in the classroom setting, has written many 
articles on translating the Piagetian operations of classification, 
seriation and number into educational terms. Recently, Kamii and 
3 
DeVries (in press) have written a book which in a sense reports an 
important evolution in her thinking with respect to the education of 
the whole child. Prior to this latest work, her writings, in essence, 
compartmentalized various aspects of child development into the major 
categories of socio-emotional objectives and cognitive objectives. 
"The previous conceptualizations no longer make sense to us for two 
reasons. First, as discussed above, they confused the development 
seen on Piagetian tasks with the development of the child in the 
everyday world. Second, they compartmentalized the objectives into 
classification, seriation, numerical reasoning, spatial reasoning, etc. 
This juxtaposition of cognitive abilities as if they were separate 
mechanisms . . . was an assimilation of Piaget's theory into a 
3Constance Kamii and Rheta DeVries, Piaget For Early Education 
(In Press) . 
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mechanistic notion of intelligence. One of the most central ideas in 
Piaget's theory is that intelligence develops as a whole."4 5 
In light cf this realization, she reconceptualizes the role that 
education has to play in the development of the child. First and 
foremost is the development of the socio-emotional factors. Incorpo¬ 
rated within this general area come what are the cognitive objectives. 
Instead of emphasizing the cognitive aspects as they had been pre¬ 
viously, they state that early childhood education should first "come 
up with interesting ideas, problems and questions." Eleanor Duckworth's 
(1972) article which is titled "The Having of Wonderful Ideas" is a 
major source of what is meant by this. The second cognitive objective 
is to have the young child "put things into relationships and notice 
similarities and differences."^ The major thrust of this curriculum 
would depend upon the child coming up with new things and creating 
new relationships in the learning environment which is basic to the 
development of the whole child. 
The ANISA model, as is evident at this point, provides an uplift¬ 
ing framework through the integration of a definition of man, a philoso¬ 
phy, a theory of development and a theory of curriculum, in which the 
total child is dealt with. As has been stated earlier, the particular 
aspect of number must, of course, be integrated into a total program 
and then, and only then, will number be placed in its proper perspective. 
4Ibid., p. 43 of the manuscript. 
5Ibid., p. 43 of the manuscript. 
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"The Having of Wonderful Ideas" 
The article by Eleanor Duckworth (1972) on "The Having of Wonder¬ 
ful Ideas provides an insight of important dimensions to the type of 
integration which must occur on the part of the teacher attempting to 
apply a program such as ANISA. In this article, she, as has Kamii, 
has spent a great deal of time and effort thinking and working with 
Piagetian ideas in the classroom. The evolution in her depth of under¬ 
standing is one which must be paralleled by parents and teachers who 
might use this Piagetian derived number training program presented at 
the end of this chapter. 
Her's is essentially a struggle to bring Piaget’s Theory of 
Development and the attendant Piagetian tasks (number conservation, 
seriation, etc.) into the real world of a child and the world of the 
classroom. She begins this struggle as one who is well-versed in the 
theory and as one who has attempted to lead children through a pro¬ 
gressive accomplishment of Piagetian tasks. She begins: 
The other day I was going over some classic Piagetian inter¬ 
views with a few children to show a friend what they were 
like. One involved seriation of lengths. I had cut ten 
cellophane drinking straws at different lengths, and was 
asking the children to put them in order, from smallest to 
biggest. The first two seven-year-olds did it with no dif¬ 
ficulty and little interest. And then came Kevin. Before 
I said a word about the straws, he picked them up and said 
to me, 'I know what I’m going to do,’ and proceeded, on his 
own, to seriate them by length. He didn’t mean, 'I know 
what you’re going to ask me to do.’ He meant, 'I have a 
wonderful idea about what to do with these straws. You’ll 
be surprised by my wonderful idea.' 
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It wasn't easy for him. He needed a good deal of trial 
and error as he set about developing his system. But he 
was so pleased with himself when he accomplished his self¬ 
set task that when I decided to offer them to him to keep 
(ten whole drinking straws!) he glowed with joy, showed 
them to one or two select friends, and stored them away 
with other treasures in a shoe box. 
The having of wonderful ideas is what I consider to be the 
essence of intellectual development. And I consider it 
the essence of pedagogy to give Kevin the occasion to have 
his wonderful ideas, and to let him feel good about him¬ 
self for having them.6 
She cites two other examples similar to this one in which the 
child succeeded in having their own wonderful ideas about the logical 
nature of the Piagetian task. One involved a six-year-old girl named 
Stephanie who discovered and wrote an essay on the compensation of 
height versus volume while working with capillary tubes. The second 
example involved an example cited by Piaget of the boy who discovered 
that he could arrange ten items in a row and count them and then put 
them in a circle and count them and he still came up with ten items. 
The wonderful idea in this case involved the conservation of number. 
Each of these instances involved a high level of interest and a 
sense of accomplishment and pride on the part of the child who made the 
important discovery. 
I think it must be that the whole enterprise was his own 
wonderful idea (referring to the boy who discovered number 
conservation). He raised the question for himself, and 
figured out, for himself, how to try to answer it. In 
essence, I am saying that he was in a transitional moment, 
^Eleanor Duckworth, "The Having of Wonderful Ideas," Harvard 
Education Review, 1972, 42, 2, p. 218. 
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and Stephanie and Kevin were, too. He was at a point where 
a certain experience fit into certain thoughts, and he took 
then a step forward. 
I think a powerful pedagogical point can be made from this. 
These three instances dramatize it, because they deal with 
children moving ahead with Piaget notions, which are usually 
difficult to advance with any one experience. The point 
has two aspects: First, the right question at the right 
time can move children to peaks in their thinking which 
result in significant steps forward and real intellectual 
excitement; and second, although it is almost impossible 
for the adult to know exactly the right time for a given 
question for a given child—especially for a teacher who 
is concerned with thirty or more children—children can 
raise the right question for themselves when the setting 
is right. And once the right question is raised, they are 
moved to tax themselves to the fullest to find an answer. 
The answers did not come easily in any of these three cases, 
but the children were prepared to work them through. Having 
confidence in one's ideas doesn't mean, 'I know my ideas 
are right'; it means, 'I am willing to try out my ideas.'7 
The essence of her ideas concerning the having of wonderful ideas 
on the part of the child is then in finding ways to interest children 
in order that their own zest for learning be supported and allowed to 
flourish. She asserts that there is a wide gulf between a theory of 
development and a theory of curriculum and then application in a class¬ 
room setting. 
A theory of intellectual development might have been the 
basis of a theoretical framework for a curriculum. But in 
making things work in a classroom, it was but a small part 
when compared with finding ways to interest children, to 
take into account different children's interests and 
abilities, to help teachers with no special training in the 
subject, and so forth.8 
7Ibid. , p. 222. 
8Ibid., p. 220. 
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She goes on to state that her knowledge of Piaget's theory of 
intellectual development and prior attempts to apply it directly to 
educational settings by leading the child through Piagetian tasks, lead 
her to directly confront the crux of the problem; namely, that of main¬ 
taining the child's interest. Direct application of skills in a situa¬ 
tion tightly controlled by the teacher did little to spark the child's 
interest. Whereas skillful arrangement of the environment and asking 
the right question at the right time proved to lead the child to make 
his own discoveries. She explains that "there are essentially two 
aspects to providing occasions for wonderful ideas, then. One is being 
prepared to accept children's ideas. The other is providing a setting 
which suggests wonderful ideas to children—different ideas to dif¬ 
ferent children—as they get caught up in intellectual problems that 
q 
are real to them." 
The second aspect of her criteria is directly derived from a tho¬ 
rough and intimate familiarity with the Theory of Development and the 
Theory of Curriculum. This level of competence is relatively easily 
attained by the adult through training programs, such as this one on 
the development of number. The first criterion lies at the heart of 
what may distinguish an effective "ANISA" teacher or parent from an 
ineffective one, precisely for the reason that it allows a child to 
develop his own creative potentials for purposive activity and hence 
allows the child the all important feeling of "effectance." All of 
9Ibid., p, 224. 
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this leads to the formulation of the most fundamental objective; i.e., 
the task for the parent or teacher is not to teach Piagetian tasks 
from an instructive or didactic perspective, but is rather to provide 
a setting in which the child's interest, initiative and sense of 
curiosity and feeling of accomplishment are supported. 
Kamii and DeVries provide many examples of situations both in the 
everyday life situations of the child and others arranged by the 
teacher whereby this objective is met. For this reason, their work 
should be required reading for any ANISA trained program. 
Earlier in this work, research on the child's understanding of the 
words "more" and "less" was presented. Two points can be summarized 
from this research. First, relational terminology; i.e., the child's 
understanding of the words "more" and "less" as specific examples and 
in general the child's developing facility with language in general, 
are integrally linked to the child's developing logical capacities, 
not in a causal relationship but in a simultaneous and intertwined 
manner. Second, most young children do not understand and therefore 
do not use the words "more" and "less" in a correct manner until the 
age of four and five. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that an 
understanding of these words should be part of what a teacher is con¬ 
cerned with. Kamii and DeVries include an example using these words 
which supports the perspective of involving the child s interest and 
at the same time the words are used meaningfully. The device used is 
an elastic toy which is fastened to the edge of a table. The child is 
presented with the problem of finding something heavy enough to make 
287 
the elastic stretch to the floor and possibly even "break." The situa¬ 
tion is naturally enough an exciting situation for the child. In this 
situation, the teacher uses the words "heavy" and "light," "short" and 
long, and more" and "less." The level of involvement of the child 
is high for obvious reasons, whereas, other situations which could 
emphasize the correct use of the relational terms might not be. For 
example, "Does this set contain more candies than this one?" or "Which 
row has more?" These two questions are of the model used in most 
research, including Piaget's. Employed directly, these questions seem 
dull and uninteresting, but in the right circumstance, they are alive 
and interesting. Kamii and DeVries record many such ideas. 
Duckworth cites similar examples using, for example, biological 
phenomena which if presented in one way can be exciting, but if taught 
to the young child, loses all potential for involving the child’s 
interest. She states: "So the best one can do is to make such 
knowledge, such familiarity, seem interesting and accessible to the 
child. That is, one can familiarize children with a few phenomena in 
such a way as to catch their interest, to let them raise and answer 
their own questions, to let them realize that what they can do is 
significant—so that they have the interest, the ability, and the self- 
confidence to go on by themselves. 
The point being made need not be belabored any further. In sum¬ 
mary, however, it is clear that it is a consideration which initiates 
10 Ibid., p. 225. 
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from the very heart of ANISA's 
development. For this reason, 
conceptualization about the nature of 
it necessitates careful planning and. 
most importantly, an orientation and attitude toward teaching. 
orientation presented above becomes even more challenging 
when the learning studies work of Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet (1974) 
are considered. It has been reported earlier that their studies 
involved a careful and scientific manipulation of the structures of 
knowledge to induce learning with a consequent change in the organiza¬ 
tional structures. None of their studies assessed the level of 
interest of the children, yet dramatic operative development occurred, 
especially among those children who were in a transitional stage. 
The application of such scientifically-based training is not only con¬ 
cerned with ANISA theory but clearly characterizes ANISA's approach to 
child development. 
Jordan and Streets, in the opening paragraphs of an article 
cited earlier, 1 discuss the deleterious effects of poorly planned and 
executed programs and state: "Perpetuation of the tendency to imple¬ 
ment new programs without regard for careful thinking, long-range 
planning and painstaking evaluation is disturbing. Logically, such 
thinking and planning would draw upon the vast body of research find¬ 
ings concerning the development of children and provision would then 
be made to apply those findings systematically and to assess their 
practical utility. . . . Either we must find a way of translating 
^Jordan and Streets, "The ANISA Model: A New Basis for 
Educational Planning," 1973. 
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what we know into a powerful and comprehensive system of educational 
practice or face the continuation of insignificant results that 
inevitably comes from piecemeal, short-term and, therefore, necessarily 
superficial program planning. 
The incorporation of the carefully designed and implementive 
methods of Inhelder, et al. (1974) into an educational effort such as 
ANISA’s will require the careful and painstaking analysis referred 
to above. Educational experiences which are designed to evoke inferen¬ 
tial mechanisms in response to cognitive conflict are matters of suffi¬ 
cient complexity such that they can only be handled by a well-trained 
teacher. The potential of such careful and scientific manipulation to 
effect not only the rate of development but also to maximize the effec¬ 
tiveness of educational planning appears to be exactly what is intended 
by the commentary of Jordan and Streets. 
The Development of a Parent-Teacher Training Program 
This, the concluding section of this chapter, is devoted to the 
specifications for the units of the first part of the training program. 
First, a general outline of the units to be considered in this program 
will be discussed. Second, an example of a finished unit with objec¬ 
tives, materials, student booklet and a transcript of a narrative which 
is to be taped is presented. 
■^■^Ibid. , pp. 289-290. 
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Suggested Units for Development 
Part of the philosophy of this approach is to divide a topic of 
reasonable complexity, such as number development, for example, into 
a series of easily understood units. Therefore, each of these units 
should be deliberately kept short and have a limited number of major 
objectives. The first unit to be suggested is an overview of the most 
fundamental factors in the development of number. 
The Fundamental Properties of Number. This unit should emphasize 
the development of the relations of similarity and ordered difference 
as they relate to number. The unit is introduced as the fundamental 
number. Logic is suggested as that property of thinking which allows 
the child to synthesize similarity and ordered difference relations 
into number. 
The Conservation of Number. The role of conservation and its 
importance to the development of logical thinking should be considered 
the central theme of this unit. Early stages in the development of 
number thinking, for instance gross quantification, should be con¬ 
trasted with the use of the logical-mathematical arguments of identity, 
reversibility, and compensation. Conflict in the intuitive stage may 
provide the focus of the contrast suggested above. Two further addi¬ 
tions might be considered within this context, namely, the intuitive 
visual number sense and the importance of using small collections of 
objects in initial training sequences. Second, relational terminology 
can also be discussed in this context. The development of an accurate 
understanding of "more," "less" and "same," are examples of relational 
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words. 
Classification. This unit would explore the various forms of 
classifactory skills, such as simple sorting, hierarchical, classifi¬ 
cation and the class inclusion relation, within a developmental con¬ 
text. These should then be integrated with number in general and the 
cardinal property in specific. 
Seriation. This unit would explore in detail the various forms 
of ordered difference relations. Simple seriations, seriation with 
correspondence and other more complex forms of seriation would be 
explored within a developmental context. 
Diagnosis of Developmental Level or Level of Competence. This 
unit is most appropriate for teachers rather than parents. Prior to 
formal training, accurate diagnosis of the level of competence is not 
thought to be crucial. Accurate diagnosis may also require the use of 
specific and complex tests and is, therefore, beyond the level of con¬ 
cern for the layman. Accurate diagnosis followed by training of 
specific skills and the manipulation of structures after the model 
established by Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet (1974) requires a 
specialist such as a teacher. 
Prototypical Experiences 
Appendix B has been developed to provide a definition of each of 
the skills of structures important to the development of number and 
logical thinking. Each definition is followed by suggested materials 
which should be considered prototypical; i.e., materials used by the 
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teacher can be modeled after the suggested materials. Therefore, this 
list of materials should in no way function to limit what a teacher 
uses but should instead be suggestive of things in the real world of 
the child which can be used. 
The following unit is an example of what is intended as an adapta¬ 
tion of Postlethwaite’s program. It indicates a statement of objec¬ 
tives, materials, booklet and transcript. 
The Meaning of Yan: A Unit on the Fundamental 
Properties of Number 
Objectives 
Upon completion of this unit, the student should be able 
to: 
(1) Describe what a quality is. 
(2) Describe how qualities are structured into rela¬ 
tions based on similarity. 
(3) Describe what a difference is. 
(4) Describe how differences are structured into 
relations of ordered difference. 
(5) Relate the similarity relation and ordered dif¬ 
ference relation to number. 
Materials 
Box A: Contains a set of attribute plastic shapes of red, blue 
and yellow, small and large, circles, squares and triangles. 
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Box B: Contains a set of cubical solids, rectangular solids and 
triangular solids which should be stacked into a tower. However, the 
difference in dimensions should not be regular. 
Box C: Contains a set of ten rods of the same design as 
Cuisenaire rods. The difference in this case has the property of being 
a unit difference. 
Booklet, for the students' use. 
Page 1 should contain a list of the objectives. 






II. Box A groups. 
Page 3. Explain the meaning of yan in terms of 
similarity and ordered difference rela¬ 
tions . 
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Music. Hello. This is a unit on the meaning of yan. What'9 
a yan, you ask? In the booklet you have been provided with you will 
find the word yan" at the top of a list of words. I'll give you a 
little problem to see if you can figure out what a yan is. You will 
need your pencil or pen and should use the space in the booklet to 
down the problem. Ready! If a yan plus a tyan equal a 
tethera — Music — and three tyans equals a sethra — Music — and 
two tethras also equal a sethra, what does a tethra minus a tyan 
equal? Music Have you got it? If not, I shall give you a hint: 
A tethra plus a yan equals a sethra. What then is a yan? Did you get 
it? If you did, you know that six yans also equals a sethra. Believe 
it or not, the concept of yan is basic to a child's understanding of 
number. Most children do not attain an understanding of the concept 
of yan until they are five or six years old. There are several reasons 
for this, the first of which we will explore by using the box labelled 
"A". In the box, you will find a number of objects and one string 
loop. Take these out and set them on the table before you. Take the 
loop and lay it out. Now see how many different ways you can group 
or sort the plastic objects in the loop. Stop the tape and write as 
many of the ways that you can think of in the space under the Roman 
numeral II. — Music — How many ways did you find? It so happens 
that there are nearly fifty ways to group these objects. If you did 
not devise nearly that number, stop the tape and try again. There 
are, as you have discovered, many ways to group these objects, all of 
which depended upon the recognition and use of the qualities of the 
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objects, such as color or shape or size of the objects. You could have 
used any one of the qualities alone to define your group, or you could 
have used two together, such as color and shape. All three could have 
been used also, such as large red triangles or large blue straight- 
edged objects. Our world is filled with such qualities, the grouping 
of which depends upon establishing a relationship of similarity. 
Similarity relations as it turns out have a great deal to do with the 
child’s understanding of number. As you might expect, it takes the 
child a long time to develop to the point where he or she can do what 
you have just done. This difference between the way in which you 
approached the problem and the way in which a child might do it is that 
you have the rules of logic to use where the child does not. Logical 
thinking slowly develops in the child and part of it happens through 
the child's use of the similarity relation. Now you ask what the 
similarity relation has to do with number. To answer this, I shall 
ask you a question. When can apples equal elephants? Never, but a 
given number of apples, say three, can equal the same number of 
elephants. A group of three apples and a group of three elephants 
have the same number property, but this property of three is not 
apparent to the very young child. A group of three apples equals a 
group of three elephants when the child is able to understand a property 
of the groups which is not present when qualities are considered alone, 
for elephants and apples have little in common. Number then necessi¬ 
tates the use of the similarity relation in a logical way. 
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In order to illustrate a second property of number, I would like 
you to take the box labelled "B" and build a tower. Stop the tape and 
do this. What does your tower look like? Chances are you put the 
largest object on the bottom and built from there to the smallest on 
the top. You recognized immediately that there was a difference in 
the size of the objects. Further, you arranged those differences from 
largest to smallest. In the box labelled "C", you will find a series 
of ten rods which can be arranged again from largest to smallest or 
smallest to largest. — Music — This group is different from the 
one you used to build the tower in that the difference between each 
is the same, that is, the differences equal one another. This then is 
the second important characteristic of number. Essentially, it is not 
a relationship of similarity but it is a relationship of difference. 
The ability to order the differences is again something that you are 
able to do easily as an adult possessed of logical thinking. However, 
for the child this ability is slowly built, as it first depends upon 
noticing the differences and, most importantly, being able to put those 
differences into an ordered relationship. 
Now we can return to the first question, "What is the meaning of 
the word yan?" Stop the tape and see if you can write a statement 
explaining the meaning of yan using the concepts of similarity and 
ordered difference, which we have just explored; that is, how can you 
use these relationships to figure out what you mean? — Music — 
Yan is, of course, equal to the basic unit or to the concept 
one. One plus two (a yan plus tyan) equals three or tethra. Three 
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twos equal six or sethra as would two threes equal six. Therefore, 
tethra, or three, minus two, or tyan, equals a yan. The problem 
clearly required a relationship of ordered difference between these 
words equal to the unit one which never changes. Also, as we see, 
there are several different ways to arrive at six. You can add six 
ones or three twos or two threes. All of these groups depend upon 
the group or six elements being similar to another group of six ele¬ 
ments. These relationships are technically described as the cardinal 
property of number which depends on the similarity relation and the 
ordinal property which depends upon the ordered difference property 
of number. 
In closing, it is important to emphasize again that these proper¬ 
ties of number for the child are slowly built up from first being able 
to notice similarity and differences among objects, then to place 
similarity and difference into more complex relationships and finally 
possess both of these characteristics. The words "yan," "tethra" and 
so forth are actually a system of numbers found in Yorkshire, England 
and are Celtic in origin. 
After the Unit 
Upon completion of this aspect of the program, the adult must 
now be guided in a situation which will require generalization of these 
concepts of similarity and ordered difference. This generalization is 
with respect to the real world of the child, where aspects of everyday 
experience are placed within the conceptual framework. The adult would 
then be able to interact with the child in a manner that would 
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FURTH'S KNOWING CIRCLE 
The following diagram (the knowing circle) is directly taken from 
Furth’s work titled Piaget and Knowledge. It is an attempt by Furth to 
specify in a schematic way the relationship of the various functional 























The solid lines schematize 
sensori-motor knowing. At 
that stage, the circle is 
only closed when it is part 
of an external motor reac¬ 
tion. The sensori-motor 
scheme. 
Operational thinking (repre¬ 
sented by the broken line) 
is characterized by a grow¬ 
ing dissociation between 
the knowing act and its 
particular external mani¬ 
festation. By means of 
functional internalization 
the knowing circle is closed 
without external action. 
(1) The circle assimilates or incorporates the real event into the 
structure and at the same time accommodates the structure to the 
particular features of the real event. 
(2) Only through the closing of the circle is the real event turned 
into an object of knowing, i.e. , an event that is known, and 
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the structure into an active knowing structure. 
(3) The growth and development of the internal structure is pri¬ 
marily due to the coordinating abstraction which feeds back 
from the knowing activity itself to the enrichment of the 
structure. 
(A) The internal structure is not something that at any time was 
external and gradually became internalized, rather, it is 
developmentally and phylogenetically related to the living 
organization itself which at no level can be considered as 
being outside the organism. 
(5) Functional interiorization is thus the specific condition of 
a knowing in which external motor reaction is no longer an 
essential prerequisite, although it may well remain accompany¬ 
ing the phenomena. 
(6) In the case of a sensori-motor scheme, there issues an external 
act, in the case of an operational scheme, an internal knowing. 
(7) Piaget refers to internal knowing by different terms: 
a) Operations — When emphasizing their being part of a 
structure; 
b) Judgment — When he considers assimilatory activity 
that assigns an event as belong to a 
structure; 
c) Concept — When he focuses on the operational 
scheme as the common source of 
assimilations. 
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For Piaget's theory at all developmental levels, knowledge is 
basically linked to the biological internal organization. Knowledge 
does not merely derive from the taking in of external data; the 
organism is interacting with the environment, transforms or constructs 
external reality into an object of knowledge. 
Hans Furth, Piaget and Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 






Each prototypical experience is designed to provide a setting in 
which the child encounters an environment with specific limitations 
designed to strengthen a specific cognitive operation. Many of the 
arranged environments, i.e., learning situations, can be used in a 
variety of ways to strengthen various cognitive abilities, simply by 
altering the manner in which the interaction takes place. In addition, 
it must be recognized that cognitive structures occur developmentally, 
that is, some are designed for the child who as yet has not become 
competent in that operation. It must also be borne in mind that the 
theoretical developmental sequence presented on number suggest that 
experience must proceed simultaneously in the operation's prerequisite 
to number, mainly classification and seriation. 
Most of the experiences suggested here are direct applications of 
tests Piaget used to explore epistomic questions. They can be adapted 
to be used either as diagnostic tools to explore the state of the 
child's development or they can be applied as educational experiences. 
In general, the educational sequencing of experiences should 
follow the sequence of the successive planes of the structuration of 
knowledge. First comes discrimination of perceptual attributes, then 
their coordination in conservation, classification and seriation 
problems which are then extended into numeration problems involving 
cardination, ordination, addition and multiplication of relations. 
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Set No. I: Discrimination, Differentiation 
(Qualitative Analysis) 
Discrimination, differentiation of perceptual attributes 
such as: length, height, width, squareness, roundness, 
color, shape, smallest, largest, etc. Part of these 
exercises is involved with labelling, as in knowing or 
attaching a word to a color or shape. This is a very 
basic form of qualitative analysis. A simple form of 
quantitative analysis can be introduced also in a global 
recognition and comparison of relative size, as in the 
largest or smallest circle. 
A. Each of the perceptual dimensions, such as color, 
shape, size, should be explored. 
(1) From a set of red, yellow and blue circles, 
squares and triangles of various sizes, 
the child is asked to pick out a single 
dimension 
a) Circle, square or triangle. 
b) A red, yellow or blue object. 
c) A large or small object. 
(2) Coordination of two dimensions 
a) A red circle or yellow triangle. 
b) A large red object. 
(3) Coordination of three dimensions 
a) A small red circle or large blue square. 
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B. Another aspect of the use of crlterial attributes is 
in the recognition and use of different critical 
attributes of the same object or objects. This might 
be titled "changing criterial attributes." 
(1) Using the red, yellow and blue squares, circles 
and triangles, the child can be asked to spon¬ 
taneously classify the set of all objects by 
being asked to divide them into two piles. 
After a division has taken place have a dis¬ 
cussion of the criteria used. Then ask the 
child to divide the entire set in another way, 
asking then "How did you separate them this 
time?" 
Set No. II: Class Inclusion 
(Simple Qualitative Analysis) 
Differentiated or discriminated criterial attributes can be 
explored from a perspective of their sameness; i.e., among a field or 
set of objects similarities can be used to form elementary sets. The 
previous prototypical set which emphasized differentiation can be 
modified to emphasize a discussion of sameness, or evaluation of simi¬ 
larity across many objects. Shapes, both solid and figural, as in 
closed, open, curved line and straight lined, could be used. Material 
forming solid shapes could be the circles, squares and triangles men¬ 
tioned before. Buttons of various shapes, sizes, and colors also are 
of this form. Figures can also be drawn on separate pieces of paper as 
S , ^ A I 
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The child is asked with materials of this type to separate or 
divide them into two or three groups. Generally, it is important for 
the young child to have the materials in a form that can be manipu¬ 
lated physically instead of conceptually as would be the case if they 
were drawn on a board or piece of paper. It is also important that 
the materials be able to be separated in a number of different ways. 
For instance, the geometric figures could be divided into two sets, 
one containing curved lines and the other straight lines. The same 
materials could be divided into two sets of open and closed figures. 
Set No. Ill: Seriation 
(Simple Quantitative Analysis) 
Seriation conceptually deals with ordered difference. Simple 
seriation is the ordering of materials along one dimension of dif¬ 
ference, such as: length, height, or color. Materials, therefore, 
can simply be, for example, a set of six sticks each differing in 
length from shortest to longest jj | I I I Ij • ManV other examples 
which may conceptually be more complicated can be drawn from an order 
of events perspective. These might be in the form of picture cards of 
a glass being filled with liquid —| Ld fel • An? event 
which can be simply illustrated and that takes place in a logical 
sequence can be used as material. 
The child In each of these examples Is asked to place the objects 
or pictures In order. The reasons for the order can then be discussed 
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Set No. IV: Conservation 
(Quantitative Analysis) 
Conservation conceptually deals with the ability to preserve the 
invariance of a characteristic despite a transformation of some sort. 
Most transformations used by Piaget are simple perceptual or position 
changes of the materials involved. 
A. Continuous quantity 
Liquid is a good example of a continuous 
quantity that is easily transformed in shape. 
Piaget used either a drink that was familiar to 
the child, such as orangeade or lemonade, or he 
used colored water as the basic material. Glasses 
or beakers of various sizes are also needed. 
(1) A friend has orangeade, the child has 
lemonade. Each glass is filled to exactly 
the same height. 
(2) The child is asked "who has more?" The 
child is able to adjust the amounts by add¬ 
ing more to either glass until he agrees 
that they are the same. 
(3) The friend's is then taken and poured into 
a taller and thinner glass. "Now who has 
more?" 
(4) The friend's is then poured back into the 
original glass. "Who has more now?" 
(5) The friend's may then be divided among 
several smaller glasses. "Who has more 
now?" These are then returned to the 
original glass. 
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B. Discontinuous Quantity 
Materials for this type of conservation exer¬ 
cise might be a set of any of a variety of separate 
objects, such as beans or seeds, or beads. 
(1) Both teacher and child have a pile of beans. 
As the teacher takes one bean, the child is 
instructed also to take one out of the pile 
and place it into a glass. The teacher 
might have a short, wide glass and the child 
a tall, thin glass. The child is asked each 
time, "Are they the same?" After placing 
ten beans one by one into their glasses, the 
child is asked, "Who has more?" The Stage I 
child will eventually concede that he has 
more, indicating a conflict between percep¬ 
tion and one-one correspondence. 
(2) Another variation with these materials is to 
pour them into various containers, asking 
each time if they are the same. The ques¬ 
tion of their sameness might be also 
approached by asking the child if we made a 
necklace with the beads, "Whose would be the 
longest?" 
C. Conservation of Number 
Conservation of number tests typically involve 
the comparison of two sets of objects. The teacher 
would lay out in a row, for example, six counters. 
The child is then asked to select from a pile of 
counters exactly the same number of counters, no 
more, no less. The teacher, if necessary, arranges 
both sets so that there is a perceptual correspon- 
dence. The question is asked again, "Do we each 
have the same number?" Then one of the rows is 
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shortened or lengthened, and the child is asked 
again if they both have the same number. 
Set No. V: Class Inclusion and 
Quantitative Analysis 
This basic exercise is intended to develop quantitative judgment 
of more or less through the construction of sets. The materials are 
basically a number of round and square pieces roughly the same size. 
There are two colors, three squares and three round pieces of the 
same color (white) and two squares and two round of another color 
(red) . 
The child is asked to identify the various dimensions present 
such as roundness or squareness or the two colors that are present. 
Then the child is asked to place all of the white ones in a pile. The 
remaining pile consists of round and square shapes of the same color. 
Questions after this might be "Are there more red ones than white 
ones?" or "Are there more red ones than round ones?" or "Are there 
more white ones than square ones? 
Set No. VI: Conservation and 
One-One Correspondence 
One-to-one correspondence is the first stage of establishing what 
is later conserved as a lasting equivalence between objects or sets of 
Quantitative correspondence is established between two 
objects. 
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conceptually connected objects, such as a flower and Its vase or an 
egg and an egg cup or in the form of a penny exchanged for an object 
"purchased" as a piece of candy. 
A. Provoked Correspondence 
Flowers and vases or eggs and egg cups. 
The child is asked, "What do we put in vases?" 
"Flowers" is the response. Instructions can 
then be given that we will have one flower in 
each of seven vases. A pile of flowers is then 
presented. The child is then told to pick a 
flower out of the pile and place one near each 
vase. "Do we have the same number?" The child’s 
answer can be confirmed by placing each flower 
in its vase. The flowers can then be taken out 
and bunched together in front of the vases. "Now 
do we still have the same number of both?" 
A similar sequence could be followed for 
eggs and egg cups or through the exchange of 
one penny for each object purchased. The 
Stage I child will no longer see the two sets as 
equivalent after a transformation takes place. 
B. Spontaneous Correspondence and the Cardinal Value of Sets 
In this type of encounter, the child has to 
find the correspondence between a model and a set 
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he is to construct. Here the objects need not be 
of a homogeneous nature such as all buttons, or pen¬ 
nies, but may be a set of irregular objects. The 
child is simply asked to construct an equivalent 
set by any method of his own demise. The models 
should be of differing perceptual or configural 
arrangements, i.e., 
• ® o 0*0 o o 
000000% o a % 0 1 o*o • 7 O 00 • 
After an equivalent set has been constructed 
according to the child, the constructed set can 
be rearranged and their equivalence questioned. 
Equivalence in this example can be of a 
numerical nature if correspondence is established 
on the basis of equal number in each set. Explored 
here is, therefore, the cardinal value of a set. 
A Stage I child may use number to begin with but 
after rearrangement will not be able to preserve 
equivalence because of the overwhelming perceptual 
transformation that has taken place. 
Set No. VII: Serial and 
Ordinal Correspondence 
Ordinal correspondence fundamentally depends upon position in the 
order. This order can either be one of actual position or it can be 
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completely conceptual. To illustrate the example of Piaget's dolls 
and sticks model is discussed. 
Materials for this consist of a set of dolls of increasing height 
and a set of walking sticks of various heights. Each set can be seri¬ 
ated by the child. The child is after the construction of the serial 
order of the dolls asked to choose a walking stick for each doll. 
Research has indicated that it is conceptually no more difficult to 
arrange in order each set separately and then match the sets by bring¬ 
ing them together (double seriation) than to construct one seriation 
and find the corresponding element from the second set (simple seria¬ 
tion with correspondence). One of the major factors contributing to 
this is found in the fact that the correspondence is determined by 
physical position in the order. Much more difficult is finding the 
correspondence between doll and stick without having previously 
arranged or order the set. Only the third stage child is capable of 
this. Ordination at this stage is truly numerical in character. 
Set No. VIII: Ordination and Cardination 
Experiences of this type are intended for either the Stage II or 
III child as they involve what must be numerical reasoning. Generally, 
the child is required to evaluate from a perspective of simultaneously 
considering the cardinal value of a set and position within the set or 
ordinal values. Success in working at this level indicates that the 
unit is understood, or is close to being understood. 
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A. Cards and Ordination-Cardination 
Materials for this experience are con¬ 
structed equivalent to unit lengths; i.e., the 
first card A - 1 unit of height, card B « 2 
units of height, card C ■ 3 units of height, 
etc. If A ■> 1 and C ■ 3, then C - 3A or 
C ■ A + A + A. The child is asked to construct 
the series or a staircase A-F. The child is 
then asked how many cards like A could we make 
with B or C or F. Cards can then be picked at 
random to further test this form of cardination. 
In this series, the ordinal position also cor¬ 
responds to its cardinal value; i.e., the 
fourth card D*=A + A + A + A. This can be 
utilized if we ask the child how many steps has 
the doll climbed if it is on step F. Finally, 
the staircase can be destroyed; i.e., the visual 
seriation is destroyed and the same cardinal and 
ordinal questions can be asked. Only the third 
stage child can answer these questions. 
B. Insertion of Extra Sticks in an Already Existent or 
Just Constructed Series by the Child 
The materials are one set of sticks (A, B, C, 
D, E, F) and a second set (a, b, c, d, e, f) such 
that "a" is a length longer than "A" but shorter 
than "B". First the series (A, B, C, D, E, F) is 
constructed. Then the child is asked to insert 
the remaining stairs such that we have 
(AaBbCcDdEeFf). The doll can then be introduced 
and questions asked concerning how many stairs 
have been climbed. 
Mats and Hurdles 
This 1h a slightly more complex example 
because it involves a lag between the cardinal 
and ordinal values. Basically, we have a set of 
hurdles from shortest to tallest and a set of 
nine mats to place between the hurdles. The 
teacher might begin by placing two mats around 
the first hurdle and ask the child to place the 
remaining in the set. The lag comes because after 
the doll has Jumped two hurdles, three mats have 
been touched. Questioning then proceeds utiliz¬ 
ing this asking how many hurdles have been Jumped 
and mats touched if the doll is here, for example. 
The relationship may be explored also by removing 
the mats and some of the hurdles and asking, "How 
many mats are needed for the remaining hurdles?" 
Lastly, the arrangement can be destroyed and the 
same questions asked. 
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Set No. IX: Additive and Multiplicative Composition 
Compositions of a complex type require manipulation of several 
relationships simultaneously. Classes in a hierarchical relationship 
provide an interesting example. We define a whole as the wider class 
with various sub-classes as parts. Manipulation of the part-whole, 
whole-part relationship requires the presence of conservation, class 
inclusion rules and an understanding of ordered differences of seria- 
tion. For instance, the sub-classes of A = basset hounds and A' = 
all other dogs add to make the class B of all dogs. This type of 
relationship specifies and A + A + A ^ 3A rather A + A + A = A. It 
states and A + A’ = B, or B - A' = A. Numerically, this is related 
to the whole being defined, for example as 7 and A + A' add to equal 
the whole such that 1+6, 2+5, 3+4 all equal 7. 
Continuing with the dog example, we can further make the relation¬ 
ships more complex by adding wider classes. For example, B = all 
dogs and B^ equals all other mammals such that B + B1 = C where C = 
all mammals; C^ = all other vertebrates such that C + C^ = D, where 
D = all vertebrates. Finally, we have A + A^ + B + B^ + C + C^ = D. 
Composition of relations as was mentioned in the elaborate descrip¬ 
tion is dependent upon two systems of quantification. The first is the 
logical transitivity of relations. Herein is the ability to understand 
part-whole relations such that from the example being discussed, 
class C contains sub-classes B and B1 and B contains sub-classes A and 
A"*-, therefore, A< C; i.e., sub-class A is a part of the larger class C. 
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Secondly, composition of relations depends upon the ability to parti¬ 
tion the whole into equal units, the concept of proportions. 
Addition and multiplication of relations are hierarchical stages 
of composition or quantification. The former is the ability to compose 
relationships along one dimension. This is related to what Piaget 
identifies as intensive quantification. Multiplication of relations 
is the ability to compose relationships on more than one dimension 
simultaneously. This is related to extensive quantification, as in the 
idea of true proportions where what is lost in the dimension of height 
is gained in the dimension of width in a volume problem. 
A. Additive Composition of Classes 
Generally, materials for this in a simple 
example would consist of a set of objects B 
definable in purely qualitative terms. A and A^ 
are subsets of set B also definable in purely quali¬ 
tative terms. For example, B is a set of wooden 
beads most of which are brown (subset A) and two of 
them are white (subset A^). The problem for the 
child is to discover if there are more elements In 
B than in A. Specifically, the question would be, 
"Are there more wooden beads than brown beads?" 
B. Additive Composition Involving Numbers 
Two sets of sweets, both totalling eight 
(A + A) and (7+1), are used in a setting where 
the child is told he will get four sweets today 
and four tomorrow or he will get seven ones the 
first day and one on the second. The question is 
basically, "Will there be the same to eat in the 
two days?" 
Multiplication of Relations 
One example used by Piaget is where the child 
is given three differently shaped containers, all 
filled with an equal quantity of liquid, and 
several empty vessels. Perceptually, it looks as 
though there is more liquid in the taller and thin¬ 
ner container. The child is asked simply whether 
the quantities are the same, greater than or less 
than one particular container of the set. Then the 
child is asked what can be done to be sure that 
there is more in one of them. 


